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UNITED STATES

Cert. to the C 9
(Goodwin) (en anc) ~~ ~
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v.
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BRIGNONI-PONCE
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Summary:

.a~

Prior to the dec'

o AI
r ""'

..:.?. .

--z::r:---

~~~.Q.;, c~

~4- jJ-~.r_)

in Almedia-Sanchez, Border Patrol

agents observed traffic from

he site of a fixed checkpoint 65 miles

north of the Mexican borde •

The checkpoint was closed because of

inclement weather.

observed a car with occupants of Mexican

--

descent pass by, they f llowed a nd stopped it and, when questjoning

w--

revealed that the passen

-

arrested the occupants.

•

were aliens illegally in the U.S., they

n,__._ c~- 1-v.-ee

A._ c-vu-),_,J&f_ l!y

1

~ uf~<-~ rl:;;;.~/..4-.-77 -'i?z.-d

-2-

Resp, the driver of the car, was convicted of transportjng
illegal aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1324(a) (2) and sentenced
to 4 years imprisonment in a trial occurring before Almeida-Sanc hez
with his motion to suppress having been denied by the USDC.

On

appeal, after the decision in Almeida, the 9th Circuit en bane
'---

--------------- ----------------- -- -

-

sho~ld

reversed the conviction holding that the motion to suppress

-- --

be granted based

on ~

Court's decision in Almeida since the

decisjon applied retroactively to roving

patr~ls

as in the present

case and since Almeida applies to Border Patrol stops of autos
even though not accompanied by a search so that "founded suspicjon"
was required for the stop despite the language of 8
(1).

u.s.c.

1357(a)

The SG now seeks cert to review the 9th Circuit's holding

arguing that Almeida is limited to border searches pursuant to
8

u.s.c.

1357(a) (3) and does not apply to require a "founded

suspicion" in order to stop an auto to interrogate suspected

. the U.S. 11
aliens as to legality of their presence 1n
Facts and Contentions:

Petr's sole argument is that Almeida

is limited to auto searches pursuant to 1357 (a) (3) and does not
apply to auto stops pursuant to 1357 (a) (1).

~

Section 1357 (a) (1)

. ! .!(The SG recognizes that the immediate c~se presents the same q~e~ti on
as to the retroactivity of Almeida that 1s presented in his pet1t1on
in United States v. Peltier, No. 73-2000. However, because of the
u ency of resolution of the "stop/search'r questj on 12.r esented in _:She
immediate case, he specifically notes that he does not- pr esent or
ur~onretroact ivity q~tion in the immedJate case.---[ p;t. 89, - ~~~------------------~~--------------------------------

,,

~

...,.·

'

-3generally provides that an authorized Bbrder Service officer has
the power without wa r rant " .•• to interrogate any alien or person
-~----------

-------

-------- -- - --

believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to remain in the
United States."

Unlike §1357 (a) (3) construed in Almeida, it does
'

no_t

specifically al2E._ly . _ to searches and it contains no limit to

~

reasonable distance from the border.
---~---

The SG points out that the decision in the instant case is
in direct conflict with the lOth Circuit's decision in United
States v. Bowman, 487 F. 2d 1229 limiting Almeida to §1357 (a) (3)
searches and holding it inapplicable to §l357(a) (1) stops.
r ),-·

He

states that many cases are pending in which this point of law
will

~e

crucial and that the uncertainty resulting from the

split as to standards governing such stops has seriously undermined the Border Service's effectiveness.
On the merits, he points out that Justice Powell's concurring
opinion in Almeida recognized that "under appropriate limiting
circumstances there may exist a constitutionally adequate equ3valent
\

of probable cause ••• " to conduct vehicle searches.

413 U.S. at 279.

While he concedes that the stop in the instant case is a seizure

----

under
...__ the Fourth Amendment, he argues that the intrusjon involved

--

--

in a stop to determine legality of presence is sufficiently de
minimis not to require prior judicial supervision and that the
:.:;v

-- - -

--

presence of suspected aliens in the g e neral area of the Mexi.ca.n

--

--

border is a sufficient circumstance to justify the stop.

.'

Cf.

I

r

-4Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22.

He points out that 12,000

aliens were apprehended at the fixed checkpoint in question in this

-

~-

case during 1973.
The 9th Circuit specifically rejected the result in Bowman and
held that Almeida applies to such stops focusing on language in the
decision referring to both stops and searches.
268, 272,

274.

See 413 U.S. at

It reasoned that the government under its argument

---- -------------------------------------

would be free to conduct stops anywhere in the country [since

-------------------------------

-------- -- - -

---

§l357(a) (1) contains no distance limit] without real limit on their
power to do so.
. \.._.

It reasoned that the correct standard for such

stops by border patrol agents is the same as that for police stops
generally -- reasonable or founded suspicion

and that the

---

presence of persons of Mexican descent 65 miles from the Mexican
~

-.......

~--

border does not meet this standard.
--...__

~

....-...._ .

-

217, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

---------

Cf. Au Yi Lau v. INS, 445 F. 2d

Resp, who has filed a motion to proceed

IFP, argues generally as per the CA, noting that a contrary decision
would make all Mexican Americans subject to such searches, and

'---

----------------------

concluding that the case is not certworthy because Bowman was so
obviously wrong whereas the 9th Circuit here was so obviously
correct.
Discussion:

There is a direct and irreconcilable conflict

between this case and Bowman.

1
r

deportab~e J

"---

The point is of substantial

importance both in the daily operation of the Border Service and

-5in a substantial number of lower court ca·s es where the question
is controlling.

The case thus appears certworthy.

On the

merits, the decision below is supported by the language and
logic of Almeida and a narrow

reading of the holding

there is

"-

required to reach the Bowman result.
There is a response.
O'Neill

9/17/74
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UNITED STATES

Cert. to the CA 9
(Goodwin) (en bane)

Timely

v.
BRIGNONI-PONCE

Summary:

Federal/Criminal

This memo supplements the pool memo in the case.

--

It

is not clear from the papers in this case precjsely what evidence
was sought to be excluded in the motion to suppress.

The jmplicatjon

from the petition is that it is statements of the passengers at the
time of the stop although it may also include statements of resp
himself at the time of the stop.

[Pet. at 4].

The CA opinion

-2-

indicates the statements of both the resp and the passengers.
[Pet. at 6a].
The facts thus may raise the question presented on somewhat
similar facts in United States v. Guana-~anchez, No. 73-820 in
which cert has been granted.

Assuming arguendo that the stop was

a violation of Fourth Amendment rights, did the responde n t driver
have standing to move to suppress the statements of the passengers?
Although the 9th Circuit did cite in its opinion the 7th Circujt
decision in Guana-Sanchez [Pet. 6a], there is no indication in
that opinion nor in any of the papers in the case that the government ever rais e d below or intends to raise here the standing
question with regard to the respondent's motion to suppress the
statements of the passengers.
It can be argued that the absence of standing to assert
third party rights
standing)

(if the Court in Guana-Sanchez finds no

is jurisdictionally fatal to the respondent's motion

to suppress and hence can be raised sua sponte by the Court.
See FCC v. N.B.C., 319 U.S. 239,
Co., 351

u.s.

192, 197.

246;

u.s.

v. Storer Broadcasting

If third party standing is not a

jurisdictional defect, then the failure of the government to
raise the question here or below would preclude review under this
Court's Rules 23 (1) (c) and 40 (1) (d) (2).

Although this Court has

never specifically passed on whether the absence of standing to

-3raise a third party's Fourth Amendment rights in an attack on a
conviction is a jurisdictional defect, it appears that it ought
not to be so treated inasmuch as there is a constitutional
"case or controversy" and the lack of standing to assert one
particular constitutional argument in an attack on a criminal
conviction does not affect jurisdiction over the appeal.

-

is no controlling law on the question.
9/19/74
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O'Neill

There
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Almeida-Sanchez Cases:

Summary and Recommendations

Foerster v. Unitedl States - r~·~cu:.t ~ <Mt Iv-..--lvvi:to:iiz. 5 ·
Pre-A-S.
73-1896 Hendrix v. United States _ f-t\.:.ul ~~ ~ Sbci..c..~ g(o.
Pre- A-S.
73-2000 United States v. Peltier _ Rov;"'j p~~l (12~.)-y.-;,--c:)-~~ 9)
73-1856

Juf1.,._J,.,r

r,j£)-13-2050
~-~-~J~~ 3-6848

United Stales v. Ortiz - F.')(.4_cJ.. ~
Po.s.+A2
Bowen v. United States f:":utt. ~~t

73-6851

ax

74-114

United States v. Brignoni-Ponce

h'\

Rodriguez-Hernandez v.=United States -

Pf'e -4.:.:$'.

<9-v\

:C.~o.L.. 5 ·

1-h.u::i

{I

g(;,,

~-'~"e..-~·

Pu-tl~· =Ict~o.J

4o

~-=l>~C!-'2.

~ /?4~ - ,d-~tU-~

[Miller v. United States, ~No. 73-697~ has not yet been circulated and
is not on t e Oct.
conference list. The clerk tells me that :BhBn11••••
it is not scheduled for listing before Oct. 25, but he could circulate
it sooner if the Justices want it.]
Retroactivity of Almeida-Sanchez in Roving Patrol Cases: Peltier
and Miller are identical in all material respects except the CA results.
Both cases were pending on appeal when A-S was decided.

Either case

would serve the purpose of settling the issue, but Peltier has a
slight edge since it has already been listed.

2

Fixed Checkpoint Issues:
Ortiz.

The choice is between Bowen and

Bowen has the advantage of presenting both fixed-checkpoint

issues in a single case:

applicability and retroactivity.

Unfortunately

the SG aecided • not to cross-petition in Bowen, and the issue of
A-S applicability to fixed-checkpoint cases will wash out if the
Court decides in Peltier/Miller that A-S is not retroactive for
roving patrol cases.

Ortiz squarely presents the issue on

applicability (on the SG's petition) but if the Court applies A-S
retroactively in Peltier/Miller, it would still be necessary to
Jizai iani<la take Bowen to resolve the conflict between CA9 and CAlO

.
.
.
on retroact1ve
app 1.1cat1on
.;~. f.1xe d -c h ec k po1nt
search es.

Accordingly,

I would reconnnend •&Lg taking both Bowen and Ortiz and consolidating
l 4.o "--f ~k ~ WLiY"cl -re..~oa_.t: . .:.f... ,·~s-14 1~ Qr.:b';. ~~
them for argument. [ ~pte..iat ~si~~. f+ woc.d~c..lo~a-~·1
Holds:

Foerster and Hendrix will be squarely governed by the

disposition in iiwnnl Bowen and/or Ortiz; both are fixed checkpoint
searches that occurred before the date of A.-S.
Rodriguez-H~rnandez

Bowen/Ortiz.

n

1

•

I

3

i

will be governed either by Peltier/Miller or by

CAS did not decide in that case whether the search

was a roving patrol or a fixed checkpoint, and the facts are apparently
ambiguous.

Thus it might :l&&na require a factual remand i f - .

A-S is held retroactive to '

1
•

L

roving patrols but either inapplicable

or nonretroactive to fixed checkpoints.
I would also reconnnend -.&holding Brignoni-Ponce.
Guana-Sanchez or PeltiertMiller

e

Either

could dispose of the case.

(That is,

~~

iT Guana-Sanchez holds that a driver cannot suppress testimony of his

"

passengers, iihann&IIR111Bt1iRvxvxwwtiubsuvvumnzrrmc or if PeltiertMiller
results in a holding that A-S

is nonretroactive, the Court would have

no occasion to reach the issue the SG is so concerned about.)

CA

q

November 15, 1974 Conference
List 3, Sheet 2
Motion of Re sp for
Appointment of Counsel
UNITED STATES

v.
BRIGNONI-PONCE
On October 18, the Court

ranted cert to CA 9 in this case to review a question

IFP.

sent him in this Court.

Federal Defenders is a community defender organization and

was appointed to represent resp in the USDC and CA.

The organization is not funded

by grant, but relies exclusively on pay1nents under the Criminal Justice Act.

Mr. John J. Cleary, Executive Director of the organization and a mernber of
the Bar of this Court, would present oral argument on behalf of resp.
DISCUSSION:

While the motion is framed in terms of seeking appointment for

the organization as counsel to represent resp, the practice in this Court in similar
cases has been to appoint Mr. Cleary.
There is no response.

11/14/74
PJN

Ginty
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FILE HE?·fO

This file memo, dictated primarily to focus certain
facts and issues more clearly in my mind, is rough snd
incomplete.

n1ere are helpful cert memos in each case, and

also the bench memo prepared by David.
The four border search cases are as follows:
No. 73-2000

tmited Stnten v. Peltier - roving patrol

stopped arid sear.ched 70 miles from border.
conviction in DC occurred before

~md

The search

Aln;eida.-S:-nc~.

Sole

question is retroactivity.
No. 74-lll Unitcc St,"'ten v.

Brif'oni-Ponc~

-

·nig!:1tim~

stop 58 mile9 north of the border, for purpose of questioning.
This stop occurred

but the SG in this

pre-~cJ..di-t-Snnchez,

argues only the substantive question ns to the "stop".
~~c~

No. 73-6843

v. tm.1J:ed States - stop and search

at fi:l!:ed checkpoint 49 miles north of border.

This ia the

"key" Ct\9 decision, holdil1g 7 to 6 that Almcida-Sen.chez is
applicable to fixed-checkpoint soarches.

vote, hl.!£!.:;}-4a t·ms

h~ld

to create s

ne~-1

But by 7 to 5

constitutional

tul~

as to fixed checkpoi.nts, and therefore not retroactive tc
aearches prior to Juru 21, 1973 .
No. 73-2050

and search at

.

11

United f?_!:_etet} v •. Ortir: - a post A/S stop
fixed chcclcpo1..nt (3 alie.ns ttzcre found) •

2.

66 milea n orth of the border.

This is the "corner!!tone"

checkpoint operating continuously.

This case also presents

a potential issue of retroactivity:

whether the decision

should apply to invalidate searches conducted prior to the
9th Circuit's e n bane decision in Bo'\·7en.

Fncts

Section 287 (a)

Co~non

[.t_.~.,

by the government in all

to All Cases
8 U.S. C. 1357 ('a)] is relied upon

cases~

This was the statute before

us in A/S, authorizing immigration service officers without
a warrant:

"(1) to interrogate any alien · or · person
believed to be an alien as to his right to be
or to r emain in the United States;

*

***

(3) ~vithin a reasonable distance from any
external border of the United States, to board
and search for aliens any • • • vehicle, • • • "
An Imrnigration Service regulation defines "reasonable

distance" to mean within 100 miles from any external boundat7.
There was no warrent and no "probable cause", in a
Fourth Amendment sense, in any case.

Nor does the

contend that any of these stops or searches was the
"functional equivalent" of a border search.

gove~~ e n t

3.

Signifi cant Facts and Issues
Peltier
The question presented is ~<1hether A/S is to be applied

retroactively.
Respondent' a vehicle 'o1as stopped and searched by a roving

patrol, 70 miles north of the border , several months prior to
t o our decision in A/S.

270 pounds of marijuana

~vere

found .

The District Court, acting prior to A/S, denied a motion to
suppress .

Respondent was found guilty and sentenced prior

to A/ S, but GA9 - 7 to 6 en bane - reversed the judgment ,
holding that A/S must be applied retroactively to cases
pending on appeal .
The rat5.ona.le of CA9 ' s opinion would apply A/ S retroact:i.ve l'>
c ertainly to all cases not finally litigated . *
...

Judge Goodwin ' s

opinion stated that A/S neither overruled past precedent of

the Supreme Court nor disrupted l ong-accepted practice .

The

SG argues , however , that A/ S "was a departure from existing
l aw".

The SG states that t his 't<1as recognized in Justice

White ' s opinion in A/ S , as we ll as i n my opinion . **
* !t is not clear to me that the rationale "1ould not also apply

even to habeas corpus proceedings
years before.

~ith

respect to cases decided

**Justice Hhite, at 413 u.s. 298, said that "the clear rule
of the Circuit (CA9} is that conveyr.nces rr.ay be stooped and
examined for aliens without \Jarrant or probable cause • . • • "
In footnote 10, Justice \Jhite stvtod thnt in the "20 court s
of appcnls cases I have noted , • • • 35 different j udges
of thr c courts of appeuls found inspection of vehicl~s for
i l legn . aliens, ~·rithout warrant or probable cause , to be
c onstitutional .

4.
The SG nlso argues thnt A/S was a ne\.: application td

of the evidentiary exclusionary rule, and overruled pnst
precedent in the Courts of /lppeals a.s well as long ... establ19he d
administrative practice of r:he immigration authorities .
Finally, the SG argues, persuasively, I think, thzt
a retroactive application of A/S would not further the
of the exclusionary rule:

purp o~~=

that is, it would not deter future

violations of the Fourth Amendment .

Ortiz
-This is a major fixed checkpoint case , involving a
stop and search at the San Clemente checkpoint • the
cornerstone of the Immigration Service network .
is a smuggler.

He was stopped and three aliens were found

c oncealed in the trunlc of his car .
is involved .

Respondent

No question of

retroactiv ~ t

In view of the confusion resulting from A/S ,

some 20 cases pending in the Southern District of

Californi ·~

were consolidated in the fall of 1973 for a comprehensive
f actual hearing, presided over by Judge Turrentine .

After

" extensive evidence" was submitted , the district judge file d
a comprehensive opinion in which the relevant facts relatin;
to

~he

magnitude of the problem are

drrumstically .

s~~rizcd

- rather

See the SG ' s petition for certiorari in

73-2050 (Ortiz) .

The DC found these fixed checkpoints to

be the functional equivalent of a border search .

5.
But CA9, 6 to 7, in !!_..§... v . Bm..ren, held to the contrary,
and applied the rationale of A/S to fixed checkpoints.
Accordingly, CA9 - relying on Bowen - reversed the District
Court in this case.

The arguments pro and con are well set forth in the
opinions of Judge GoodHin (for seven judges) and Judge
Wallace (for eight judges) in Bm.;ren, No. 73;..6848.

These

opinions should be reread prior to Conference.

On appeal, the SG substantially abandons the

argurr~nt

that these fixed checkpoints - remote from the border - are
the functional equivalent of a border search.

Rathe.r, the

SG'a principal argument is that - based on the facts

applica~l ~

to this particular area of California - there is "an area-wide
equivalent of probable cause for the limited-vehicle searche s
conducted at fb::cd checkpoints ."

The special conditions in

this area, allegedly giving rise to the "equivalent of
probable cauoe" include the
(i)
in the

follm~ing:

high concentration of aliens illegally

u.s.

(ii)

policing national boundaries with Hexico

present "peculiar and difficult law enforcement
problems".
(iii) traffic checkpoints are essential to
effective enforcement of inunigration laws.
(iv). the checkpoint operations are conducted
primarily for administrative rather than prosecutorinl

•.''

6.

purposeo, as virtually no aliens are prooecuted
(only the smugglers).
(tv)

the checkpoint searches involve only a

modest intrusion upon privacy.
(vi)

checkpoint searches have conaistently

bean approved by courts of appeals and employed for
many years.
An interasting question (especially in view of my

concurrence in A/S) is tho feasibility of an area warrant
procedure addressed to specific checkpoints.

Respondents'

brief(pp. 66-69) argues that such procedure is feaslble, nnd
emphasizes that such 't-7arro.nts "arc currently issued in various
federal diatr:tcts throughout southwestern United States .'r
The SG 1 s brief (p. 38 et seg.) argues that a warrant

proce_d ure for checkpoints would be unworkable primarily
because of (i) the necessity or coordination between the
17 pet'llmnent and 30 temporary checkpoints in Cal:tfornia,

Arizona, Ne-.;·7 1'1exico and Texas, within six different federal
judicial districts, and (ii) the tendency of district judges based on experience to date - to limit the warrants merely
to stopping (in many instances) and to limit the periods to

10 days.

.."

7.

Comment:

Although there in obvious force to the govern -

ment's reluctance to endorse a general area-type war~ant or
specific checkpoints, ! am not yet persuaded that this
procedure is not feasible - especially if we laid
fairly broad guide l:i.nes.

do~~

some

In this connection, I wonder if

anything is to be gained from an analogy to authorizati·:m
in the wiretap cases.

To be sure, this is pursusnt to

congressional leginlation.

Bowen
Like Ortiz, this is a fixed checkpoint case .

Indeed,

CA9 1 s opinion in this ce.se is the controlling 9th Circuit

·- -

authority applying (by 7 to 6 vote) A/S to fixed checkpoints
on the same rationale as the Court adopted with respect to
r oving patrols .
But this case has a retroactivity question not present
in

Orti~:

CA9 held, again 7 to 9 (but with a different

lineup) that , in view of long-established precedent in the
9th Circuit to the contrary, the court ' s decision in

3ot;rcn

should not be applied retroactively .
It 'tdll be recalled that in Peltier, decided Y1.2.y 9,
1974 , CA9 applied A/S retroactively to a roving patrol
case, but in Bowen
retroactivity -

.,.

CA9 distinguished - for purposes of

bet-v~ecn

roving patrols and fixed checkpotnts .

8.
l,Jith respect to the latter, CA9 concluded that lcng-establis h.. •
authority in the C:b:cuit, s.s well e.s administrative conduct,
had established fixed checkpoints as the principal means of
immigration .

controlli~g

Comment:

The single most important isGue, as I

vie~-:

it, to be decided in theoe four cases is the validity of
searches at fixed checkpoints .

The rt'.Oat exhaustive appellst

court consideration of thnt issue is in Boi·:en, "rr.·:;ereas the
district court decision that is most helpful on the facts is
in Ortiz .

I

suppose "m could decide the substantive Fourth

Amendment issue in Orti.z which is squarely presented there .
We could then co-nfine our decision of Em\•en to the retroacti ,,. ... · ·
issue .

Humbcrto nr:tr>non:t-Poncc
Thia case, significartiy different from the foret;oing ,
i nvolves only a

"~"

with no search .

·----I mmigration officers were
~

.

stationed at a

fL~ed checkpoin~·

65 miles north of the border, but which happened to be closed
due to bad vmathcr .

The officers observed passing cars , and

fo llowed respondent ' s car because its occupants S??Cared to
be Mexicans .

The three occupants spoke no English and had

n o identificntion papers .

Hhen questioned in Spanish, it

appeared that two of them - the passengers - were Yexics.n

9.
citizens ii%g illegally in the United States .

Respondent

was prosecuted and convicted for transporting aliens, but
the Court of Appeal3 - aguin sitting en bane and again by
a 7 to 6 vote - reversed the conviction .

CA9 found no distinction between a"stop" and a
in the application of the rationale of A/S .

lfa~rch"

It recognized

that A/S involved only a search, but pointed to language
(dictum) that appeared to apply the seme principles to a sto p .
It '\<las conceded that there was no probable cause , and
t~---------------

CA9 concluded there \>las not evtm "a founded suspicion" .

The govarnmcnt, easentinlly , makes two argur;:1ent£:
(i)

That there exists in fact an area-wide equivalent

of probable

RBXHR

cause that justifies a brief stop of a

vehicle in the Mexican-border area; and
( ii) Advance judicial approval is not necessary to
insure the reasonableness of a brief investigative stop of
a vehicle in this area .

The latter point, vJhich is of considerable inter est to
me , is buttressed to some extent at least by the Court ' s
decision in Terr.z v . Ohio, 392

u.s .

1 , 17-18 .

The SG ' s

brief (p . 25) states that the Immigration Service "informs
us that a stop for questioning at a checkpoint ordinarily
t akes no more thun about 5 seconds per occupant and that
even a roving- patrol stop for questioning usually consumes
no more than a minute .

Such stops involve no search unless

t he officers have a particularized probable cause .

10 .
The SG also poi.nts out that courts have upheld routine
warrnntless stops of vehicles for license and regi s t::-ation
checks.

See SG's brief p . 28 and cases cited in note 19.

Comment:
t he Fourth

This type of stop is easier to reconcile vith

Amend=~nt

and our cases than a search , CS?ecially

if the stop occurs at s. fixed checkpoint .

The situation is

somewhat less clear, and the government ' s position l:eaker,
where the stop appecrs to be altogether random by a
patrol.

ru~ing

Having in rnind the customary checking of licenses

that goes on in Virginia at regular intervals , when officers
at checkpoints stop most cars and check driver ' s licenses,
t he procedure here involved differs only in that the stops
are confined to automobiles occupied by persons who ap?ear
to be Mexicans .

Tnere may be sn Equal Protection Clause

is sue , but it is difficult for rae to see a Fourth
distinction .

L.F.P., Jr.
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MEMORANDUM

TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Penny Clark

DATE:

May 8, 1975

No. 74-114 U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce
Here is a draft opinion along the lines we have discussed.
I am still fairly uncomfortable with it, and I will outline
my current thoughts about its weak points.
I have tried to write as strong a case as I can for the
area probable ~se and search warrant theories, but the more
~-

time I spend on them, the less I am convinced.

As written

now, the entire discussion of Camara is rather mechanical.
At the least, it needs to be smoothed out, with less obvious
emphasis on the precise "factors" relied on in Camara.

But

more basically, it seems to me that what we should be talking

---

about is not so much the use of area-wide "probable cause"
for stopping cars in the border area, but simply the

------

constitutional reasonableness of taking special measures to
control and monitor cars and people entering the country.
I could be quite happy with a rule that draws the line
between stops and searches: saying that because of the minimal
intrusiveness of a stop for questioning and the strong public
interest in protecting the border, the Border Patrol may

..

reasonably treat the border as a zone rather than a line and
.....
stop motorists for questioning - but it may not search either
the vehicles or their occupants without consent or probable

2.
cause.

This line of reasoning could be based squarely on

the Government's power with respect to aliens and the border,
with, at most, a brief comparison to Camara.

I would then

dispense entirely with the warrant discussion, saying only
that the Border Patrol's interference with persons near the
border must be reasonable, and leaving open two avenues of
challenge to the manner and degree of surveillance (Ljmotions
;o-

su~ress

in criminal cases an

~~ctions

for injunctive

relief on behalf of persons subjected to regular stops.
I think this may be a better practical solution for two
reasons.

First, it would dispense entirely with the need to

distinguish between roving patrols and checkpoints, drawing
the line in both instances between questioning and searches.

----

-----------~------

Second, I continue to doubt that a warrant procedure would
add significantly to the protection of motorists in the border
area.

It seems unrealistic to suppose that a warrant would

limit in any significant way a roving officer's discretion
to stop any car he pleases or to harass certain kinds of
people (long-hairs, Mexicans, whatever).

I also think that a

warrant requirement!s primary effect may be what the Government fears: simply making it too expensive or impractical to
conduct roving patrols.

The Border Patrol seems currently

to stay out of the cities, operating its roving patrols
mostly in rural areas, and since they have only limited
resources, I think it's safe to assume that they deploy the
patrols in the areas where they catch the most illegal aliens -

3.
probably the same areas in which they could obtain warrants.
Moreover, we still haven't worked out the dilemma whether
a person stopped under an area warrant could challenge its
validity in a motion to suppress and if so, whether the
result wouldn't be just as many challenges to "area probable
cause" as the Government would face in the absence of a
warrant.
I do not think the analysis I suggest would be inconsistent with your prior position on the warrant clause.
Primarily, we are not here concerned with searches or arrests,
the two areas where the warrant clause has been most active.
The stop for questioning is far less intrusive, and we are
dealing in almost every case with an automobile (and in all
other cases with an equally mobile human).

For these reasons,

I think the analysis you used in U.S. District Court is consistent with dispensing with the warrant here, especially
since the only possible warrant is the area warrant, which
provides far less protection to individuals.
This approach would require a vote to reverse rather than

~ )

whether on these facts the stop was reasonable.
~\
Jr- . J '
If you would prefer to stick with the "founded suspicion"

~

doctrine and an area probable cause requirement, I would

~q~trongly urge
~

tvR--vt'

before you circulate.

/.._.;'Y~~ ( /
r.---~ fl ';>
~

From talking with Justice White's clerks,

I get a strong impression that he will not budge from his

'--'

~, ~:fo

that you show this opinion to the key Justices

~

~

J. .
'.

~~$

~1-

dh.-4 p 3

4.
position in Almeida-Sanchez that the Border Patrol can stop
any car near the border without probable cause, founded
suspicion, or a warrant.

Since a stop for questioning is

much less intrusive than a search, and not governed by any
of this Court's prior Fourth Amendment cases, he will not
feel bound by Almeida-Sanchez.

Even if you can count on

Stewart, Rehnquist, and the Chief Justice to agree that stops
are illegal without either founded suspicion or an area warrant,
I s e e no possibility for a majority on the dual proposition
that an area warrant is required and that it would be sufficient
to justify a stop for questioning.

Justice Douglas ftad. kas

declared his position, and he would not even agree with us
that a stop may be made on something less than probable cause.
Justice Brennan may not take such a radical stance, and might
agree with us that "founded suspicion" is enough to justify
stops for questioning, but I gather he too would disagree
that an area warrant can substitute for indivi9aalized cause.
Bill BrySon tells me that Justice Marshall is almost certain
to follow Brennan in this area.
My inclination would be to settle for establishing the
first proposition in this caset1)that a stop may be made on
----..less than probable cause, but that a "founded suspicion"
is required.
~

There may be a fair chance of getting a majority

on that point (Brennan, Marshall, Stewart and perhaps Blackmun).
Then, in any subsequent case (and we may expect to get some
out of CA9 rather soon) that squarely tests the adequacy

5.
of an area warrant to justify stops without individualized
cause, I would think you would have a good chance of lining
up a different majority for the proposition that a stop under
an area warrant is constitutional.
Blackmun and the Chief Justice).

(White, Rehnquist,
What I fear is that by

circulating the entire opinion now, you would risk getting

\Aloulcl

no majority on either part because both sidesAsee a lot to
disagree with.
( adequate

(d~

By suggesting that an area warrant would be
in this case, of course) this opinion could

scare Brennan and Marshall away from the part they otherwise
might agree on.

And until Justice White confronts a square

holding that some cause is required for a stop, he is unlikely
to accede to the suggestion that the Border Patrol must
justify its operations to anyone.

I think it not unreasonable

to suppose that if Justice White writes separately, we run
a risk of losing all three votes that were with him in
Almeida-Sanchez.

In short, it appears that there aren't enough

"swing votes" in the Fm\th Amendment area to forge a compromise
majority.
process.

I think the best we can hope for is a two-sta.$e
I think we could try for it by circulating an opinion

that contains Parts I-III, and an ending along these lines:
the Government asserts that there is "area probable cause"
for stops of this nature in the border area; we need not decide,
for even if there were, a warrant would be required (basing
this conclusion primarily on the extra- sensitivity of areawide assessments that affect many people) and none was obtained
in this case.
P.C.
ss
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JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR .

May 23, 1975

Border Search Cases

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
In accordance with the request of the Chief Justice,
I have prepared memoranda in the above cases - which I now
circulate.
For your convenience, I summarize my conclusion in
each case:
No. 74-114 U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce. This was a stop
(not a search) by a roving patrol. The only basis for the
stop was the apparent Mexican ancestry of the occupants of
the car. I concluded that reasonable grounds for suspicion
(one of which may be the app~!~exica.tlan cestry) is
required for a stop by a roving patrol. As there was no
basis for suspicion other than the appearance of the
occupants, I concluded the stop was unlawful. I . would
affirm.

I

No. 73-2050 U.S. v. Ortiz. This was a search at an
established checkpoint (San Clemente) without- -probable cause
and without either a specific or an "area" warrant. I
concluded that our prior decision in Almeida-Sanchez is
controlling, and that the search is unlawful. It was unnecessary in this case to determine whether an "area" type
warrant for a particular checkpoint would validate searches.
As I agreed with CA9 that Almeida-Sanchez was controlling,
I would affirm.
· No. 73-6848 Bowen v. U.S. This also was a search at a
checkpoint without warrant or probable cause. The search
occurred prior to our decision in Almeida-Sanchez. Primarily

l

- 2 on the authority of Peltier, I would hold that Almeida-Sanchez
should not be applied retroactively. Accordingly, I would
affirm.
The principal issue that would not be resolved by the
foregoing cases is whether a mere stop for questioning as
to citizenship may be made at an established checkpoint
without particularized grounds of suspicion. There are
substantial differences in the circumstances attendant
upon stops at established checkpoints and those that may
exist in random stops by roving patrols. We are holding No.
74-993 Janney v. U.S. (among others) which presents the
established checkpoint stop issue.

1---<!~
~ .P., Jr.
ss

.:§nvrttttt Qj:ottrt cf tltt ~ttittb ;§taftg
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.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR .

March 13, 1975

Border Search Cases
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
I thought it might be helpful if I shared with you this
memorandum on the latest decision relating to the border
search cases we considered in February. In United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, et al, Nos. 74-2462, 74-2568, 74-2714 (March
5, 1975), a panel (2 to 1) of the Ninth Circuit invalidated
the "warrant of inspection" issued by the District Court to
authorize the operation of the fixed checkpoint at San Clemente.
The warrant there considered authorized agents "to stop
northbound motor vehicles for the purpose of making routine
inquiries to determine the nationality and/or immigration
status of the occupants," and also "to conduct a routine
inspection of said vehicles for the presence of aliens."
The latter authorization appears to have been interpreted by
the Government to empower agents to search trunks and other
places where persons might hide. But the validity of that
authori~ation was not an issue in these appeals,* and the
court noted that subsequent warrants limited the agents to
a stop and inquiry procedure.
The Ninth Circuit's opinion indicates that the warrant
was issued for ten-day periods and had been renewed 26 times.
'i'>In each of the three cases considered by the Ninth
Circuit the stop and inquiry, without search, revealed that
the automobile contained illegal 'aliens. In United States
v. Guillen, No. 74-2714, a subsequent search of the trunk
revealed additional illegal aliens. The court assumed in
that case that the initial discovery provided probable cause
to inspect the trunk, and therefore did not consider that
search to have been conducted pursuant to the warrant's
"inspection" authorization.

- 2 -

The District Court required the compilation of statistics
relating to the operation of the checkpoint, and the Ninth
Circuit opinion summarizes this data. These indicate that
an average of 1,200 vehicles pass through the San Clemente
checkpoint per hour and that at peak times the figure
increases to 2,500. By the Ninth Circuit's calculation,
this suggests that over 10-1/2 million .automobiles pass
through that checkpoint annually.
The more interesting figures are those compiled during
an eight-day period in June of 1974. Over that period
approximately 145,960 vehicles passed through the checkpoint
during periods . in which it was operating. Presumably all of
that number were required to slow down to allow the officer
at the "point" to scan the vehicle and its occupants and
determine whether further inquiry was warranted. But only
820 of the almost 146,000 vehicles were "stopped" and referred
to a secondary area for questioning regarding citizenship and
immigration status. And of the 820 "stopped", 202 were
"inspected".
The Ninth Circuit suggested that it was unable to ascertain
exactly what an "inspection" was. But it apparently is something less than a search. The court noted that deportable
aliens were discovered in "plain view" in 169 of the 202
vehicles so "inspected". The court further indicated that
agents searched portions of the vehicles in which aliens
might hide in 33 instances, each allegedly with the consent
of the driver, and discovered illegal aliens in two of the
automobiles so .searched.* In total, agents discovered 725
deportable aliens in 171 vehicles during the eight-day period
in question.
·ki would suppose that in virtually all of the 169 instances
in which the initial questioning revealed illegal aliens in
"plain view" the agents conducted a further search of the
automobile. See note 1, supra. In those cases the subsequent
search would appear to be suppor~ed by concrete probable cause
and justifiable under more traditional Fourth Amendment
principles. I assume, therefore, that the 33 instances
identified as searches are cases in which the initial ·inquiry
does not itself reveal the presence of illegal aliens but does
suggest the need to inquire further. Whether "probable cause"
or "founded suspicion" existed in these cases would be a
matter to be determined on the facts of the particular case.

- 3 -

Relying primarily on these statistics, the Ninth Circuit
determined that the "inspection warrant" system was invalid.
Judge Duniway noted that of the nearly 146,000 automobiles
passing through the San Clemente checkpoint only 171, or
0.12%,were found to contain illegal aliens. He considered
this to be too low an incidence to justify what he viewed as
an "intolerable" degree of interference imposed on the
motorists passing through the checkpoint:
"Roughly 999 of every 1,000 cars passing through
the checkpoint carry only persons who are lawfully
within the country and under Carroll are.entitled
'to use the public highways [and] have a right
to free passage without interruption.' Although
the duration of a stop and even a detention for
immigration questioning may be brief, the concentration of illegal alien traffic is too small.
We cannot countenance the cumulative intrusion of
stopping ten million cars per year where only one
out of 1,000 passing cars may contain aliens
illegally within the country."
Judge Duniway devoted a major part of his op~n~on to
my concurrence in Almeida, viewing it, I must say, with little
enthusiasm. In addition to finding that the checkpoint
authorization would not meet the general standards outlined
in my Almeida concurrence, Judge Duniway's opinion held
flatly:
"The requirements of the Fourth Amendment apply
with full vigor at immigration checkpoints. A
stop, even a 'fleeting stop' is subject to Fourth
Amendment protections". · (pp. 10, 11 printed opinion)
Judge Carter, dissenting, viewed the case quite
differently, and I am inclined to agree with the essence
of his opinion. The undisputed facts clearly indicate that
(i) the checkpoint was used with restraint and discrimination;
(ii) only a minute fraction of the motoring population was
inconvenienced in any way except by being required to slow
down - hardly an "intolerable inconvenience"to motorists
who are accustomed - as we all are - to stop and yield signs
and occasionally being stopped for license checks; and (iii)
of the vehicles stopped for brief questioning as to
nationality and immigration status, one out of every five
(20%) was found to be transporting aliens - an extraordinarily
high percentage of successes.

- 4 It is to be remembered that this op~n~on invalidates a
simple stop and inquiry procedure. What I said in Almeida
applied to full searches by roving patrols. Indeed, as I
indicated at our Conference, I would not be inclined to
extend my Almeida standards to authorize searches at a
checkpoint 66 miles from the border and on a highway with
this level of traffic. I would require some more particularized
"cause" to justify an actual search of the private portions
of automobiles stopped at a fixed checkpoint. But there is
a controlling difference, in my view, between a checkpoint
warrant authorizing searches and one limited to routine
questions which any motorist should be willing to answer.
There simply is no comparison between the degree of
"intrusiveness" of a search and a stop only to inquire as to
nationality and immigration status.
Judge Duniway, · by relating the number of vehicles
in which aliens were found during the period in question
to the total number of vehicles passing the checkpoint,
concludes that the results do not justify the "intolerable"
inconvenience imposed upon motorists. I do not consider
discovery of 725 deportable aliens during the course of
a part-time operation of the checkpoint over eight days to
be an inconsequential result. This operation apprehended
rtearly 100 aliens per day. Moreover, these figures do not
take into account the number of smugglers and aliens
"deterred" from attempting to go northward, a factor
' emphasized by Judge Turrentine in his district court opinion
in United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. Cal. 1973).*

The situation in the Ninth Circuit is further confounded
by the decision of another panel in United States v. Evans,
~(Judge Turrentine's opinion in Baca, which is printed in
the petition for cert. in No. 73-2osn:-contains the most
exhaustive statement of the facts with respect to this problem.
Its findings differ from the opinion of Judge Duniway in
significant respects. The latter thought that "the influx
of illegal aliens could conceivably be stemmed in various
ways" other than by use of checkpoints. Judge Turrentine,
on the other hand, concluded that "the evidence presented
. . . clearly establishes that there is no reasonable or ·
effective alternative method of detection and apprehension
available to the border patrol. • . . " See Pet. for-· Cert.
in No. 73-2050l at 20a. That opinion also provides an
additional ind~cation of the importance of the San Clemente
checkpoint, revealing that in fiscal year 1973 over 12,000
deportable aliens were apprehended there. Id., at 25a.

'

.

- 5 -

507 F.2d 879, 880 (CA9 1974). In Evans, no constitutional
defect was found where motor traffic was simply diverted into
a zone where it could be observed by officers. In that case,
an automobile had been "waived through" a fixed checkpoint
without being required to pull over. As the automobile
passed, however, an officer noticed aliens lying in the
space between the front and back seats. and the car was then
stopped. The appellant argued that the "slow down", which
allowed the officer to look into the automobile,was itself
a violation of Fourth Amendment rights since it was conducted
without a warrant or probable cause. The Ninth Circuit panel
rejected that contention, holding that there is no constitutional objection to a warrantless "diversion of motor traffic
into a zone where it can be observed by officers." Id., at
880.
In view of these two recent cases, following those
pending before this Court, the law of the Ninth Circuit is
in a state of shambles. Martinez-Fuerte, which was decided
after Evans, mentions the latter only in a footnote and
purports to distinguish that case on the ground that it did
not involve a stop. When one attem].X:s to rationalize· the t'i~JO,
the result seems to be as follows: Under Evans, government
agents may erect a checkpoint anrahere and, without a warrant
of any kind, compel traffic to s ow down sufficiencly to
allow an effective visual inspection of vehicles and their
occupants. If that inspection arouses "founded suspicion"
the vehicle can be stopped for inquiry, and if probable cause
exists it can then be searched. Yet Martinez-Fuerte applies
the Fourth Amendment with full vigor even to a "fleeting stop,"
and invalidates a warrant authorizing operation of a fixed
checkpoint at an appropriate place and resulting stops for
the limited purpose of inquiring into nationality and
immigration status. In short, a slow down anywhere for
visual inspection is valid, whereas a fleeting stop for
questions is invalid even when authorized by a che ckpoint
warrant. The purposes of both procedures are identical and
the degree of intrusion is likely to be indistinguishable.
If immigration officers in CA9 find little rationality
in these distinctions, they are not alone.

- 6 -

In view of the foregoing, and the present inconclusiveness of our tentative votes at the Conference on the
cases that have been argued, it occurs to me that perhaps we
should relist these cases for a further Conference discussion. If a Court cannot be assembled, the cases presumably
should be set for reargument early next fall and some thought
should be given as to what stays, if any, should be entered
pending final resolution.

-1
. /....,

·1- j)
l

.,

L.F.P., Jr.
ss
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April 1, 1975

.JUSTICE L E WIS F. POWELL, .JR.

FILE COPl'
PLEASE RETURN
TO FILE
Border Search Cases
Dear Chief:
In a conversation today with Chief Judge John Brown
of the Fifth Circuit, he again expressed the hope that
we will be able to decide the Border Search Cases this
Term.
Judge Brown stated that the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals is holding some 15 to 20 cases, awaiting our
decision. He emphasized, however, that the more serious
problem is the backup of cases in the United States
prosecutors' offices in the Southern and Western Districts
of Texas. It is estimated that some 200 prosecutions are
being postponed pending our decision.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

..

, .__J-..L._ ~eMA ~ ~

.Q. J.-....,.-4_.,
~ + ~ ~ ~~
_

~ ~.J...&...~- 4-() ~II.

3.

We cannot accept respondent's contention

that, even though§ 287(a)(3) does not mention
probable cause, its legislative history establishes
~rud- t
that Congress impl i ei tiy condition ~ immigration #

1

officers' authority to board 4W and search vehicles
/

on probable cause to believe that they contained
aliens.

The legislative history simply does not

support this

contentio~.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN , JR .

May 28, 1975

RE: Nos. 73-2050 United States v.Ortiz
74-114 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce
73-6848 Bowen v. United States
Dear Lewis:
If your proposed memoranda in the border search case
become opinions for the Court, I vote as follows:
I join No. 73-2050, United States v. Ortiz. I join
Parts I and III of No. 74-114, United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce and also Part II if you will delete
n. 3 at p. 4. That note seems inconsistent with the
view of Section 287(a)(3) that I expressed in my dissent in Peltier. I cannot join No. 73-6848, Bowen v.
United States in light of my dissent in Peltier. I
would appreciate your adding at the foot of your Bowen,
Mr. Justice Brennan dissents and would reverse substantially for the reasons expressed in his dissent in
No. 73-2000, United States v. Peltier.
11

11

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

May 28, 1975

No. 74-114, U. S. v. Brignoni-Ponce
Dear Lewis,
I agree with your memorandum in
this case and would join it as an opinion of
the Court.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

May 28, 1975

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re: No. 74-114, U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce

Dear Lewis:
I agree with your memorandum in this
case and would join it as an opinion of the Court.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR.

May 28, 1975

RE: No. 74-114 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce

Dear Lewis:
After our discussion please note me as joining
you in full your opinion in the above.

Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

.hFnnt <.g:oud of flrt ,-nib~ .ifafn
..asJringfon, ~. <!f. 2ll.?'*.;l
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

I

June 4, 1975

Dear Lewis:
RE:

UNITED STATES V. ORTIZ, 73-2050
UNITED STATES V. BRIGNONI-PONCE, 74-114
BOWEN V. UNITED STATES, 73-6848

If your memoranda in these cases become opinions for the
Court, I vote as follows:
In UNITED STATES V. ORTIZ, 73-2050, please join me.
In UNITED STATES V. BRIGNONI-PONCE, 74-114, I shall file
a separate statement concurring in the result.
In BOWEN V. UNITED STATES, 73-6848, I shall dissent for
reasons stated in my dissent in UNITED STATES V. PELTIER, 73-2000.

William 0. Douglas

Mr. Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

.h.vrmtt <!fomf llf tJr~ ..nit~lt .ihtf~s
.a.sJringfott, ~. <!f. 21l~'!.;l
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

June 5, 1975

j

Dear Lewis:
RE:

United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 74-114

If your memorandum in this case becomes an opinion of the
Court I shall file the enclosed statement concurring in the
judgment.

WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS

Mr. Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

.iu.pt"mtt Clfouri of Ur~ ~b .itaftg
'Jfasftittght~ ~. QJ. 2ll.;t'l.;l
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 6, 1975

Re: 74-114 - United States v. Brignoni-Ponce
73-2050 - United States v. Ortiz
73-6848 - Bowen v. United States

Dear Lewis:
To keep you informed, my present view is that
73-6848, Bowen v. United States, should be affirmed.
As to 74-114, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
and 73-2050, United States v. Ortiz, I am not yet persuaded
to affirm.
I am glad you now avoid the "area search warrant"
approach but I fear we may not have found the key I need to
resolve this problem.
As of now, in the latter two cases, I am close to
where I was at Conference.

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMB E RS OF"

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL , JR .

June 6, 1975

PERSONAL
Border Search Cases
Dear Chief:
Although I am grateful for the vote in Bowen, I am
quite disappointed that you think we have not "found the
key" to the proper resolution of Brignoni-Ponce and Ortiz.
I write primarily to suRgest that we are unlikely to
find five votes for any "key more to your liking. This
is a judgment (with which you may disagree entirely) based
on my having devoted more time to the study of these cases
than to any other assignment you have given me this year.
The drafts which I have circulated are in accord on
principle with Fourth Amendment precedents, the most recent
of which is Almeida-Sanchez. In one respect, however, it
can be said that I have departed somewhat from precedent.
In Brignoni-Ponce, I proposed a "reasonable suspicion"
standard for random stopping and questioning of occupants
of vehicles by roving patrols. This affords more leeway
to law enforcement officers than any prior Fourth Amendment
case with which I am familiar, although I drew heavily on
Terry and Adams.*
I do not believe that the "reasonable suspicion"
standard will unduly handicap officers on roving patrol.
*In those cases, as you will recall, the investigating
officers had reasonable grounds to believe that the
suspects were armed and that they might be dangerous.
This is a considerably higher requirement than the "reasonable suspicion" which I propose in Brignoni-Ponce.
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I invite your attention particularly to Part IV of my
Brignoni-Ponce opinion (p. 10-12) for the "factors [that]
may be taken into account ·in deciding whether there is a
reasonable suspicion to stop a car in the border area".
With this portion of my opinion in mind, I further invite
you to read Bill Douglas' concurrence, circulated June 5, in
which he attacks the "reasonable suspicion" proposal.
It is thus evident that, so long as the composition of
the Court remains as it is now, the resolution I propose is
likely to be the closest to your tentative views. Putting
it differently, we have the same 5 to 4 split that decided
Almeida-Sanchez, except that Bill Douglas would require an
even higher standard than I propose. Absent a change in
the personnel of the Court, it is unrealistic to think that
the result will be different at any future Term - unless
Justices Brennan or Marshall retreat from my position to
that of Bill Douglas.
It is also entirely speculative whether a change in
Court composition will create a new majority.* We hope there
will be no change for many years; we have no idea which Justice
will be the first to leave; and we certainly have no idea as
to the views of the Justice who might fill a vacancy.
Of course, we do not have to agree on a Court opinion.
But examples that come to mind (e.g., Metromedia) have hardly
been satisfactory to the bench or Dar. The Border Search
Cases present an especially pressing problem, with courts
and U.S. Attorneys in four states awaiting definitive
guidance. I am sure we all would regret further delay or
a fractured Court.
As you know, we also have pending here cases which
present the validity of random stops for questioning at
established checkpoints. These are perhaps the most im~ortant
of all of these cases. I confirm what I said at Friday s
Conference, namely, that I have carefully considered the
*I do not imply that the possibility of a future change
affects any of our judgments. I am merely exploring whether
it is realistic to think the present situation will change.
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issue, and will vote to affirm the right of the border patrol
officers to make such stops - without requiring reasonable
suspicion - at the established checkpoint. Potter expressed
the same view at Conference, and has confirmed it to me personally. I think there is a vast difference between the
circumstances of the regularized stops at established checkpoints (which are quite analogous to stopping vehicles for
license checks), and the random stops by roving patrols at
any time of day or night on any road or highway within a
hundred miles of the border.
You may recall Bill Rehnquist's statement that he might
consider joining me if I made clear that we were implying no
view with respect to stops by state and local officers for
such purposes as checking driver's licenses, auto registration,
weighing trucks or enforcing agricultural quarantines. I
attach a proposed new footnote to be added to Brignoni-Ponce.
I do not know whether this will satisfy Bill.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss

Footnote 8, for p. 9 in Brignoni-Ponce. (The note
reference would appear after the word "Amendment" at
the end of the long paragraph).
8.

Our decision is based on an assessment of

the Border Patrol's function, its statutory authority
for stopping vehicles, and the character of stops for
quesioning in the border areas.

We imply no view as to

issues that may arise with respect to state and local
law enforcement practices of stopping vehicles for such
purposes as checking driver's licenses and auto
registration, weighing trucks, or enforcing agricultural
quarantines.

74-114--0PINION
UNITED STATES v. BRIGNONI-PONCE
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identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily
while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at
the time." /d., at 145-146.
These cases together establish that in appropriate circumstances the Fourth Amendment allows a properly
limited "search" or "seizure" on facts that do not constitute probable cause to arrest or to search for contraband
or evidence of crime. In both Terry and AdamB v.
Williams the investigating officers had reasonable grounds
to believe that the suspects were armed and that they
might be dangerous. The limited searches and seizures
in those cases were a valid method of protecting the
public and preventing crime. In this case as well, because of the importance of the governmental interest at
stake, the minimal intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of practical alternatives for policing the border, we
hold that when an officer's observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain
aliens who are illegally in the country, he m~y stop the
car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke
suspicion. As in Terry, the stop and inquiry must be
"reasonably related in scope to the justification for their
initiation." 392 U. S., at 29. The officer may question
the driver and passengers about . their citizenship and
immigration status, and he may ask them to explain suspicious circumstances, but any further detention or
search must be based on consent or probable cause.
We are unwilling to let the Border Patrol dispense" entirely with the requirement that· officerS'
must have a reasonable suspicion to justify rovingpatrol stops.7 We conclude that in the context of
border area stops the reasonableness requi rement
of the Fourth Ame~dment demands something more than
the broad and unlimited discretion sought by
the government. Roads near the border carry not only
Because the stop in this case was made without a warrant and
officers made no effort to obtain one, we have no occasion to
decide whether a warrant could be issued to stop cars in a d~ignated
T

~he
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aliens seeking.~ enter the country illegally, but a large
volume of legitimate traffic as well. San Diego, with a
metropolitan population of 1.3 million, is located on the
b?rder. Texas has two fairly large metropolitan areas
directly on the border: El Paso, with a population of
360,000, and the Brownsville-McAllen area with a combined population of 320,000. We are co;fident that a
large. majority of traffic in these cities is lawful and that
relat~vely few of their residents have any connection with
the Illegal. entry and transportation of aliens. To approve r~vmg-patrol stops of all vehicles in the border
area, Without any suspicion that a particular vehicle is
carrying illegal immigrants, would subject the resident.R

of these and other areas to interference with their
use of the highways, solely at the discretion of
Border Patrol officers who seek to enforce laws
having nothing to do with the regulation of
highway use!~The only formal limitation on that discretion appears to be the administrative
regulation detining the term "reasonable distance" in
§ 287 (a) (3) to mean withip 100 air miles from the border.
8 CFR § 287.1 (1974). That, however is not enough

a t least in xkxe these

~

circumstances.·~

If we approved the Government's position in this case,
Border Patrol officers could stop motorists at random for
questioning, day or night, anywhere within 100 air miles
of the 2,000-mile border, on a city street, a busy highway,
?r a desert road, without any reason to suspect that they

:1av e violated any law. Yet the cases in u hich border
area stops have been considered establish that Exxex
bases for reasonable suspicion are available wxxk to
Border Patrol officers. As we discuss in Part IV,
infra, the nature of the violations which are here
involved naturally generate articulagle grounds for
differentiating between violators and nonviolators.
Even though the intrusion involved in Border Patrol
stops is admittedly modest, we do not think it
"reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment to make such
stops on a random basis when means are available to
~~~i:~; l~~~=~~~~~~c~~s~di£(s from indiscriminate

1

I

area on the basis of conditions in the area. as a whole and in the
absence of reason to SUBpect that any particular car is carrying
Jlliens. See Almeida-Sanchez, wpra, at 275 (MR. JusTICE PoWELL,
concurring); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. 6. 523 (1967).

'

I

,

I

Footnote

15/

Our decision in this case is based on an assessment of the
Border Patrol's function, theimportance of the governmental
interests served by its stops, the character of its stops, and,
as discussed below, the availability of alternatives to
indiscriminate stops unsupported by reasonable suspicion. The
decision is also one which concerns stops having nothing to do
with an inquiry whether highway users and their vehicles are
entitled, by virtue of compliance with laws governing highway
usage, to be upon the public highways. Our decision thus does
not imply that state and local law enforcement agencies are
without power to conduct such limited stops as are necessary
to enforce laws regarding driver's licenses, vehicle registration, truck weights, agricultural quarantines and similar
matters.

i
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June 19, 1975

Cases Held for No. 74-114 U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE :
No. 74-993 Janney v. United States
No. 74-6150 Coffey and Sparks v. United States
These two cases are exactly like No. 74-6016, Arnold
v. United States, and the petition of Bylund and Dixon ~n
No. 74-6014, discussed in the memo of cases held for United
States v. Ortiz. In each case the petitioner was stopped
at the Sierra Blanca checkpoint and, in the course of
questioning, Border Patrol officers discovered evidence
that provided probable cause for a search. In each case
CAS relied on its decision in Hart. If the Court wants to
review the functional equivalency issue, in hopes of reaching
the stop question, these cases should be held. If the Court
vacates and remands in the other cases, I think these
petitioners should receive the same treatment. I might
add that these Sierra Blanca cases are the only petitions
presently before us that potentially present the issue of
stops for questioning at checkpoints. I was in error in my
memorandum of May 23, in suggesting that several pending
petitions presented this issue. Our options, if we want to
settle this remaining issue,are to Rrant one of these petitions
despite the "functional-equivalency' hurdle, or to wait for
a petition that presents the issue cleanly. My current
inclination is to vacate and remand these petitions and wait.
No. 74-5062 Quiroz-Reyna v. United States
No. 74-5307 Baca v. United States
These petitions involve stops conducted prior to the
date of decision in Almeida-Sanchez. None of the present

- 2 cases will decide whether the principles of Brignoni-Ponce
should be applied retroactively. I believe, however, that
the rationale of Peltier and the lower-court decisions prior
to Almeida-Sanchez would lead to a conclusion that the Government reasonably could have continued making such stops at
least until the date of decision in Almeida-Sanchez. Because
we are not deciding the retroactivity question, it would seem
appropriate to vacate these judgments and remand to the courts
of appeals in light of Peltier, Bowen and Brignoni-Ponce, but
I could als·o vote to deny the petitions if that is the
consensus.
The rema1n1ng cases represent stops for questioning
upheld by the courts of appeals on "reasonable suspicion."
In light of the decision in Brignoni-Ponce, the only issues
raised by these petitions will e the application of that
standard to the facts of each case. For your convenience,
I will outline the facts in each case, and indicate how I
intend to vote.
No. 74-5422 Madueno-Astorga and Lopez-Saenz
v. United States
This petition challenges two separate inCidents. In
the first (Madueno-Astorga), Border Patrol agents saw
Petitioner's car on an Interstate Highway 10 miles from
the border, at 6:50 a.m. They said that the car had a large
trunk and a heavy-duty suspension system, and appeared to
"drift" on curves. They concluded that it must be heavily
loaded, so they stopped it. There were no other suspicious
circumstances preceding the stop. Vacate and remand under
Brignoni-Ponce.
The second incident (Lopez-Saenz) occurred in the early
morning hours less than half a mile from the Mexican border,
in an area "heavily used by alien and narcotic smugglers."
The officer tried to stop a Ranchero pick-up (not Petitioner's
vehicle). It tried to run him off the road, but he finally
stopped it. The driver jumped out and fled, leaving the
pick-up in a ditch. Within 2 to 4 minutes (and before the
officer discovered that the pick-up contained marijuana),
another Ranchero pick-up came by. The driver (Petitioner)
appeared to be Mexican. The officer stopped the pick-up

l
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suspecting it might be associated with the first vehicle,
and found marijuana in plain view. Petitioner does not claim
standing to challenge the stop of the first pick-up, but
contends that there was no reasonable basis for the officer
to suspect that he was associated with it. Deny.
No. 74-6003 Alvarez-Garcia v. United States
Petitioner and a codefendant were traveling, about
5:15a.m., in closely-following cars near the border. They
were traveling slowly, and the trailing car did not take
opportunities to pass the lead car. Petitioner was driving
the lead car. Border Patrol officers followed them and
noticed that the trailing car was riding low, despite new
shock absorbers. It also appeared to have control problems
on curves, leading the officers to believe it was heavily
loaded. The officers stopped the rear car and found
marijuana, then stopped Petitioner's car, which also had
new shock absorbers but was not riding low. Deny.
No. 74-6061 Rocha-Lopez v. United States
Border Patrol officers saw Petitioner (a Mexican-American)
at 6:40 a.m. on a road 1-1/2 miles from the border in an area
"notorious for smuggling." The officers testified that normal
traffic at that hour is light and that they can identify most
drivers as local residents. They did not recognize Petitioner.
When Petitioner saw the agents, he jammed on his brakes,
reducing his speed to 10 mph. On these facts he was stopped.
Vacate and Remand.
No. 74-6086 Gonzalez-Diaz v. United States
Border Patrol officers were on patrol in a ''notorious
smuggling area" 7-1/2 miles from the border at 2:30 a.m.
They stopped to investigate an unusually-placed rock beside
the road and saw footprints, leading them to believe that
aliens had been picked up there. Petitioner then drove by
in a Pontiac sedan of a sort often used for smuggling aliens.
He was Mexican, a stranger to the officers, and he was
traveling 20 mph in a 55 mph zone. They followed him for
a short distance and stopped him. Vacate and remand.

- 4 No. 74-6259

Gonzales v. United States

A Border Patrol officer was on patrol at 5:20 a.m.
1-1/2 miles from the border on a road that parallels the
Rio Grande. The area between the highway and the river is
sparsely populated and is often used by smugglers. The
officer saw Petitioner's truck top a levee, corning from the
border, and turn its headlights on. The officer became
suspicious and signaled the vehicle to stop. Petitioner
tried to run him off the road, but the officer finally
succeeded in stopping the truck. Deny.

L. F. P. , Jr.
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C HAMB E RS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 9, 1975
PERSONAL
Re:

Nos. 73-2050 -United States v. Ortiz
74-114 - United States v. B rignoni-Ponce
73-6848 - Bowen v. United States

Dear Lewis:
I'm sorry to "let you down" on the Border Search cases.
There is, of course, no Court opinion resolving these troublesome
is sues. And the v exing aspect of the plurality opinion in AlmeidaSanchez is that it has been followed by an unemployment figure exceeded only by the number of illegal aliens reliably estimated to be
in the United States.
I argue for no nexus between the two except that they coincide.
I add to that what I said in some dissenting opinions over the past 20
years, that we are becoming an "impotent society." With a shocking
rise in crime, both in prosperity and recession, we are constantly -and blandly-- telling the society we serve "you can't get there from
here."
Here, as elsewhere, the key lies in the irrational, monolithic,
mechanical application of the Suppression Doctrine, fulfilling Cardozo's
prophecy on it once a month if not more.
You have my vote on the Border cases if you link it with a sane,
selective use of exclusion -- as in England, Israel, and every other
civilized country in the world save ours 1

Mr. Justice Powell
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

June 9, 1975

Re:

J

No. 73-2050 - United States v. Ortiz
No. 74-114 - United States v. Brignoni- Ponce

Dear Lewis:
I am still unable to join your proposed opinions
for these cases. I remain where I was at the time of our
conference.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

I
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 10, 1975

Re:

No. 74-114 - United States v. Brignoni-Ponce

Dear Fellow Losers:
At this stage of the Term, it seems to be the common
understanding that we have two choices in this case and in
Ortiz, both of which represent extensions of Almeida-Sanchez
in which we dissented. The first choice is to continue our
votes to reverse the Court of Appeals, and thereby under
Conference practice during the past few months to require the
cases to go over for reargument next fall. The other choice
is to try to persuade Lewis to make some modifications in his
draft opinion in exchange for the four of us concurring
either in the opinion or in the result.
I think the second choice has much to be said for it for
at least two reasons. First is that if we follow the first
option we are apt in the long run to find that it will become
a Court opinion in spite of our disagreement with it, and as
presently drafted it has a good deal of potential for spillover into areas quite different from Border Patrol searches.
The basic conception of the opinion, as I now read it, is that
even though the governmental interest is significant, and the
intrusion produced by a stop is minor, the interest of
innocent citizens in using the highway is such that even this
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minor intrusion will not be permitted under the Fourth
Amendment. I am hopeful that Lewis may be amenable to
changing some of the language in his opinion so as to shift
its emphasis in a way that would confine the result more to
.
.
.
tpe part~cular
s~tuat~on of the Border Patrol, and l~ve open
not merely in form but in substance t~ question of the
propriety of stops where the stop is related to inquiring as
/ to whether conditions imposed by law for operating a vehicle
on a public highway have been met.

----------

The second reason why I think it wise to pursue the
second alternative is that it does seem to me that we all
have institutional responsibility for getting these cases
decided this Term. I don't think any of those who have voted
to join Lewis are about to change, and so the changes will
have to come from us. If it were a case of a numerically
evenly divided Court, it could well be argued that there is
no more reason for us to alter our views than for those on the
other side to alter theirs, but here there is a five man
majority in support of Lewis' present position.
Feeling as I do, I want to take this opportunity to
sound out each of the three of you on the proposed changes
in the draft opinion which are attached to this memorandum.
I include a partial rewrite of pages 8 and 9 of the May 24th
circulation, together with a typed footnote "7a" following
revised page 9, and an insertion on page 11 of the phrase
"give rise" to the present word "add" in the eighth line on
that page.

.

I have no idea whether these changes would be satisfactory
to Lewis, and I am quite sure they might produce some objections
on the part of others who have joined his present draft. But
here we do have some bargaining strength. Lewis has proposed
to me a somewhat pro forma footnote which would go on page 9
of the present draft and read as follows:

{

-
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"Our decision is based on an assessment
of the Border Patrol's function, its
statutory authority for stopping vehicles,
and the character of stops for questioning
in the border . areas. We imply no view as
to issues that may arise with respect to
state and local law enforcement practices of
stopping vehicles for such purposes as
checking driver's licenses and auto registration, weighing trucks, or enforcing agricultural
quarantines."
While this adequately reserves these issues in form,
I do not regard it as being nearly as satisfactory as the
proposed changes in language which I have incorporated in
the attachments to this memorandum. I have heard enough
discussions in three and a half years of Conference to
realize that a simple footnote in a case saying, "We do not
decide this question," is not always thought by everybody
who joins the opinion to mean exactly what it says, and I
would like to make sure that the opinion itself is structured
in such a way-aB to genuinely reserve these issues.
If that is done, I would propose something very generally
along the following as a concurrin statement for as many of
the four of us as agree with it, probably to be issued in the
name of the Chief Justice, as our senior and mentor, or in Byron's
name, if he were willing, since he authored the dissent in
Almeida-Sanchez:
"We dissented from1he Court's decision
in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266 {1973), and we are of the view
that the Court's decision in this case
represents a still further extension of
departures taken in that case. Nonetheless,
because a majority of the Court adheres

- 4 to Almeida, and believes that this case
should be similarly resolved, we [join in
the Court's opinion] [concur in the result].
"We think it quite important to point
out, however, that the Court's opinion and
reasoning deal only with the type of stop
involved in th iS case. We think that just
as travelers entering the country may be
stopped and searched without probable cause
and without founded suspicion because of
'national self protection reasonably requiring
one entering the country to identify himself
as entitled to come in, and his belongings as
effects which may be lawfully brought in, '
Carroll v. United States, 267 u.s. 132, 154
(1925), a strong case may be made for those
charged with the enforcement of laws conditioning the right of vehicular use of a highway to
likewise stop motorists using highways in order
to determine whether they have met the qualifications prescribed by applicable law for such use.
See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 u.s. 433, 440-441'
(1973); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311
(1972). We regard these and similar situations,
such as agricultural inspections and highway
roadblocks to apprehend known fugitives, as not
in any way constitutionally suspec~ .b y re ~ on ~ f - _
today's decision. ~ ~ w.Jt-1~d Cff7 ~

.

I would appreciate receiving your reaction to this very rough
and tentative proposal.
Sincerely,~

The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Blackmun
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,JR .

June 16, 1975

Brignoni-Ponce and Ortiz

Dear Bill, Potter and Thurgood:
You may recall that at our Conference on June 6, (when
these cases were discussed) Bill Rehnquist indicated that if
the opinions were clarified in certain respects, he might
reconsider his position.
I followed up with Bill and he identified two particular
concerns: (i) that our opinions would not apply to state
regulation of highway use, such as enforcement of laws with
respect to driver's licenses, truck weights and the like;
and (ii) that we not foreclose a different decision with
respect to stops for questioning at established checkpoints.
In my view, the draft opinions as circulated left open
both of these issues, as neither was addressed. Bill, however,
has a different view, and he rejected as inadequate some minor
language changes I suggested. He then submitted counterproposals that were quite lengthy.
As the result of negotiations, I submitted the changes
which are now reflected in the pages of Brignoni-Ponce and
Ortiz which I enclose herewith for each of you. Without
comm1tting himself, Bill has indicated an inclination to join
us if we adopt these changes. Prior to seeing my counterproposals Bill had conferred with the Chief Justice, Byron
and Harry with inconclusive results. I do not think my
proposals have been seen by these gentlemen, as Bill thought
it best to know first whether we would submit them to the
Conference.
·
I am willing to make these changes in the draft op1n1ons.
They certainly do not affect the result of the holdings or
change the basic rationale. I expect all of us would come
out at about the same place on the right of the states
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reasonably to govern highway usage. There may be differences
between us as to mere stops at established checkpoints.
Although Byron expressed the view that our decision in
Brignoni-Ponce would necessarily foreshadow a similar holding
with respect to all other stops, I do not agree with him.
In any event, the changes which are necessary to satisfy
Bill will still leave each of us free to decide the fixed
checkpoint stop issue as we deem proper.
In sum, I think we have a chance now to bring these cases
down. We will have settled conclusively the "search" issue
at fixed checkpoints as well as by roving patrols; and we also
will have settled the "stop" issue with respect to roving
patrols. These decisions will go far toward resolving the
doubt which now overhangs the entire Border Patrol operations.
In view of time constraints as well as the importance
of a resolution, I suggest that the four of us meet to discuss
the situation. If agreeable, perhaps we could convene in
Bill Brennan's office at say 11:00 a.m. today if this is
convenient. If Mary Fowler will let Sally Smith know, she
will advise Thurgood and Potter.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice Marshall
lfp/ss
Enc.
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CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF .JUST ICE

June 23, 1975

Re:

No. 74-114 - United States v. Brignoni - P on ce

Dear B i ll:
Please show me as joining your concurrence
but I may join only the judgment, thereby limiting my
concurrence.
I will act as soon as Lewis' "whole package''
is clear to me.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

.:§n:p:rmtt

OJonrl of tqt~lt ~Udtg

~Mlfi:nghttt.

:!fJ. Qf.
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CHAMeERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 25, 1975

Re:

No. 74-114 - United States v. Brignoni-Ponce

Dear Bill:
I am writing separately in the above and I
think it better to have that stand alone, so please
withdraw my

11

join11 of June 23.
Regards,

LJ fl..,_
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference
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June 19, 1975

Cases Held for No. 74-114

u.s.

v. Brignoni-Ponce

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
No. 74-993 Janney v. United States
No. 74-6150 Coffey and Sparks v. United States
These two cases are exactly like No. 74-6016, Arnold
v. United States, and the petition of Bylund and Dixon In
No. 74-6614, discussed in the memo of cases held for United
States v. Ortiz. In each case the petitioner was stopped
at the Sierra Blanca checkpoint and, in the course of
questioning, Border Patrol officers discovered evidence
that provided probable cause for a search. In each case
CAS relied on its decision in Hart. If the COurt wants to
review the functional equivalency issue, in hopes of reaching
the stop question, 'these cases should be held. If the Court
vacates and remands in the other cases, I think these
petitioners should receive the same treatment. I might
add that these Sierra Blanca cases are the only petitions
presently before us that potentially present the issue of
stops for questioning at checkpoints. I was in error in my
memorandum of May 23, in suggesting that several pending
petitions presented this issue. Our options, if we want to
settle this remaining issue and to firant one of these petitions
despite the "functional-equivalency hurdle, or to wait for
a petition that presents the issue cleanly. My current
inclination is to vacate and remand these petitions and wait.
No. 74-5062 Quiroz-Reyna v. United States
No. 74-5307 Baca v. United States
These petitions involve stops conducted prior to the
date of decision in Almeida-Sanchez. None of the present

- 2 cases will decide whether the principles of Brignoni-Ponce
should be applied retroactively. I believe, however, that
the rationale of Peltier and the lower-court decisions prior
to Almeida-Sanchez would lead to a conclusion that the Government reasonably could have continued making such stops at
least until the date of decision in Almeida-Sanchez. Because
we are not deciding the retroactivity question, it would seem
appropriate to vacate these judgments and remand to the courts
of appeals in light of Peltier, Brw~ and Brignoni-Ponce, but
I could also vote to deny the pet t ons if that is the
consensus.

':

:.;

The remaining cases represent stops for questioning
upheld by the courts of appeals on "reasonable suspicion."
In light of the decision in Bri~noni-Ponce, the only issues
raised by these petitions will e the application of that
standard to the facts of each case. For your convenience,
I will outline the facts in each case, and indicate how I
intend to vote.
No. 74-5422 Maduens-Astoraa and Lopez-Saenz
v. United States
This petition challenges two separate indicents. In
the first {Madueno-Astorga), Border Patrol agents saw
Petitioner's car on an Interstate Highway 10 miles from
the border, at 6:50 a.m. They said that the car had a large
trunk and a heavy-duty suspension system, and appeared to
"drift" on curves. They concluded that it 111.1st be heavily
loaded, so they stopped it. There were no other suspicious
circumstances preceding the stop. Vacate and remand under
Brignoni-Ponce.

' ,,

The second incident (Lopez-Saenz) occurred in the early
morning hours less than half a mile from the Mexican border,
in an area "heavily used by alien and narcotic smugglers."
The officer tried to stop a Ranchero pick-up (not Petitioner's
vehicle). It tried to run him off the road, but he finally
stopped it. The driver jumped out and fled, leaving the
pick-up in a ditch. Within 2 to 4 minutes (and before the
officer discovered that the pick-up contained marijuana),
another Ranchero pick-up came by. The driver (Petitioner)
appeared to be Mexican. The officer stopped the pick-up

.·

- 3 suspecting it might be associated with the first vehicle,
and found marijuana in plain view. Petitioner does not claim
standing to challenge the stop of the first pick-up, but
contends that there was no reasonable basis for the officer
to suspect that he was associated with it. Deny.
No. 74-6003 Alvarez-Garcia v. United States
Petitioner and a codefendant were traveling, about

S: 15 a.m., in dosely-following cars near the border.

They
were traveling slowly, and the trailing car did not take
opportunities to pass the lead car. Petitioner was driving
the lead car • . Border Patrol officers followed them and
noticed that the trailing car was riding low, despite new
shock absorbers. It also appeared to have control problems
on curves, leading the officers to believe it was heavily
loaded. The officers stopped the rear car and found
marijuana, then stopped Petitioner's car, which also had
new shock absorbers but was not riding l~w. Deny.
No. 74-6061 Rocha-Lopez v. United States
Border Patrol officers saw Petitioner (a Mexican-American)
at 6:40 a.m. on a road 1-1/2 miles from the border in an area
"notorious for smuggling." The officers testified that normal
traffic at that hour is light and that they can identify most
drivers as local residents. They did not recognize Petitioner.
When Petitioner saw the agents, he jammed on his brakes,
reducing his speed to 10 mph. On these facts he was stopped.
Vacate and Remand.
No. 74-6086 Gonzalez•Diaz v. United States
Border Patrol officers were on patrol in a "notorious
smuggling area" 7-1/2 miles from the border at 2:30 a.m.
They stopped to investigate an unusually-placed rock beside
the road and saw footprints, leading them to believe that
aliens had been picked up there. Petitioner then drove by
in a Pontiac sedan of a sort often used for smuggling aliens.
He was Mexican, a stranger to the officers, and he was
traveling 20 mph in a SS mph zone. They followed him for
a short distance and stopped him. Vaca.te and remand.

I

l

I;
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No. 74-6259

Gonzales v. United States

A Border Patrol officer was on patrol at 5:20 a.m.
1-1/2 miles from the border on a road that parallels the
Rio Grande. The area between the highway and the river is
sparsely populated and is often used by smugglers. The
officer saw Petitioner's truck top a levee, coming from the
border, and turn its headlights on. The officer became
suspicious and signaled the vehicle to stop. Petitioner
tried to run him off the road, but the officer finally
succeeded in stopping the truck. Deny.

L.F.P., Jr.
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CHAMBERS DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 74-114
United States, Petitioner,

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of ApFelix Humberto Brignonipeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Ponce.

v.

[May -, 1975]
Memorandum of MR. JusTICE PowELL.
This case raises questions as to the United States
Border Patrol's authority to stop automobiles in areas
near the Mexican border. It differs from our decision in
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973),
in that the Border Patrol does not claim authority to
search ~cars, but only to question the occupants
about their citizenship and immigration status.
I
As a part of its regular traffic checking operations in
southern California, the Border Patrol operates a fixed
checkpoint on Interstate Highway 5 south of San Clemente. On the evening of March 11, 1973, the checkpoint was closed because of inclement weather, but two
agents were observing northbound traffic from a patrol
car parked at the side of the highway. The road was
dark, and they were using the patrol car's headlights to
illuminate passing cars. They pursued respondent's car
and stopped it, saying later that their only reason for
doing so was that its three occupants appeared to be of
Mexican descent. The agents questioned respondent
and his two passengers about their citizenship and
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learned that the passengers were aliens who had entered
the country illegally. All three were then arrested, and
respondent was charged with two counts of knowingly
transporting illegal immigrants, a violation of 18 U. S. C.
§ 1324 (a) (2). At trial respondent moved to suppress
the testimony of and about the two passengers, claiming
that this evidence was the fruit of an illegal seizure. The
trial court denied the motion, the aliens testified at trial,
and respondent was convicted on both counts.
Respondent's appeal was pending in the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals when we announced our decision in
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, holding that
the Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of roving
patrols to search vehicles, with neither a warrant nor
probable cause, at points removed from the border and
·its functional equivalents. The Court of Appeals, sitting
en bane, held that the facts of this case were more like
a roving-patrol stop than a stop at a traffic checkpoint,
and applied the principles of Almeida-Sanchez? The
court held that the Fourth Amendment, as interpreted
in Almeida-Sanchez, forbids stopping a vehicle, even for
the limited purpose of questioning its occupants, unless
the officers have a 11 founded suspicion" that the occupants are aliens illegally in the country. The court
refused to find that Mexican ancestry alone furnished
such a 11 founded suspicion" and held that respondent's
motion to suppress should have been granted. 2 United
~For the Court of Appeals' purposes, the distinction between a
roving patrol and a fixed checkpoint was controlling. The court
previously had held that the principles of Almeida-Sanchez applied
retrospectively to the activities of roving patrols but not to those
of fixed checkpoints. See United States v. Peltier, 500 F. 2d 985
(CA9 1974), rev'd,- U.S.- (1975); United States v. Bowen,
500 F. 2d 960 (CA9 1974), aff'd,- U. S. (1975).
2 There may be room to question whether voluntary testimony
of a witness at trial, as opposed to a government agent's testimony
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States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 499 F. 2d 1109 (CA9 1974).
We granted certiorari and set the case for oral argument
with Nos. 73-2050 and 73- 6848. 419 U. S. 824 (1974).
The Government does not challenge the Court of
Appeals' conclusion that, under the facts of this case,
the stop of respondent's car was a roving-patrol stop
rather than a fixed checkpoint stop. Brief for the
United States, at 8. Nor does the Government challenge
the retroactive application of Almeida-SanchezJ ~.,
at 9, or contend that the San Clemente checkpoint is the
functional equivalent of the border. The only question
presented for decision is whether a roving patrol may
stop a vehicle in an area near the border and question
its occupants when the only ground· for suspicion is that
the occupants appear to be of Mexican ancestry. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
II

The Government claims two sources of statutory authority for making warrantless stops of cars in border
areas. Section 287 (a) ( 1) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1357 (a) (1) (1970) , authorizes any officer or employee of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, without a warrant, "to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his
right to be or to remain in the United States." There
1s no geographical limitation on this authority. The
Government contends that, at least in the areas adjacent
to the Mexican border, a person's apparent Mexican
about obj ects seized or statements overheard, is subject to suppression as the fruit of an illegal search or seizure. See Unit ed States v.
Guana-Sanchez, 484 F. 2d 590 (CA7 1973), writ dismissed as
improvidently granted,- U. S . - (1975) . But, since the question was not raised in the petition for certiorari, we do not reach
"it in this case.
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ancestry alone justifies belief that he or she is an alien
and satisfies the requirement of this statute. Section
287 (a) (3) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1357 (a) (3) (197(j,
authorizes agents, without a warrant,
"within a reasonable distance from any external
boundary of the United States, to board and search
for aliens any vessel within the territorial waters of
the United States and any railway car, aircraft, conveyance, or vehicle .... "
The Border Patrol uses this section for authority to stop
moving vehicles and question the occupants about their
citizenship, in the absence of cause to believe that they
may be aliens or that the vehicle may be carrying concealed aliens. 3 But "no Act of Congress can authorize
a violation of the Constitution," Aln1-eida-Sanchez, supra,
at 272, and we must decide whether the Fourth Amendment allows such random vehicle stops in the border
areas.

III
The Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the
person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest. Davis v. Mississippi,
394 U. S. 721 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 16-19
(1968). "[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has
'seized' that person," Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 16, and the
3 We cannot accept respondent's contention that the legislative
history of § 287 (a ) (3) establishes that Congress implicitly conditioned immigration officers' authority to board and search vehicles
on a belief that the vehicles contain aliens. The statute's predecessor
was amended in 1946 expressly to eliminate the "belief" requirement
and to substitute for it the geographi cal limitation that appears in
§ 287 (a) (3). See Act of Feb. 27, 1925, 43 Stat. 1049-1050; Act
of Aug. 7, 1946, 60 Stat. 865.
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Fourth Amendment requires that the seizure be "reasonable." As with other categories of police action subject
to the Fourth Amendment, the reasonableness of such
seizures depends on a balance between the public interest
and the individual's right to personal security free of
arbitrary interference by law officers. Terry v. Ohio,
supra, at 20-27; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S.
523 (1967).
The Government has made a convincing demonstration
that the public interest demands effective measures to
control the illegal entry of aliens at the Mexican border.
Estimates of the number of illegal immigrants in the
United States vary widely. A conservative estimate in
1972 produced a figure of about one million, but the
Immigration and Naturalization Service now suggests
there may be as many as 10 or 12 million aliens illegally
in the country. 4 Whatever the number, these aliens
create significant economic and social problems, competing with citizens and legal resident aliens for jobs, and
generating extra demand for social services. The aliens
themselves are vulnerable to exploitation because they
cannot complain of substandard working conditions without risking deportation. See generally Hearings on
Illegal Aliens before Subcom. No. 1 of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 13, pts. 1-5
(1971-1972). The Government has estimated that 85%
of the aliens illegally in the country are from Mexico.
United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 402 (SD Cal.
4
The estimate of one million was produced by the Commissioner
of the INS for the Immigration and Nationality Subcommittee of
the House Judiciary Committee. Hearings on Illegal Aliens before
Subcom. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess., ser. 13, pt. 5, at 1323-1325 (1972). The higher estimate
appears in the 1974 Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, at iii.
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1973). 5 The border with Mexico is almost 2,000 miles
long, and even a vastly reinforced Border Patrol would
find it impossible to prevent illegal border crossings.
Many aliens cross the Mexican border on foot, miles away
from patrolled areas, and then purchase transportation
from the border area to inland metropolitan centers,
where they find jobs and elude the immigration authorities. Others gain entry on valid temporary border. crossing permits, but then violate the conditions of their
entry. Most of these aliens leave the border area in
automobiles, often assisted by professional "alien smugglers." The Border Patrol's traffic checking operations
are designed to prevent this inland movement. They
succeed in apprehending some illegal entrants and smugglers, and they deter the movement of others by threatening apprehension and making the cost of illegal transportation more expensive.
Against these valid public interests we must weigh the
interference with individual liberty that results when an
officer stops an automobile and questions its occupants.
The intrusion is modest. The Government tells us that
a stop by a roving patrol "usually consumes no more than
a minute." Brief for the United States, at 25. There
is no search of the vehicle or its occupants, and the visual
inspection is limited to those parts of the vehicle that
can be seen by anyone standing alongside. 6 According
This estimate tends to be confirmed by the consistently high
proportion of Mexican nationals in the number of deportable aliens
arrested each year. In 1970, for example, 80% of the deportable
aliens arrested were from Mexico. See INS, 19~~ Annual Report,
at 95. In 1974, the figure was 92%. INS, 1977\ Annual Report,
at 95.
6 In this case the officers did search respondent's car, but because
they found no more incriminating evidence the validity of the search
is not in issue. Almeida-Sanchez changed the Border Patrol's practice of searching cars on routine stops, and the Government informs
us that roving patrols now search vehicles only when they have
5
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to the Government, " [a] 11 that is required of the vehicle's
occupants is a response to a brief question or two and
possibly the production of a document evidencing a right
to be in the United States." Ibid.
Because of the limited nature of the intrusion, stops
of this sort may be justified on facts that do not amount
to the probable cause required for an arrest. In Terry v.
Ohio, supra, the Court declined expressly to decide
whether facts not amounting to probable cause could
justify an "investigative seizure" short of an arrest, 392
U. S., at 19 n. 16, but it approved a limited search-a
pat-down for weapons-for the protection of an officer
investigating suspicious behavior of persons he reasonably believed to be armed and dangerous. The Court
approved such a search on facts that did not constitute
probable cause to believe the suspects guilty of a crime,
requiring only that "the police officer ... be able to point
to specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant" a belief that his safety or that of others is in
danger. !d., at 21, 27.
We elaborated on Terry in Adams v. Williams, 407
U. S. 143 (1972), holding that a policeman was justified
in approaching the respondent to investigate a tip that
he was carrying narcotics and a gun. We said,
"The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug
his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, Terry recognizes
that it may be the essence of good police work to
adopt an intermediate response. . . . A brief stop of
a suspicious individual, in order to determine his
probable cause to believe they will find illegally present aliens or
contraband. Brief for the United States, at 25.
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identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily
while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at
the time." Id., at 145-146.
These cases together establish that in appropriate circumstances, the Fourth Amendment allows a properly
limited "search" or "seizure" on facts that do not constitute probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a crime or that he possesses contraband or evidence
linking him to a crime. In both Terry and Adams v.
Williams the investigating officers had reasonable grounds
· to believe that the suspects were armed and that they
might be dangerous. The public interest justified the
limited searches and seizures in those cases as a method
of preventing crime. In this case as well, because of the
importance of the governmental interest at stake, the
minimal intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of
practical alternatives for policing illegal entry, we hold
that when an officer's observations lead him reasonably
to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens
who are illegally in the country, he may stop the car
briElfly and investigate the circumstances that provoke
suspicion. As in Te;rry, the stop and inquiry must be
"reasonably related in scope to the justification for their
initiation." 392 U. S., at 29. The officer may question
the driver and passengers about their citizenship and
immigration status, and he may ask them to explain suspicious circumstances, but any further detention or
search must be based on consent or probable cause.
We are unwilling to accept the Government's argument and dispense entirely with the requirement that
officers must have a reasonable suspicion to justify rovingpatrol stops. 7 Roads near the border carry not only
7 Because the stop in this case was made without a warrant and
the officers made no effort to obtain one, we have no occasion to
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aliens seeking to enter the country illegally, but a large
volume of legitimate traffic as well. San Diego, with a
metropolitan population of 1.3 million, is located on the
border. Texas has two sizeable metropolitan areas
directly on the border: El Paso, with a population of
360,000, and the Brownsville-McAllen area, with a combined population of 320,000: We· are confident that a
large majority of traffic in these cities is lawful and that
relatively few of their residents have any connection with
the illegal entry and transportation of aliens. To approve roving-patrol stops of all vehicles in the border
area, without any suspicion that a particular vehicle is
carrying illegal immigrants, would subject the residents
of these areas to potentially unlimited interference with
their use of the highways, solely at the discretion of
Border Patrol officers. The only formal limitation on
tliat discretion appears to be the administrative regulation defining the term "reasonable distance" in § 287
(a) (3) to mean within 100 air miles from the border.
s·CFR § 287.1 ( 1974). Thus, if we approved the Govet.nment's position in this case, Border Patrol agents
coulCI stop motorists at random for questioning, day or
night, anywhere within 100 air miles of the 2,000-mile
border, on a city street, a busy highway, or a desert road,
without any reason to suspect that they have violated
any law. We cannot hold that such broad and unlimited discretion is "reasonable" under the Fourth
Amendment.
The Government also has contended that the public
interest in enforcing conditions on legal alien entry justifies stopping persons who may be aliens to ask about
decide whether a warrant could be issued to stop cars in a designated
area on the basis of conditions in the area as a whole and in the
absence of reason to suspect that any particular car is carrying
aliens. See Almeida-Sanchez, supra, at 275 (MR. Jus'riCE PowELL,
concurring); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967).
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their citizenship and immigration status. Although we
may assume for purposes of this case that the broad
congressional power over immigration, see Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 765- 767 (1972) , authorizes Congress to admit aliens on condition that they will submit
to reasonable questioning about their right to be and
remain in the country, this power cannot diminish the
Fourth Amendment rights of citizens who may be mistaken for aliens. For the same reasons that the Fourth
Amendment forbids stopping vehicles at random to
inquire if they are carrying aliens who are illegally in the
country, it also forbids stopping or detaining persons for
questioning about their citizenship on less than a reasonable suspicion that they may be aliens.

IV
The effect of our decision is to limit exercise of the
authority granted by both§ 287 (a) (1) and§ 287 (a) (3).
Except at the border and its functional equivalents,
agents on roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they
are aware of specific articulable facts, together with
rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably
warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who
may be illegally in the country.
Any number of factors may be taken into account in
deciding whether there is reasonable suspicion to stop a
car in the border area. Agents may consider the area
in which they encounter a vehicle. Its proximity to the
border, the usual patterns of traffic on the particular
road, and previous experience with alien traffic are all
relevant. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132,
159-161 (1925); United States v. Jaime-Barrios, 494 F.
2d 455 (CA9), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 972 (1974). They
also may consider information about recent illegal border
crossings in the area. The driver's behavior may be rele-
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vant, as erratic driving or obvious attempts to evade
officers can add to a reasonable suspicion. See United
States v. Larios-Montes, 500 F. 2d 941 (CA9, 1974);
Duprez v. United States, 435 F. 2d 1276 (CA9 1970).
Aspects of the vehicle itself may provoke suspicion. For
instance, agents say that certain station wagons, with
large compartments for fold-down seats or spare tires,
are frequently used for transporting concealed aliens.
See United States v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F. 2d 853 (CA9
1973) , cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1136 (1974). The vehicle
may appear to be heavily loaded, it may have an extraordinary number of passengers, or the agent may see persons trying to hide when he passes. See United States v.
Larios-M ontes, supra. The Government also says that
trained officers can recognize the characteristic appearance of persons who live in Mexico, relying on such factors as the mode of dress and haircut. Reply Brief for
the United States in United States v. Ortiz, at 12. In all
situations the agent is entitled to assess the facts in light
of his experience detecting illegal entry and smuggling.
Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 27.
In this case the agents relied on a single fact to justify
stopping respondent's car: the apparent Mexican ancestry of the occupants. 8 We cannot conclude that the
agents had reasonable grounds to believe that the three
occupants were aliens. At best the agents had only a
fleeting glimpse of the persons in the moving car, illumiThe Government in its brief has also argued that the location
of the stop should be considered in deciding whether the agents had
adequate reason to stop respondent's car. This appears, however,
to be an after-the-fact justification. At the suppression hearing
the agents gave no reason for the stop except the apparent Mexican
ancestry of the car's occupants. It is not even clear that the Government presented the broader justification to the Court of Appeals.
We therefore decline to give any weight to the location of the stop
in this case.
8
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nated by headlights. Even if they saw enough to think
that the occupants were of Mexican descent, this factor
alone would justify neither a reasonable belief that they
were aliens, nor a reasonable belief that the car contained
aliens who were illegally in the country. Large numbers
of native-born and naturalized citizens have the physical
characteristics identified with Mexican ancestry, and
~even in the border area a relatively small proportion of them are aliens. 9 The likelihood that any given
person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to
make Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but standing
alone it is not enough to justify stopping all MexicanAmericans to ask if they are aliens.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.

The 1970 census and the INS figures for alien registration in
1970 provide the following information about the Mexican-American
population in the border States. There were 1,619,064 persons o_!. ;!$
Mexican origin in Texas, and 200,004 (or 12.4%) registered.JaiTens.
In New Mexico there were 119,049 persons of Mexican origin, and
10,171 (or 8.5%) registered as aliens. In Arizona there were 239,811
persons of Mexican origin, and 34,075 (or 14.2%) registered as
aliens. In California there were 1,857,267 persons of Mexican origin,
~ v..~a,dn.. 379,951 (or 20.4%) registered as aliens. Bureau of the CensusJ _
1910
Subject Reports: Persons of Spanish Origin 2 (1970); INSJ.(Annual
Report, at 105. These figures, of course, do not present the entire
9

picture. The number of registered aliens from Mexico has increased
since 1970, INS, 1974 Annual Report, at 105, and we may assume
that very few illegal immigrants appear in the registration figures.
On the other hand, many of the 950,000 other persons of Spanish
origin living in these border States, see Bureau of the Census, supra,
at 7, may have an appearance similar to persons of Mexican origin.
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This case raises questions as to the United States
Border Patrol's authority to stop automobiles in areas
near the Mexican border. It differs from our decision in
Alrneida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973).
in that the Border Patrol does not claim authority to
search cars, but only to question the occupants about
their citizenship a!ld immigration status.

I
As a part of its regular traffic checking operations in
southern California, the Border Patrol operates a fixed
checkpoint on Interstate Highway 5 south of San Clemente. On the evening of March 11, 1973, the checkpoint was closed because of inclement weather, but two
officers were observing northbound traffic from a patrol
car parked at the side of the highway. The road was
dark, and they were using the patrol car's headlights to
illuminate passing cars. They pursued respondent's car
and stopped it, saying later that their only reason for
doing so was that its three occupants appeared to be of
Mexican descent. The officers questioned respondent,
and his two passengers about their citizenship and
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learned that the passengers were aliens who had entered
the country illegally. All three were then arrested, and
respondent was charged with two counts of knowingly
transporting illeg&l immigrants, a violation of 18 U. S. C.
§ 1324 (a)(2). At trial respondent moved to suppress
the testimony of and about the two passengers, claiming
that this evidenc~ was the fruit of an illegal seizure. The
trial court denied the motion, the aliens testified at trial,
and respondent was convicted on both counts.
Respondent's appeal was pending in the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals when we announced our decision in
Almeida-Sanchez v. United State~, supra, holding that
the Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of roving
patrols to search vehicles, with neither · a warrant nor
probable cause, at points removed from the border and
its functional equivalents. The Court of Appeals, sitting
en bane, held that the facts of this case were more like
a roving-patrol stop than a stop at a traffic checkpoint,
and applied the principles of Almeida-Sanchez.1 The
court held that the Fourth Amendment, as interpreted
'in Almeida-Sanchez, forbids stopping a vehicle, even for
the limited purpose of questioning its occupants, unlesR
the officers have a "founded suspicion" that the occupants are aliens illegally in the country. The court
refused to find that Mexican ancestry alone supported
such a "founded suspicion" and held that respondent's
motion to suppress should have been granted. 21 United
1 For the (',ourt of Appeals' purposes, the distinction between a
roving patrol and a fixed checkpoint was controlling. The court
previously had held that the principles of Almeida-Sanchez applied
Tetrospectively to the activities of roving patrols but not to those
of fixed checkpoints. SeE' United States v. Peltier, 500 F. 2d 985
(CA9 1974), rev'd, -- U. S. (1975) ; United States v. Bowen,
500 F . 2d 960 (CA9 1974) , afrd, U. S. (1975).
2 There may be room to question whether voluntary testimony
of a witness at trial, as opposed to a, government agent's testimony
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States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 499 F. 2d 1109 (CA9 1974).
We granted certiorari and set the case for oral argument
with Nos. 73-2050 and 73-6848. 419 U. S. 824 (1974).
The Government does not challenge the Court of
Appeals' factu~tl conclusion that the stop of respondent's car was a roving-patrol stop rather than a checkpoint stop. Brief for the United States, at 8. Nor
does the Government challenge the retroactive application of Almeida-Sanchez, id., at 9, or contend that the
San Clemente checkpoint is the functional equivalent of
the border. The only question presented for decision
is whether a roving patrol may stop a vehicle in an area
near the border and question its occupants when the only
ground for suspicion is that the occupants appear to be
of .Mexican ancestry. For the reasons that follow, we
af!tm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

II
The Government claims two sources of statutory authority for stopping cars without warrants in border
areas. Section 287 (a)(1) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U. S. C. '§ 1357 (a) (1) (1970), authorizes any officer or employee of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, without a warrant, "to interrogate any alien o~ person believed to be an alien as to his
right to be or to remain in the United States." There
is no geographical limitation on this authority. The
Government contends that, at least in the areas adjacent
to the Mexican border, a person's apparent Mexican
about objects saized or statements overheard, is subject to suppre::>sion a.s the fruit of an illegal search or seizure. See United States v.
Guana-Sanchez, 484 F . 2d .590 (CA7 1973), writ dismissed as
improvidently granted, U S. (1975) . But, since the question was not r'lised in the petihon for certiorari, we do not address
it in this case.
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ancestry alone justifies belief that he or she is an alien
and satisfies the requirement of this statute. Section
287 (a) (3) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1357 (a) (3) (1970),
authorizes agents, without a warrant,
"within a reasonable distance from any external
boundary of the United States, to board and search
for aliens any vessel within the territorial waters of
the United States and any railway car, aircraft, conveyance, or vehicle , , , ;''
The Border Patrol uses this section for authority to stop
moving vehicles and question the occupants about their
citizenship, even when its officers have no reason to believe that the occupants are aliens or that other aliens
may be concealed in the vehicle. 3 Under current regulations, this authority may be exercised anywhere within
100 mlles of the "border. 8 CFR § 287.1 (1974). But
"no Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the
Constitution," Almeida-Sanchez, supra, at 272, and we
must decide whether the Fourth Amendment allows
such random vehicle stops in the border areas.

III
The Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the
person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest. Davis v. Mississippi,
394 U. S. 721 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 16-19
( 1968). "[W] he never a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has
We cannot accept reapondent'r1 contention that the legislative
history of § 287 (a) (3) establishes that Congress implicitly conditioned immigration officers' authority to board and search vehicles
on a belief that the vehicles contain aliens. The statute's predecessor
was amended in 1946 expressly to ehminate the "belief" requirement
and to substitute for it the geographical limitation that appears in
~ 287 (a) (3) . See Act of Feb. 27, 1925, 43 Stat. 1049- 1050; Act
(){ Aug. 7, 1946, 60 Stat. 865.
3
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'seized' that person," Tf3rry v. Ohio, supra, at 16, and the
Fourth Amendment requires that the seizure be "reasonable." As with other categories of police action subject
to the Fourth Amendment, the reasonableness of such
seizures depend~ on a balance between the public interest
and the individual's right to personal security free of
arbitrary interference by law officers. Terry v. Ohio,
supra, at 20-27; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S.
523 (1967) .
The Government has made a convincing demonstration
that the public interest demands effective measures to
control the illegal entry of aliens at the Mexican border.
Estimates of the number of illegal immigrants in the
United States vary widely. A conservative estimate in
1972 produced a figure of about one million, but the
Immigration and Naturalization Service now suggests
there may be as many as 10 or 12 million aliens illegally
in the country.4 Whatever the number, these aliens
create significant economic and social problems, competing with citizens and legal resident aliens for jobs, and
generating extra demand for social services. The aliens
themselves are vulnerable to exploitation because they
cannot complain of substandard working conditions without risking deportation. See generally · Hearings on II·
legal Aliens before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 13, pts. 1-5
(1971-1972). The Government ha,e estimated that 85%
of the aliens illegally in the country are from Mexico.
United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 402 (SD Cal.
The estimate of one million was produced by the Commissioner
of the INS for the Immigration and Nationality Subcommittee of
the House Judiciary Committee. Hearings on Illegal Aliens before
Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm on thr Judiciary, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., ser. 13, pt 5, at 1323-1325 (1972). The higher estimate
appears in the 1974 Annual Report of the Immigration and Natural~
ization Service, at iii.
4
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1973) .5 The Mexican border is almost 2,000 miles
long, and even a vastly reinforced Border Patrol would
find it impossible to prevent illegal border crossings.
Many aliens cross the Mexicart border on foot, miles away
from patrolled areas, and then purchase transportation
from the border area to inland cities, where
they find jobs and elude t.he immigration authorities.
Others gain entry on valid temporary border-crossing
permits, but then violate the conditions of their entry.
Most of t4ese aliens leave the border area in private
vehicles, often assisted by professional "alien smugglers." The Border Patrol's traffic checking operations
are designed to prevent this inland movement. They
succeed in apprehending some illegal entrants and smugglers, and they deter the movement of others by threatening apprehension and making the cost of illegal transportation more expensive.
Against these valid public interests we must weigh the
interference with individual liberty that results when an
officer stops an automobile and questions its occupants.
The intrusion is modest. The Government tells us that
a stop by a roving patrol "usually consumes no more than
a minute." Brief for the United States, at 25. There
is no search of the vehicle or its occupants, and the visual
inspection is limited to those parts of the vehicle that
can be seen by anyone standing alongside. 6 According
5 This estimate tends to be confirmed by the consistently high
proportion of Mexican nationals in the number of deportable aliens
arrested each year. In 1970, for example, 80% of the deportable
aliens arrested were from Mexico. See INS, 1970 Annual Report,
~lt 95. In 1974, the figure was 92% . INS, 1974 Annual Report ,
at 95.
6 In this case the officers did search respondent's car, but because
they found no other incriminating evidence the validity of the search
is not in issue. Alrneida-Sanchez changed the Border Patrol's practice of searching cars on routine stops, and the Government informs
us that roving patrols now search vehicles only when they have

'· ".
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to the Government, "[a]ll that is required of the vehicle's
occupants is a response to a brief question or two and
possibly the production of a document evidencing a right
to be in the United States." Ibid.
Because of the limited nature of the intrusion, stops
of this sort may be justified on facts that do not amount
to the probable ca,use required for an arrest. In Terry v.
Ohio, supra, the Court declined expressly to decide
whether facts not amounting to probable cause could
justify an "investigative seizure" short of an arrest, 392
U. S., at 19 n. 16, but it approved a limited search-a
pat-down for weapons-for the protection of an officer
investigating suspicious behavior of persons he reasonably believed to be armed and dangerous. ThP. Court
approved such a search on facts that did not constitute,
probable cause to believe the suspects guilty of a crime,
requiring only that "the police officer ... be able to point
to specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant" a belief that his safety or that of others is in
danger. ld., at 21, 27.
We elaborated on Terry in Adams v. Williams, 407
U. S. 143 (1972), holding that a policeman was justified
in approaching the respondent to investigate a tip that
he was carrying narcotics and a gun. We said,
"The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug
his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, Terry recognizes
that it may be the essence of good police work to
adopt an intermediate response. . . . A brief stop of'
a suspicious individual, in order to determine his
probable cause to believe they will find illegally present aliens ct·
contraband. Brief for the United State'.~>., &t 25 •

....
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identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily
while obtaming more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at
the time.'' Id., at 145-146.
These cases together establish that in appropriate circumstances the Fourth Amendment allows a properly
litnited "search" or "seizure'' on facts that do not constitute probable cause to arrest or to search for contraband
or evidence of crime. In both Terry and Adams v.
Williams the investigating officers had reasonable grounds
to believe that the suspects were armed and that they
might be dangerous. The limited searches and seizures
in those cases were a valid method of protecting the
public and preventinB crime. In this case as well, because of the importance of the governmental interest at
stake, the minimal intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of practical alternatives for policing the border, we
hold that when an officer's observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain
aliens who are illegally m the country, he may stop the
car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke
suspicion. As in Terry, the stop and inquiry must be
"reasonably related in scope to the justification for their
initiation." 392 U. S., at 29. The officer may question
the driver and passengers about their citizenship and
immigration status, and he may ask them to explain suspicious circumstances, but any further detention or
search must be based on consent or probable cause.
We are uu willing to let the Border Patrol dis~
pense entirely with the requirement that officer
must haVf' n reasonable suspimon to justify roving*
patrol stops/ Roads near the border carry not only
7 Because the ~>top in this casf' was made without a warrant and
the officers made no effort to obtain one, we have no occasion to
decide whether a warrant could be issued to stop cars in a designated
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aliens seeking to enter the country illegally, but a large
volume of legitimate traffic as well. San Diego; with a
metropolitan population of 1.3 million, is loct'!-ted on the
border. Texas has two fairly large metropolitan areas
directly on the border: El Paso, with a population of
360,000, and the Brownsville-McAllen area, with a combined population of 320,000. We are confident that a
large majority of traffic in these cities is lt1-wful and that
relatively few of their residents have any connection with
the illegal entry and transportation of aliens. To approve roving-patrol stops of all vehicles ,in the border
area, without any suspicion th~;~.t a particular vehicle is
carrying illegal immigrants, would subject the residents
of these areas to potentially unlimited interfert'lnce with
their use of the highw~tys, solely at the discretion of
Border Patrol officers. 'The only formal limitation on
that discretion appears to be the administrative regulation defining the term "reasonable distance" in § 287
(a)(3) to mean within 100 air miles from the border.
8 CFR § 287.1 (1974). Thus, if we approved the Government's position in this case, Border Patrol officers
could stop motorists at random for questioning, day or
night, anywhere within 100 air miles of the 2,000-mile
border, on a city street, a busy highway, or a desert road,
without any reason to suspect that they have violated
any law. We cannqt hold that such broad and unJim,..
i.ted discretion is "reasonable" under the Fourth
Amendment.
The Government also has contended that the publicinterest in enforcing conditions on legal alien entry justifies stopping persons who may be aliens to ask about
area on the basis of conditions in the area as a whole and in the·
absence of reason to suspect that any particular car is carrying
aliens. See Almeida-Sanchez, S·Upra, at 275 (MR. JusTICE PowELL,
concurring) ; Cmnam v. Municipal Cou~·t, 387 U. S. 523 (1967) •

,.
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their citizenship and immigration status. Although we
may assume for purposes of this case that the broad
congressional power over immigration, see Kleindiemt v.
Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, ·755....:767 (1972), authorizes Congress to admit aliens on condition that they will submit
to reasonable questioning about their right to be and
remain in the country, this power cannot diminish the
Fourth Amendment rights of citizen!! who may 'be mistaken for aliens. For the same reasons that the Fourth
Amendment forbids stopping vehicles at random to
inquire if they are carrying aliens who are illegally in the
country, it also forbids stopping or detaining persons for
·questioning about their citizenship on less than a reason..
able suspicion that they may be aliens.

IV
'The effect of our decision is to limit exerCise of the
authority granted by both § 287 (a)(l) and §·287 (a)(3~.
Except at the border and its functional equivalents,
officers on roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they
are aware of specific articulable facts, together with
rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably
warrant suspicion that the vehic1es contain aliens whe
may be illegally in the country.8
Any number of factors may be taken into account 'in
deciding whether there is reasonable suspicion to stop a
car in the border area. Officers may consider the chara~
teristics of the ·area in which they encounter a vehicle.
Its proximity to the border, the usual patterns
of traffic on the particular road, and previous
8 As noted above, we reserve the question whether Border Patrol
·officers also may stop persons Teasonably believed to be alieru:
when there is no reason to believe they are illegally m the country.
The facts of this case do not require decision on the point. infra,
at 12.
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experience with alien traffic are all relevant. See
Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 159161 (1925); United States v. Jaime-Barrios, 494 F.
2d 455 (CA9), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 972 (1974). They
also may consider information about recent illegal border
crossings in the area. The driver's behavior may be relevant, as erratic driving or obvious attempts to evade
officers can add to a reasonable suspicion. See United
States v. Larios-Montes, 500 F. 2d 941 (CAO 1974);
Duprez v. United States, 435 F. 2d 1276 (CA9 1970).
Aspects of the vehicle itself may justify suspicion. For
instance, officers say that certain station wagons, with
large compartments for fold-down seats or spare tires,
are frequently used for transporting concealed aliens.
See United States v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F. 2d 853 (CA9
1973), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1136 (1974). The vehicle
may appear to be heavily loaded, it may have an extraordinary number of passengers, or the officers may observe
persons trying to hide. See United States v. LariosM ontes, supra. The Government also points out that
trained officers can recognize the characteristic appearance of persons who live in Mexico, relying on such factors as the mode of dress and haircut. Reply Brief for
the United States in United States v. Ortiz, at 12. In all
situations the officer IS entitled to assess the facts in light
of his experience detecting illegal entry and smuggling.
Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 27.
In this case the officers relied on a single factor to justify stopping respondent's car : the apparent Mexican ancestry of the occupants.~ We cannot conclude that~
0 The Government in its brief also has argued that the location
of this stop should be considered in decidmg whether the officers had
adequate reason to stop respondent's car. This appears, however,
to be an after-the-fa ct justification. At tnal the officers gave no
reason for the stop except the apparent Mexican ancestry of the
<ettr':::; or!'upants. It is not even clear that the Government presented

t~e.re.
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were reasonable grounds to believe that the three
occupants were aliens. At best the officers had only a
fleeting glimpse of the persons in the moving car, illuminated by headlights. Even if they saw enough to think
that the occupants were of Mexican descent, this factor
alone would justify neither a reasonable belief that they
were aliens, nor a reasonable belief that the car concealed
other aliens who were illegally in the country. Large
numbers of native-born and naturalized citizens have the
physical characteristics identified with Mexican ancestry,
and even in the border area a relatively small propor- tion of them are aliens. 10 The likelihood that any given
person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to
make Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but standing
alone it is not enough to justify stopping all MexicanAmericans to ask if they are aliens.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.
the broader justification to the Court of Appeals. We therefore
decline at this stage of the case to give any weight to the location
of the stop.
10 The 1970 census and the INS figures for alien registration in
1970 provide the following information about the Mexican-American·
population in the border States. There were 1,619,064 persons of
Mexican origin in Texas, and 200,004 (or 12.4%) of them registered
al': aliens. In New Mexico there were 119,049 persons of Mexican
origin, and 10,171 (or 8.5%) registered as aliens. In Arizona there·
were 239,811 persons of Mexican origin, and 34,075 (or 14.2%)
registered as aliens. In California there were 1,857,267 persons of
Mexican origin, and 379,951 (or 20.4%) registered as aliens. Bureau of the Census, Subject Reports: Persons of Spanish Origin 2·
(1970) ; INS, 1970 Annual Report, at 105. These figures, of course,
do not present the entire picture. The number of registered aliens
from Mexico has increased since 1970, INS, 1974 Annual Report, at
105, and we assume that very few illegal immigrants appear in the
registration figures. On the other hand, many of the 950,000 other
persons of Sparush origin living in these border States, see Bureau
of the Census, supra, at 7, may have an appearance similar toJ
J,Jersons of Mexican origin.
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This case raises questions as to the United States
Border Patrol's authority to stop automobiles in areas
near the Mexican border. It differs from our decision in
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973)r
in that the Border Patrol does not claim authority to
search cars, but only to question the occupants about
their citizenship a!ld immigration status.

I
As a part of its regular traffic checking operations in
southern California, the Border Patrol operates a fixed
checkpoint on Interstate Highway 5 south of San Clemente. On the evening of March 11, 1973, the checkpoint was closed because of inclement weather, but two
officers were observing northbound traffic from a patrol
car parked at the side of the highway. The road was
dark, and they were using the patrol car's headlights to
illuminate passing cars. They pursued respondent's car
and stopped it, saying later that their only reason for
doing so was that its three occupants appeared to be of
Mexican descent. ' '
n C<'n' questioned respondent.
and his two passengers about their citizenship and
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learned that the passengers were aliens who had entered
the country illegally. All three were then arrested, and
respondent was charged with two counts of knowingly
transporting illeg&l immigrants, a violation of 18 U. S. C.
§ 1324 (a)(2). At trial respondent mqved to suppress
the testimony of and about the two passengers, claiming
that this evidenc/3 was the fruit of an illegal seizure. The
trial court denied the motion, the aliens testified at trial,
and respondent was convicted on both counts.
Respondent's appeal was pending in the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals when we announced our decision in
Almeida-Sanchez v. United State~, supra, holding that
the Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of roving
.11
. - fAJ IU\.0 l..L
patrols to search vehicles, wiiift ~ei~fl:e~ a warrant ~
probable cause, at points removed from the border and orits fu~tionalequivalents. The Court of Appeals, sitting YYJore close( v-e.seVV\bled
en bane, held that the ~oti etthis case we~=("ffiePe mi9cl~
a roving-patrol stop than a stop at a traffic checkpoint,
·and applied the principles of Almeida-Sanchez.1 The
court held that the Fourth Amendment, as interpreted
in Almeida-Sanchez, forbids stopping a vehicle, even for
the limited purpose of questiOning its occupants, unless
.the officers have a "founded suspicion" that the occup'arit~ are'~aliens· illegal1y in the country. The court
rt~fused to find that Mexican ancestry alone supported
such a "founded suspicion" and held that respondent's
motion to suppress should have been granted. 2 United
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1 For the Court of Appeals' purposes, the distinction between a
Toving patrol and a fixed checkpoint was contr(Jlling. The court
previously had held that the principles of Almeida-Sanchez applied
retrospectively to the activities of rovi.ng patrols but not to those
of fixed checkpoints. See Umted States v. Peltier, 500 F. 2d 985
(CA9 1974), rev'd,- U. S. - (1975); United Statea v. Bowen,
500 F . 2d 960 (CA9 1974), aff'd,- U.S.- (1975).
2 There may be room to question whetht•r voluntary testimony
of a witness Itt trial, as opposed to a government agent's testimony
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States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 499 F. 2d 1109 (CA9 1974).
We granted certiorari and set the case for oral argument
with Nos. 73-2050 and 73-6848. 419 U. S. 824 (1974) .
The Government does not challenge the Court of
Appeals' factual conclusion that the stop of .respondent's car was a roviJ1g-patrol stop rather than a checkpoint stop. Brief for the United States, at 8. Nor
does
challenge the retroactive application o Almeida-Sane ez, id., at 9, or contend that the
San Clemente checkpoint is the functional equivalent of
the border. The only EfM~ti91). presentea for creCiSlon
is whether a roving patrol may stop a vehicle in an area
near the border and question its occupants when the only
ground for suspicion \s that the occupants appear to be
of Mexican ancestry. For the reasons that follow, we
a~i·m the decision of the Court of Appeals.

'

ISSUe.

II
The Government claims two sources of statutory au-_ -th
thority for stopping cars without w~trrants in)h"order
e
areas. Section 287 (a)(1) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U. S. C. '§ 1357 (a)(1) (1970), authorizes any officer or employee of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, without a warrant, "to interrogate any alien O:!' person believed to be an alien as to his
right to be or to remain in the United States." There
is no geographical limitation on this authority. The
Government contends that, at least in the areas adjacent
to the Mexican border, a person's apparent Mexican
about objects seized or statements overheard, is subject to suppr~~
sion as the fruit of an illegul search or seizure. See United States v.
Guana-Sa:nchez, 484 F. 2d 590 {CAl 1973), writ dismissed as
improvidently granted, U S. - {1975) . ButfS!nce tbe ques··
tion was not rfliserl in the petition for certiorari, we do not addres.:;
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ancestry alone justifies belief that he or she is an alien
and satisfies the requirement of this statute. Section
287 (a) (3) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1357 (a) (3) (1970),
authorizes agents, without a warrant,
"within a reasonable distance from any external
boundary of the United States, to board and search
for aliens any vessel within the territorial waters of
the United States and any railway car, aircraft, con. veyance, or vehicle . . • ;''
he Border Patrol ~&8B this see~i~J. authority to stop
moving vehicles and question the occupants about their
citizenship, even when its officers have no reason to believe that the occupants are aliens or that other aliens
may be concealed in the vehicle.~ J -Under current regll-1
lations, this authority may be exercised anywhere within!
100 m1les of the border. 8 CFR § 287.1 (1974). But
"no Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the
Constitution," Almeida-Sanchez, supra, at 272, and we
must decide whether the Fourth Amendment allows.
such random vehicle stops in the border areas.

III
· The Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the
person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest. Davis v. Mississ-ippi,
'394 U. S. 721 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 16-19
( 1968). "[W] he never a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has·
We cannot accept re~pondent's contention that the legislative
history of § 287 (a) (3) e~tablishes that Congress implicitly conditioned immigration o.fficers' authority to board and search vehicleson a belief that the vehicle~ contain aliens. The statute's predecessor
was amended in 1946 expressly to eliminate the "belief" requirement
and to substitute for it the geographical limitation that appears in
§ 287 (a) (3) Gee Act of Feb. 27, 1925, 43 Stat. 1049-1050; Act
~r Aug. 7, 1946, 60 Stat. 865.
8
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'seized' that person," Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 16, and the
Fourth Amendment requires that the seizure be "reasonable." As with other categories of police action subject . Cottsira,·.-..-f:s.
to ~Fourth AmendmentA: the reasonableness of sucn
,
r
seizures dependt= on a balance between the public interest
and the individual's right to personal security free~ N'O~
arbitrary interference by law officers. Terry v. Ohio,
supra, · at 20-27; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S.
523 (1967) .
makes
The Government R.as;(Ba«1,__a convincing demonstration
that the public interest demands effective measures to
control the illegal entry of aliens at the Mexican border.
Estimates of the number of illegal immigrants in the
United States vary widely. A conservative estimate in
1972 produced a figure of about one million, but the
Immigration and Naturalization Service now suggests
there may be as many as 10 or 12 million aliens illegally
in the country.4 Whatever the number, these aliens
create significant economic and social problems, competing with citizens and legal resident aliens for jobs, and
generating extra demand for social services. The aliens
themselves are vulnerable to exploitation because they
cannot complain of substandard working conditions without risking deportation. See generally Hearings on II·
legal Aliens before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm.
on the JudiciarY., 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 13, pts. t-;.5
(1971-1972J. jfhe Government ha:;~ estimated that 85%]
of the aliens illegally in the country are from Mexico.
United States( v. Baca, 368 F . Supp. 398, 402 (SD CaL 4

The estimate of one million was produced by the Commissioner
of the INS for the Immigration and Nationality Subcommittee of
the House Judiciary Comm1ttee. Hearings on Illegal Aliens before
Subcomm . No . 1 of the Hou:;e Cornm on the Judiciary, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., ser. 13, pt. 5, at 1323-1325 ( 1972) The higher estimate
appears in the 1974 Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, at iii.
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973) .5 The Mexican border is almost 2,000 miles
long, and even a vastly reinforced Border Patrol would
find it impossible to prevent illegal border crossings.
Many aliens cross the Mexican border on foot, miles away
from patrolled areas, and then purchase transportation
from the border area to inland cities, where
they find jobs and elude the immigration authorities.
Others gain entry on valid temporary border-crossing
permits, but then violate the conditions of their entry.
Most of these aliens leave the border area in private
vehicles, often assisted by professional "alien smug~
glers." The Border Patrol's traffic checking operations
are designed to prevent this inland movement. They
succeed in apprehending some illegal entrants and smug~
glers, and they deter the movement of others by threatening. ap. rehension a?d o~Q&~A-§._ the cost orrrTegal transpor-tatiOn;&9Pe~~B:Si:¥Q..~

-&;~ - ....___A.gamst

valid public interest/;e must weigh the
interference wit individual liberty that results when an
officer stops an automobile and questions its occupants.
The intrusion is modest. The Government tells us that
a stop by a roving patrol "usually consumes no more than
a minute." Brief for the United States, at 25. There
is no search of the vehicle or its occupants, and the visual
inspection is limited to those parts of the vehicle that
can be seen by anyone standing alongside. 6 According
This estimate tends to be confirmed by the consistently higt
proportion of Mexican nationals in the number of deportable aliens
arrested each year. In 1970, for example, 80% of the deportable
aliens arrested were from Mexico. See INS , 1970 Annual Report,
ut 95 . In 1974, the figure was 92%. I NS, 1974 Annual Report,
5

at 95.
6 In this case the officers did search respondent's car, but because
they found no other incriminating evidence the valid1ty of the search
is not in issue. Almeida-Sanchez changed the Border Patrol's prac~
tice of searching cars on routine stops, and the Government informs
us that roving patrols now search vehicles only when they h av~

l

i Y\Cf'eas ing
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to the Government, "[a]ll that is required of the vehicle's
occupants is a response to a brief question or two and
possibly the production of a document evidencing a right
to be in the United States." Ibid.
Because of the limited nature of the intrusion, stops·
of this sort may be justified on facts that do not amount
to the probable cause required for an arrest. In Terry v.
Ohio, .supra, the Court declined expressly to decide
whether facts not amounting to probable cause could
justify an "investigative seizure" short of an arrest, 392
U. S., at 19 n. 16, but it approved a limited search-a
pat-down for weapons-for the protection of an officer
investigating suspicious behavior of persons he reasonably believed to be armed and dangerous. ThP. Court
approved such a search on facts that did not constitute'
probable cause to believe the suspects guilty of a crime,
requiring only that "the police officer ... be able to point
to specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from thoE1e facts, reasonably
warrant" a belief that his safety or that of others is in
danger. Id., at 21, 27.
We elaborated on Terry in Adams v. Williams, 407
U. S. 143 (1972), holding that a policeman was justified
in approaching the respondent to investigate a tip that
he was carrying narcotics and a gun. We sai9,
"The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable ca.use to arrest to simply shrug
his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to esca.pe. On the contrary, Terry recognizes·
that it may be the essence of good police work to
adopt an intermediate response. . . . A brief stop of'
a suspicious individual, in order to determine his
probable cause to believe they will find illegally present aliens o:r
<:ontraband. Brief for the United. St,ateR, at 25.

-~
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identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily
while obtaining more information, may be most rea~
sonable in light of the facts known to the officer at
the time.'j !d., at ·145-146,
These cases together establish that in appropriate cir~
cumstances the Fourth Amendment allows a properly
limited "search" or "seizure" on facts that do not constitute probable cause to arrest or to search for contraband
or evidence of crime. In both Terry and Adams v,
Williams the investigating officers had reasonable grounds
to believe that the suspects were armed and that they
might be dangerous. The limited searches and seizures
in those cases were a valid method of protecting the
pub1ic and preventing crime. In this case as well, because of the importance of the governmental interest at
stake, the minimal intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of practical alternatives for policing the border, we
hold that when an officer's observations lead him reason~
ably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain
aliens who are illegally in the country, he may stop the
car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke
suspicion. As in Terry, the stop and inquiry must be
"reasonably related in scope to the justification for their
initiation." 392 U. S., at 29. The officer may question
the driver and passengers about their citizenship and
immigration status, and he may ask them to explain suspicious circumstances, but any further detention or
search must be based on consent or probable cause.
We are unwilling to let the Border Patrol dispense entirely with the requirement that officers
must have a reasonable suspicion to justify rovingpatrol stops. 1 Roads near the border carry not only
1 Because the stop in thitl case was made without a warrant and
the officers made no effort to obtain one, we have no occasion to
decide whether a warrant could be isllued to stop cars in a designated

'•
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aliens seeking to enter the country illegally, but a large
volume of legitimate traffic as well. San Diego, with a
metropolitan population of 1.3 million, is located on the
border. Texas has t.wo fairly large metropolitan areas
directly on the border: El Paso, with a population of
360,000, and the Brownsville-McAllen area, with a combined population of 320,000. We are confident that a
large majority of traffic in these cities is lawful and that
rel11.tively few of their residents have any connection with
the illegal entry and transportation of aliens. To approve roving-patrol stops of all vehicles in the border
area, without any suspicion that a particular vehicle is
carrying illegal immigrants, would subject the residents
of these~areas to potentially unlimited interfer~nce with
their use of the highways, solely at the discretion of
Border Patrol officers. The only formal limitation on
that discretion appears to be the administrative regulation defining the term "reasonable distance" in § 287
(a) (3) to mean within 100 air miles from the border.
8 CFR § 287.1 (1974). A~M we approved the"-Government's position in this case, Border Patrol officers
could stop motorists at random for questioning, day or
night, anywhere within 100 air miles of the 2,000-mile
border, on a city street, a busy highway, or a desert road,
without any reason to suspect that they have violated
any law. We cannot hold that such broad and unlim·
ited discretion is "reasonable" under the Fourth
Amendment.
The Government also .lw! .~ten~(~~ that the public
nterest in enforcing conditwns on legal alien entry justies stopping persons who may be aliens ~,.(ibou t

fj

.

area on the l1asis of conditions in the alea as a whole and in the
absence of reason to suspect that any particular car is carrying
aliens See Almeida-Sanchez, supra, at 275 (MR. JusTICE PowELL,
conc11rring) ; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967).

- T~<~f.) ~o weve'f".) is
""'1\ot e\f\.o~k.
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their citizenship and immigration status. Although we
may assume for purposes of this case that the broad
congressional power over immigration, see Kleindiemt v.
Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, '765-767 (1972), authorizes Congress to admit aliens on condition that they will submit
to reasonable questioning about their right . to be and
remain in the country, this power cannot diminish the
Fourth Amendment rights of citizene who may ·be mistaken for aliens. For tbe same reasons that the Fourth
Amendment forbids stopping vehicles at random to
inquire if they are carrying aliens who are illegally in the
country, it also forbids stopping or detaining persons for
·questioning about their citizenship on less than a reasonable suspicion that they may be aliens.

IV
'The effect of our decision is to limit exerCise of the
authority granted by both § 287 (a)(l) and§ 287 (a)(3~.
Except at the border and its functional equivalents,
officers on roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they
are aware of specific articulable facts, together with
rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably
warrant suspicion that the vehic1es contain aliens wha
may be illegally in the country.8
Any number of factors may be taken into account in
deciding whether there is reasonable suspicion to stop a
car in the border area. Officers may consider the characteristics of the area in which they encounter a vehicle.
Its proximity to the border, the usual patterns
of traffic on the particular road, and previous
8

As noted above, we reserve t he question whether Border Patrol
·officers also may stop ·persons Teasonably believed to be alien:'
hen there is no reason to believe they are illegally m the country.
The facts of this case do not require decision on the point. Infra,
at 12.

Se.e. Cheu.Yig,Iin w~
v. INS)_
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experience with alien traffic , are all relevant. See
Carroll · v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 159161 (1925); United States v. Jaime-Barrios, 494 F.
2d 455 (CA9), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 972 (1974). They
also may consider information about recent illegal border
crossings in the area. The driver's behavior may be relevant, as erratic driving or obvious attempts to evade
officers can add to a reasonable suspicion. See United
States v. Larios-Montes, 500 F. 2d 941 (CA9' 1974);
Duprez v. United States, 435 F. 2d 1276 (CA9 1970).
Aspects of the vehicle itself may justify suspicion. For
instance, officers say that certain station wagons, with
large compartments for fold-down seats or spare tires,
are frequently used for transporting concealed aliens.
853 CA9
See United States v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F.
,...
1'- - -1973), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1136 (1974)j The vehici;
may appear to be heavily loaded, it may have an extraordinary number of passengers, or the officers may observe
persons trying to hide. See United States v. LariosM antes, supra. The Government also points out that
trained officers can recognize the characteristic appearance of persons who live in Mexico, relying on such factors as the mode of dress and haircut. Reply Brief for
the United States in United States v. Ortiz, at 12. In all
situations the officer is entitled to assess the facts in light
of his experience detecting illegal entry and smuggling.
Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 27.
In this case the officers relied on a single factor to justify stopping respondent's car: the apparent Mexican an~
cestry of the occupants. 0 We cannot conclude that~

_
7

!.~

·
IS

. u The Government i11: its eFie;5, also ~ &Igt!e'i,. that the lo~ ~Y':
of thi& stop should be considered m rlecidmg whether the officers had
adequate reason to stop respondent's car. This appears, however,
to be an after-the-fact justification. At trial the officers gave no
reason for the stop except the apparent Mexican ancestry of the
'car'" occupant~ . It is not even clear that, the Government presented

:g
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turYI\Shed. ~
X'"~ reasonable

dot.-s -

.

grounds to believe that the three
occupants were aliens. At best the officers had only a
fleeting glimpse of the persons in the moving car, illuminated by headlights. Even if they saw enough to think
that the occupants were of Mexican descent, this factor
alone would justify neither a reasonable belief that they
were aliens, nor a reasonable belief that the car concealed
other aliens who were illegally in the country. Large
numbers of native-born and naturalized citizens have the
physical characteristics identified with Mexican ancestry,
and even in the border area a relatively small proportion of them are aliens. 10 The likelihood that any given
person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to
make Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but standing
alone it
not QAQU.~ ~justify stopping all MexicanAmericans to ask if they are aliens.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

h

Affirmed.
the broader justification to the Court of Appeals. We therefore
decline at this stage of the case to give any weight to the location
of the stop.
~ 10 The 1970 census and the INS figures for alien registration in
1970 provide the following information about the Mexican-American
population in the border States. There were 1,619,064 persons of
Mexican origin in Texas, and 200,004 (or 12.4%) of them registered'
ar:; aliens. In New Mexico there were 119,049 persons of Mexican
origin, and 10,171 (or 8.5%) registered as aliens. In Arizona there
were 239,811 persons of Mexican origin, and 34,075 (or 14.2%)
registered as aliens. In California there were 1,857,267 persons of
Mexican origin, and 379,951 (or 20.4%) registered as aliens. Bureau of the Census, Subjrct Reports: Persons of Spanish Origin z·
(1970); INS, 1970 Annual Report, at 105. These figures, of course,
do not present the entire picture. The number of registered aliens
from Mexico has increased since 1970, INS, 1974 Annual Report, at
105, and we assumt> that very few illegal immigrants appear in the
registration figure<~. On the other hand, many of the 950,000 other
persons of Spanish origin living in these border States, see Bureau·
of the Census, supra, at 7, may have an appearance similar t.o)
lJersons of Mexican ori12in.
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Memorandum of MR. JusTICE PowELL.
This case raises questions as to the United States
Border Patrol's authority to stop automobiles in areas
near the Mexican border. It differs from our decision in
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973),
in that the Border Patrol does not claim authority to
search cars, but only to question the occupants about
their citizenship and immigration status.
I
As a part of its regular traffic checking operations in
southern California, the Border Patrol operates a fixed
checkpoint on Interstate Highway 5 south of San Clemente. On the evening of March 11, 1973, the checkpoint was closed because of inclement weather, but two
officers were observing northbound traffic from a patrol
car parked at the side of the highway. The road was
dark, and they were using the patrol car's headlights to
illuminate passing cars. They pursued respondent's car
and stopped it, saying later that their only reason for
doing so was that its three occupants appeared to be of
Mexican descent. The officers questioned respondent
and his two passengers about their citizenship and
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learned that the passengers were aliens who had entered
the country illegally. All three were then arrested, and
respondent was charged with two counts of knowingly
transporting illegal immigrants, a violation of 18 U. S. C.
§ 1324 (a)(2). At trial respondent moved to suppress
the testimony of and about the two passengers, claiming
that this evidence was the fruit of an illegal seizure. The
trial court denied the motion, the aliens testified at trial,
and respondent was convicted on both counts.
Respondent's appeal was pending in the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals when we announced our decision in
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, holding that
the Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of roving
patrols to search vehicles, without a warrant or probable
cause, at points removed from the border and its functional equivalents. The Court of Appeals, sitting en
bane, held that the stop in this case more closely resembled a roving-patrol stop than a stop at a traffic checkpoint, and applied the principles of Almeida-Sanchez.1
The court held that the Fourth Amendment, as interpreted in Almeida-Sanchez, forbids stopping a vehicle,
even for the limited purpose of questioning its occupants,
unless the officers have a "founded suspicion" that the
occupants are aliens illegally in the country. The court
refused to find that Mexican ancestry alone supported
such a "founded suspicion" and held that respondent's
motion to suppress should have been granted;2 United
For the Court of Appeals' purposes, the distinction between a.
roving patrol and a fixed checkpoint was controlling. The court
previously had held that the principles of Almeida-Sanchez applied
retrospectively to the activities of roving patrols but not to those
of fixed checkpoints. See United States v. Peltier, 500 F . 2d 985
(CA9 1974), rev'd, - U. S . - (1975); United States v. Bowen,
500 F. 2d 960 (CA9 1974), aff'd,- U.S.- (1975) .
2 There may be room to question whether voluntary testimony
of a witness at trial, as opposed to a government agent's testimony
1
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States v. Brignoni-Ponce . 499 F. 2d 1109 (CA9 1974).
We granted certiorari and set the case for oral argument
with Nos. 73-2050 and 73-6848. 419 U. S. 824 (1974).
The Government does not challenge the Court of
Appeals' factual conclusion that the stop of respondent's car was a roving-patrol stop rather than a checkpoint stop. Brief for the United States, at 8. Nor
does it challenge the retroactive application of AlmeidaSanchez, id., at 9, or contend that the San Clemente·
checkpoint is the functional equivalent of the border.
The only issue presented for decision is whether a roving
.patrol may stop a vehicle in an area near the border and
question its occupants when the only ground for suspicion
is that the occupants appear to be of Mexican ancestry.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
II
The Government claims two sources of statutory authority for stopping cars without warrants in the border'
areas. Section 287 (a)(1) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1357 (a)(1) (1970), authorizes any officer or employee of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, without a warrant, "to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his·
right to be or to remain in the United States." There
is no geographical limitation on this authority. The·
Government contends that, at least in the areas adjacent
to the Mexican border, a person's apparent Mexican:
about objects seized or statements overheard, is subject to suppression as the fruit of an illegal search or seizure. See United States v;..
Guana-Sanchez, 484 F . 2d 590 (CA7 1973), writ dismissed as
improvidently granted, U. S. (1975) . But since the ques..tion was- not raised. in the lJetitil>D' for certiA:>rar~ we do not addr~
it~
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ancestry alone justifies belief that he or she is an alien
and satisfies the requirement of this statute. Section
287 (a) (3) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1357 (a) (3) (1970),
authorizes agents, without a warrant,
"within a reasonable distance from any external
boundary of the United States, to board and search
for aliens any vessel within the territorial waters of
the United States arid any railway car, aircraft, conveyance, or vehicle ...."
Under current regulations, this authority may be exercised
anywhere within 100 miles of the border. 8 CFR § 287.1
(1974). The Border Patrol interprets the statute as granting authority to stop moving vehicles and question the occupants about their citizenship, even when its officers have
no reason to believe that the occupants are aliens or that
other aliens may be concealed in the vehicle. 3 But "no
Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the Constitution," Almeida-Sanchez, supra, at 272, and we must decide
whether the Fourth Amendment allows such random
vehicle stops in the border areas.

III
The Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the
person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest. Davis v. Mississippi,
394 U. S. 721 (1969); TerT"'j v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 16-19
( 1968). "[W] he never a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has
8 We cannot accept respondent's contention that the legislative
history of § 287 (a) (3) establishes that Congress implicitly conditioned immigration officers' authority to board and search vehicles
on a belief that the vehicles contain aliens. The statute's predecessor
was amended in 1946 expressly to eliminate the "belief" requirement
and to substitute for it the geographical limitation that appears in
§ 287 (a)(3). See Act of Feb. 27, 1925, 43 Stat. 1049-1050; Act
of Aug. 7, 1946, 60 Stat. 86.1.

'14-114--0PINION
UNITED STATES v. BRIGNONI-PONCE

5

'seized' that person," Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 16, and the
Fourth Amendment requires that the seizure be "reasonable." As with other categories of police action subject
to Fourth Amendment constraints, the reasonableness of
such seizures depends on a balance between the public
interest and the individual's right to personal security
free from arbitary interference by law officers. Terry v.
Ohio, supra, at 20-27; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
u. s. 523 (1967).
The Government makes a convincing demonstration
that the public interest demands effective measures to
control the illegal entry of aliens at the Mexican border.
Estimates of the number of illegal immigrants in the
United States vary widely. A conservative estimate in
1972 produced a figure of about one million, but the
Immigration and Naturalization Service now suggests
there may be as many as 10 or 12 million aliens illegally
in the country.4 Whatever the number, these aliens
create significant economic and social problems, competing with citizens and legal resident aliens for jobs, and
generating extra demand for social services. The aliens
themselves are vulnerable to exploitation because they
cannot complain of substandard working conditions without risking deportation. See generally Hearings on II·
legal Aliens before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 13, pts. 1-5
(1971-1972).
The Government has estimated that 85% of the aliens
illegally in the country are from Mexico. United States
' The estimate of one million was produced by the Commissioner
of the INS for the Immigration and Nationality Subcommittee of
the House Judiciary Committee. Hearings on Illegal Aliens before
Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., ser. 13, pt. 5, at 1323-1325 (1972) . The higher estimate
appears in the 1974 Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturali2'.ation Service. at iii.

'
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v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 402 (SD Cal. 1973). 5 The
Mexican border is almost 2,000 miles long, and even a
vastly reinforced Border Patrol would find it impossible
to prevent illegal border crossings. Many aliens cross
the Mexican border on foot, miles away from patrolled
areas, a.nd then purchase transportation from the border
area to inland cities, where they find jobs and elude the
immigration authorities. Others gain entry on valid
temporary border-crossing permits, but then violate the
conditions of their entry. Most of these aliens leave the
border area in private vehicles, often assisted by professional "alien smugglers." The Border Patrol's traffic
checking operations are designed to prevent this inland
movement. They succeed in apprehending some illegal
entrants and smugglers, and they deter the movement of
others by threatening apprehension and increasing the
cost of illegal transportation.
Against this valid public interest we must weigh the
interference with individual liberty that results when an
officer stops an automobile and questions its occupants.
The intrusion is modest. The Government tells us that
a stop by a roving patrol "usually consumes no more than
a minute." Brief for the United States, at 25. There
is no search of the vehicle or its occupants, and the visual
inspection is limited to those parts of the vehicle that
can be seen by anyone standing alongside.il According
\

15 This estimate tends to be confirmed by the consistently high
proportion of Mexican nationals in the number of deportable aliens
arrested each year. In 1970, for example, 80% of the deportable
aliens arrested were from Mexico. See INS, 1970 Annual Report,
at 95. In 1974, the figure was 92% . INS, 1974 Annual Report,
at 95.
il In this case the officers did s~arch respondent's car, but because
they found no other incriminating evidence the validity of the search
is not in issue. Almeida-Sanchez changed the Border Patrol's practice of searching cars on routine stops, and the Government informs
us that roving patrols now sea rch vehicles only when they have
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to the Government, "[a]ll that is required of the vehicle's
occupants is a response to a brief question or two and
possibly the production of a document evidencing a right
to be in the United States." Ibid.
Because of the limited nature of the intrusion, stops
of this sort may be justified on facts that do not amount
to the probable cause required for an arrest. In Terry v.
Ohio, supra, the Court declined expressly to decide
whether facts not amounting to probable cause could
justify an "investigative seizure" short of an arrest, 392
U. S., at 19 n. 16, but it approved a limited search-a
pat-down for weapons-for the protection of an officer
investigating suspicious behavior of persons he reasonably believed to be armed and dangerous. The Court
approved such a search on facts that did not constitute
probable cause to believe the suspects guilty of a crime,
requiring only that "the police officer ... be able to point
to specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant" a belief that his safety or that of others is in
danger. ld., at 21, 27.
We elaborated on Terry in Adams v. Williams, 407
U. S. 143 (1972), holding that a policeman was justified
in approaching the respondent to investigate a tip that
he was carrying· narcotics and a gun.
"The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable caus-e to arrest to simply shrug
his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, Terry recognizes
that it may be the essence of good police work to
adopt an intermediate response. . . . A brief stop of
a suspicious individual, in order to determine his
probable cause to believe they will find illegally present aliens ot·
CQlltraband. Brief for the- United S\ates, at 25.
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identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily
while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at
the time." !d., at 145-146.
These cases together establish that in appropriate circumstances the Fourth Amendment allows a properly
limiwd "search" or "seizure" on facts that do not constitute probable cause to arrest or to search for contraband
or evidence of crime. In both Terry and Adams v.
Williams the investigating officers had reasonable grounds
to believe that the suspects were armed and that they
might be dangerous. The limiwd searches and seizures
in those cases were a valid method of protecting the
public and preventing crime. In this case as well, because of the importance of the governmental interest at
stake, the minimal intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of practical alternatives for policing the border, we
hold that when an officer's observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain
aliens who are illegally in the country, he may stop the
car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke
suspicion. As in Te;rry, the stop and inquiry must be
"reasonably related in scope to the justification for their
initiation." 392 U. S., at 29. The officer may question
the driver and passengers about their citizenship and
immigration status, and he may ask them to explain suspicious circumstances, but any further dewntion or
search must be based on consent or probable cause.
We are unwilling to let the Border Patrol dispense entirely with the requirement that officers·
must have a reasonable suspicion to justify rovingpatrol stops. 7 Roads near the border carry not only
Because the stop in this case was made without a warrant and
the officers made no effort to obtain one, we have no occasion to
decide whether a warrant could be issued to stop cars in a designated
1
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aliens seeking to enter the country illegally, but a large
volume of legitimate traffic as well. San Diego, with a
metropolitan population of 1.3 million, is located on the
border. Texas has two fairly large metropolitan areas
directly on the border: El Paso, with a population of
360,000, and the Brownsville-McAllen area, with a combined population of 320,000. We are confident that a
large majority of traffic in these cities is lawful and that
relatively few of their residents have any connection with
the illegal entry and transportation of aliens. To approve roving-patrol stops of all vehicles in the border
area, without any suspicion that a particular vehicle is
carrying illegal immigrants, would subject the residents
of these and other areas to potentially unlimited interference with their use of the highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol officers. The only formal limitation on that discretion appears to be the administrative
regulation defining the term "reasonable distance" in
§ 287 (a) (3) to mean within 100 air miles from the border.
8 CFR § 287.1 (1974). That, however, is not enough.
If we approved the Government's position in this case,
Border Patrol officers could stop motorists at random for
questioning, day or night, anywhere within 100 air miles
of the 2,000-mile border, on a city street, a busy highway,
or a desert road, without any reason to suspect that they
have violated any law. We cannot hold that such broad
and unlimited discretion is "reasonable" under the Fourth
Amendment.
The Government also contends that the public interest
in enforcing conditions on legal alien entry justifies
stopping persons who may be aliens for questioning about
area on the basis of conditions in the area as a whole and in the
absence of reason to suspect that any particular car is carrying
aliens. See Almeida-Sanchez, supra, at 275 (MR. JusTICE PowELL,
concurring); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967).
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their citizenship and immigration status. Although we
may assume for purposes of this case that the broad
congressional power over immigration, see Kleindien~t v.
Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 765- 767 ( 1972), authorizes Congress to admit aliens on condition that they will submit
to reasonable questioning about their right to be and
remain in the country, this power cannot diminish the
Fourth Amendment rights of citizens who may be mistaken for aliens. For the same reasons that the Fourth
Amendment forbids stopping vehicles at random to
inquire if they are carrying aliens who are illegally in the
country, it also forbids stopping or detaining persons for
questioning about their citizenship on less than a reasonable suspicion that they may be aliens.

IV
The effect of our decision is to limit exercise of the
authority granted by both § 287 (a) (1) and§ 287 (a) (3) .
Except at the border and its functional equivalents,
officers on roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they
are aware of specific articulable facts, together with
rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably
warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who
may be illegally in the country.8
Any number of factors may be taken into account in
deciding whether there is reasonable suspicion to stop a
car in the border area. Officers may consider the characteristics of the area in which they encounter a vehicle.
Its proximity to the border, the usual patterns
of traffic on the particular road, and previous
8 As noted above, we reserve the question whether Border Patrol
officers also may stop persons reasonably believed t o be aliens
when there is no reason to believe they are illegally in the country.
See Che·ung 'l'in Wong v. INS,- U. S. App . D . C. - , 468 F . 2d
1123 (1972 ) ; Au Yi Lau v. INS, - U. S. App. D. C. - , 445 F .
2d 217, cert . denied, 404 U. S. 864 (1971) . The facts of this case do
not require decision on the point. Infra, at 12.
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experience with alien traffic are all relevant. See
Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 159161 (1925); United States v. Jaime-Barrios, 494 F.
2d 455 (CA9), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 972 (1974). They
also may consider information about recent illegal border
crossings in the area. The driver's behavior may be relevant, as erratic driving or obvious attempts to evade
officers can add to a reasonable suspicion. See United
States v. Larios-Montes, 500 F. 2d 941 (CA9 1974);
Duprez v. United States, 435 F. 2d 1276 (CA9 1970).
Aspects of the vehicle itself may justify suspicion. For
instance, officers say that certain station wagons, with
large compartments for fold-down seats or spare tires,
are frequently used for transporting concealed aliens.
See United States v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F. 2d 853 (CA9
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1136 (1974); United States
v. Wright, 476 F. 2d 1027 (CA5 1973). The vehicle
may appear to be heavily loaded, it may have an extraordinary number of passengers, or the officers may observe
persons trying to hide. See United States v. LariosM ontes, supra. The Government also points out that
trained officers can recognize the characteristic appearance of persons who live in Mexico, relying on such factors as the mode of dress and haircut. Reply Brief for
the United States in United States v. Ortiz, at 12. In all
situations the officer is entitled to assess the facts in light
of his experience detecting illegal entry and smuggling.
Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 27.
In this case the officers relied on a single factor to justify stopping respondent's car: the apparent Mexican ancestry of the occupants. 9 We cannot conclude that this
The Government also argues that the location of this stop
be considered in deciding whether the officers had adequate reason to stop respondent's car. This appears, however,
to be an after~the-fact justification. At trial the officers gave no
rea~m for the stop ext-ept the apparent Mexican ancestry of the
9

~:;hould

74-114.-0PINION
12

UNITED STATES v. BRIGNONI-PONCE

furnished reasonable grounds to believe that the three
occupants were aliens. At best the officers had only a
fleeting glimpse of the persons in the moving car, illuminated by headlights. Even if they saw enough to think
that the occupants were of Mexican descent, this factor
alone would justify neither a reasonable belief that they
were aliens, nor a reasonable belief that the car concealed
other aliens who were illegally in the country. Large
numbers of native-born and naturalized citizens have the
physical characteristics identified with Mexican ancestry,
and even in the border area a relatively small proportion of them are aliens. 10 The likelihood that any given
person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to
make Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but standing
alone it does not justify stopping all Mexican-Americans
to ask if they are aliens.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.
car's occupants. It is not even clear that the Government presented
the broader justification to the Court of Appeals. We therefore
decline at this stage of the case to give any weight to the location
of the stop.
1.o The 1970 census and the INS figures for alien registration in
1970 provide the following information about the Mexican-American
population in the border States. There were 1,619,064 persons of
Mexican origin in Texas, and 200,004 (or 12.4%) of them registered
as aliens. In New Mexico there were 119,049 persons of Mexican
origin, and 10,171 (or 8.5%) registered as aliens. In Arizona there
were 239,811 persons of Mexican origin, and 34,075 (or 14.2%)
registered as aliens. In California there were 1,857,267 persons of
Mexican origin, and 379,951 (or 20.4%) registered as aliens. Bureau of the Census, Subject Reports: Persons of Spanish Origin 2
(1970) ; INS, 1970 Annual Report, at 105. These figures, of course,
do not present the entire picture. The number of registered aliens
from Mexico has increased since 1970, INS, 1974 Annual Report, at
105, and we assume that very few illegal immigrants appear in the
registration figures. On the other hand, many of the 950,000 other
persons of Spanish origin living in these border States, see Bureauof the Census, supra, at 7, may ha.ve an appearance similar to.
llersons of Mexican o~in •.
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Memorandum of MR. JusTICE PowELL,
This case raises questions as to the United States
Border Patrol's authority to stop automobiles in areas
near the Mexican border. It differs from our decision in
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973),
in that the Border Patrol does not claim authority to
search cars, but only to question the occupants about
their citizenship end immigration status.

I
As a part of its regular traffic checking operations in
southern California, the Border Patrol operates a fixed
checkpoint on Interstate Highway 5 south of San Clemente. On the evening of March 11, 1973, the checkpoint was closed because of inclement weather, but two
officers were observing northbound traffic from a patrol
car parked at the side of the highway. The road was
dark, and they were using the patrol car's headlights to
illuminate passing cars. 'I'hey pursued respondent 1s car
and stopped it, saying later that their only reason for
doing so was that its three occupants appeared to be of
Mexican descent. The officers questioned respondent
and his two passengers about their citizenship and
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learned that the passengers were aliens who had entered
the country illegally. All three were then arrested, and
respondent was charged with two counts of knowingly
transporting illegal immigrants, a violation of 18 U. S.C.
§ 1324 (a)(2). At trial respondent moved to suppress
the testimony of and about the two passengers, claiming
that this evidence was the fruit of an illegal seizure. · The
trial court denied the motion, 'the aliens testified at trif.tl,
and respondent was convicted on both counts.
Respondent's appeal was pending in the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals when we announced our decision in
Almeida-Sanchez v.' "United States, supra, holding ·that
the Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of roving
patrols to search vehicles, without a warrant or probable
cause, at points removed from the border and its func~
tional equivalents. · The Court of Appeals, sitting en
bane, held that the stop in· this case more closely resem~
bled a roving-patrol stop than a stop at a traffic checkpoint, and applied the principles of Almeida-Sanchez.1
The court held that the Fourth Amendment, as interpreted
Almeida-Sanchez, forbids stopping a vehicle,
even for the limited purpose of questioning its occupants,
unlebs the officers have a "founded suspicion" that the
occupants are aliens illegally in the country. The court
refused to find that Mexican ancestry alone supported
such a "founded suspicion" and held that respondent's
motion to suppress should have been granted;2 United

in

1 For the Court of Appeals' purposes, the distinction between a.
roving pattol ·and a fixed checkpoint was controlling. The court
previously had held that the principles of Almeida-Sanchez applied
retrospectively to the activities of roving patrols but not to those
of fixed checkpoints. See United States v. Peltier, 500 F. 2d 985
(CA9 1974), rev'd, --U.S.- (1975); United States v. Bowen,
500 F. 2d 960 (CA9 1974), aff'd, -·U.S.-- (1975).
2 There may he room to question whether voluntary testimony
()f a. witness 11t trial, as opposed to a government agent's testimon;r

·,
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States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 499 F. 2d 1109 (CA9 1974).
We granted certiorari and set the case for oral argument
with Nos. 73-2050 and 73-6848. 419 U. S. 824 (1974).
The Government does not challenge the Court of
Appeals' factual conclusion that the stop of respondent's car was a roving-patrol stop rather than a checkpoint stop. Brief for the United States, at 8. Nor
does it challenge the retroactive application of Almeidar
Sanchez, id., at 9, or contend that the San Clemente
checkpoint ie the functional equivalent of the border.
The only issue presented for decision is whether a rov.ing
patrol may stop a vehicle in an area near the border and
question its occupants when the only ground for suspieion
is that the occupants appear to be of Mexican ancestry.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
II

The Government claims two sources of statutory authority for stopping cars without warrants in the border
areas. Section 287 (a) (1) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1357 (a)(1) (1970), authorizes any officer or employee of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, without a warrant, "to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an aHen as to his
right to be or to remain in the United States." There
is no geographical limitation on this authority. The
Government contends that, at least in the areas adjacent
to thA Mexican border, a person's apparent Mexican
about objects seized or statements overheard, is subject to suppres~
sion as the fruit of an illegal .search or seizure. See United States v.
Guanar-Sa:nchez, 484 F . 2d 590 (CA7 1973), writ dismissed as
Improvidently granted, -- U. S. (1975) But since the ques.
tion was not ralbt'd m the petition for certiorari, we do not address

it.
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ancestry alone justifies belief that he or she is an alien.
and satisfies the requirement of this statute. Section
287 (a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S. C.. § 1357 (a)(3) . (1970),
authorizes agents: without a warrant,
"within a :-easonable distance from any external
boundary of the United States, to board and seat;ch
for aliens any vessel within the territorial waters of
the United States and any railway car, aircraft, conveyance, or vehicle .•.."
Under current regulations, this authority may be exercis.ed
anywhere within 100 miles of the border. 8 C:fR § 287.1
(1974). The Border Patrol interprets the statute as granting authority to stop moving vehicles and question the occupants about their ci~izenship, even when its offkers have
no reason to believe that the occupants are aliens or that
other aliens may be concealed in the vehicle.3 But ''no
Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the Constitution," Almeida-Sanchez, supra, at 272, and we must decide
whether the Fourth Amendment allows such random
vehicle stops in the border areas.

III
The Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the
person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of trs.ditional arrest. Davis v. Mississippi,
394 U. S. 721 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 16-19
( 1968) . "[W] henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has
'seized' that person," Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 16, and the
We cannot act:ept rt~~pondeut '::. contention that, even though
§ 287 (a) ( 5) does not mention probable cause, its legislative history
establishes that Congrc::;~< meant to cond1t1on 1mmigrat10n officers'
Jtuthority to board and ~carch veh1cle~ on probable cause to believe
that the)· cont:um·d a hen,: The legii<la tive h1stor:v simply does not
l'llpport t.lu~ contention.
1
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Fourth Amendment requires that the seizure be "reasonable." As with other categories of police action subject
to Fourth Amendment constraints, the reasonableness of
such seizures depends on a balance between the public
interest and the individual's right to personal security
free from arbitary interference by law officers. Terry v.
Ohio, supra, at 20-27 ; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U. S. 523 (1967) ,
The Government makes a convincing demonstration
that the public interest demands effective measures to
control the illegal entry of aliens at the Mexican border,
Estimates of the number of illegal immigrants in the
United States vary widely. A conservative estimate in
1972 produced a figure of about one million, but the
Immigration and Naturalization Service now suggests
there may be as many as 10 or 12 million aliens illegally
in the country,4 Wh:ttever the number, these aliens
create significant economic and social problems, competing with citizens and legal residtmt aliens for jobs, and
generating extra demand for social services. The aliens
themselves are vulnerable to exploitation because they
cannot complain of substandard working conditions without risking deportation. See generally Hearings on IJ...
legal Aliens before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm,
on the J'udiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 13, pts, 1- 5
( 1911-1972).
The Government has estimated that 85% of the aliens
illegally in the country are from Mexico. United States
'The estimate of one million was produced by the Commissioner
of the INS for the Immigration and Nationality Subcommittee of
the House Judiciary Committee. Hearings on Illegal Aliens before
Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Cornm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong.•
1st Ses..<;., ser. 13, pt. 5, at 1'323-1325 (1972). The higher estimate
appears in the 19'1'4 Annual Report of the Immigration ;and Natural..
ization Service1 at. iii,
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v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 402 (SD Cal. 1973):'~ The
Mexican border is almost 2,000 mil(ls lo~g, and even a
vastly reinforced Border Patrol would find it impossible
to prevent illegal border crossin.gs. Many aliens cross
the Mexican border on foot, miles away from patrolled
areas, and then purchase transportation from the border
area to inland cities, where they find jobs and elude the
immigration authorities. Others gain entry on valid
temporary border-crossing permits, but then violate the
conditions of their entry. Most of these aliens leave the
border area in prh:ate vehicles, often assisted by professional "alien smugglers." The Border Patrol's traffic
checking operations are 'designe-d to prevent this ·irilana
movement. They succeed in apprehending some illegal
entrants and smugglers, and they -deter the movement of
others by threatening apprehension and increasing the
cost of illegal transportation.
Against this valid public- interest we must weigh the
interference with individual liberty that results when an
officer stops an automobile arid questions its occupants.
The intrusion is modest. - The Government tells us that
a stop by a roving patrol "usu~Jly consumes no more than
a minut~." Brief for ·the United States, at 25. There
is no search of the vehicle or its occupants, and the visual
in!'lpection is limited to those parts of the vehicle that
can be seen by anyone standing alongside.6 According
5 This estimate tends to be confirmed by the consistently hig!J.
proportion of Mexican nationals in the number of deportable aliens
arrested each year. In 1970, for example, 80% of the deportable
aliens arrested were from Mexico. See INS, 1970 Annual Report,
at 95. In 1974, t.he figure was 92% . INS, 1974 Annual Report,
at 95.
6 In this case the officers did tlearch respondent's car, but becaus&
they found no other incriminatmg ev1dence the validity of the search
is not in issue. Almeida-Sanchez changed the Border Patrol's prac...
tice of searching cars on routine stops, and the Government informsillS that roving patrols l\OW Sf'..arch vehicles only when they have-
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to the Government, "[a]ll that is required of the vehicle's
occupants is a response to a brief question or two and
possibly the production of a document evidencing a. nght
to be in the Unit(:;d States." Ibid.
Because of the limited nature of the intrusion, stops
of this sort may be justified on facts that do not amount
to the probable ceuse required for an a::-rest. In Terry v"
Ohio, supra., the Court declined expressly to decide
whether facts not amounting to probable cause could
justify an "investigative seizure" short of an arrest, 392
U. S., at 19 n. 16, but it approved a limited search-a
pat-down for weapons-for the protection of an officer·
investigating suspicious behavior of persons he reasonably believed to be armed and dangerous. 'l'he Court
approved such a search on faces that did not constitute
probable cause to believe the suspects guilty of a crime,
requiring only that 11 the police officer ... be able to point
to specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant" a belief that h1s safety or that of others is in
danger. Id., at 21, 27.
We elaborated on Terry in Adams v. Williams, 407
U. S. 143 (1972), holding that a policeman was justified
in approachmg the re1:1pondent to investigate a tip that.
he was carrying narcotics and a gun.
"The Fourth AmendmP-nt does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug
his Elhoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, Terry recognizes
that it may be the essence of good police work to
a::lopt an intermediate response .. , . A bnef stop of
a suspicious individual, in order to determine his:
probable cause co believe they will find illegally present aliens or
.contrabrmd Brief for the United StatE.'.s, at 25.

'd4-114-0PINION
UNITED STATFS v. BRIGNONI-·PONCE

· S

identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily
while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known ·to ·the officer at
the time." ld., at 145-146,
These cases together establish that in appropriate circumstances the F'ourth Amendment allows a properly
limit,ed "search" or "seizure" on facts that ·do not constitute probable cause to arrest or to search for contraband
or evidence of crime. In both Terry arid Adams · v,
Williams the investigating officers had reasonable grounds
to believe that the S!Jspec_ts were armed and that they
might be dangerous. The _limited searches arid seizures
in those cases were a valid method of protecting the
public and preventing, crime. In this case as well, be ..
cause of the importance of the governmentaJ interest at
stake, the minimal intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of practical alternatives for policing the border, we
hold that when an officer's observations lead him reasonably to suspec:t that a particular vehicle may contain
·aliens who are illegally in the country, he may stop the
car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke
suspicion. As in Terry, the stop and inquiry must be
"reasonably related in scope to the justification for their
initiation." 392 U. S., at 29. The officer may question
the driver and passengers about their citizenship and
immigration status, and he may ask them to explain suspicious circumstances, but any further detention or
search must be based on consent or probable cause.
We are unwilling to let the Border Patrol dispense entirely with the requirement that officers
must have a reasonable suspicion to justify roving..
patrol stops.7 Roads near the border carry not only
1

Because the stop in this case was made without a warrant anti

the officers made no effort to obtain one, we have no occasion to
s:l;ecide whether a warrant could be issued to stop cars in a designatecT
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·aliens seeking to enter the country illegally, but a large
volume of legitimate traffic as well. San Diego, with a
metropolitan population of 1.3 million, is located on the
border. Texas has two fairly large metropolitan areas
directly on the border: El Paso, with a population of
360,000, and the Brownsville-McAllen area, with a combined population of 320,000. We are confident that a
large majority o; traffic in these cities is lawful and that
relatively few of their residents have any connection with
the illegal entry and transportation of aliens. To approve roving-patrol stops of all vehicles in the border.
area, without any suspicion that a particular vehicle is
carrying illegal immigrants, would subject the residents
of these and other areas to potentially unlimited interference with their use of the highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol officers. The only formal limitation on that discretion appears to be the administrative
regulation defining the term "reasonable distance" in
§ 287 (a) (3) to mean within 100 air miles from the border.
8 CFR § 287.1 (1974). That, however, is not enough.
If we approved the Government's position in this case,
Border Patrol officers could stop motorists at random for
questioning, day or night, anywhere w;thin 100 air miles
of the 2,000-mile border, on a city street, a busy highway,
or a desert road, without any reason to suspect that they
have violated any law. We cannot hold that such broad
and unlimited discretion is ''reasonable" under the Fourt4
Amendment.
The Government also contends that the public interest
in enforcing conditions on legal alien entry justifie$
stopping persons who may be aliens for que~tioning about
area on the basis of conditions in the area as a whole and in the
·absence of reason to suspect that any particular car is carrying
aliens. See Almeida-Sanchez, mpra, at 275 (MR. JusTrcE PowELL1
1cpncurring); Ccmm·a Vo Municipal Cou1·t, 387 U S. 52~ (1967).
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their citizenship and immigration status. Although we
may assume for purposes of this case that the broad
congressional power over immigration, see Kleindiemt v.
Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 765-767 (1972), authorizes Congress to admit aliens on condition that they will submit
to reasonable questioning about their right to be and
remain in the country, this power cannot diminish the
Fourth Amendment rights of citizens who may ·be mist aken for aliens. For the same reasons that the Fourth
Amendment forbids stopping vehicles at random to
inquire if they are carrying aliens who are illegally in the
country, it also forbids stopping or detaining persons for
questioning about their citizenship on less than a reasonable suspicion that they may be aliens.

IV
The effect of our decision is to limit exercise of the
authority granted by both ~ 287 (a)( I) and § 287 (a)(3) .
Except at the border and its functional equivalents,
officers on roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they
are aware of specific articulable facts, together with
rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably
warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who
may be illegally in the country.
Any number of factors may be taken into account in
· deciding whether there is reasonable suspicion to stop a
car in the border area. Officers may consider the charac..
teristics of the area in which they encounter a vehicle.
Its proximity to the border, the usual patterns
6 As noted above, we reserve the question whether Border Patrol
' officers also may stop persons reasonably believed to be aliens
when there is no reason to believe they are illegally in the country.
See Cheung Tin Wong v INS,- U. S. App D. C. - , 468 F. 2d
1123 (1972); Au Yt Lau v INS, U. S. App. D. C. - , 445 F.
· 2d 217 cert demed, 404 U. S. 864 (1971) . The facts of this case donot rPquire decision on the point. Injm1 at 12.
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of traffic on the particular road, and previous
experience with alien traffic are all relevant. See
Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 159161 (1925); United States v. Jaime-Barrio's, 494 F .
2d 455 (CA9), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 972 (1974) .9 They
also may consider information about recent illegal border
crossings in the area. The driver's behavior may be relevant, as erratic driving or obvious attempts to evade
officers can add to a reasonable suspicion. See United
States v. Larios-Montes, 500 F. 2d 941 (CA9 1974);
Duprez v. United States, 435 F. 2d 1276 (CA9 1970) .
Aspects of the vehicle itself may justify suspicion. For
instan~e, officers say that certain station wagons, with
large compartments fl)r fold-down seats or spare tires,
are frequently used for transporting concealed aliens.
See United States v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F. 2d 853 (CA!J
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1136 (1974); United States
v. Wright, 476 F . 2d 1027 (CA5 1973) . The vehicle
may appear to be heavily loaded, it may have an extraordinary number of passengers, or the officers may observe
persons trying to hide. See United States v. LariosM antes, supra. The Government also points out that
trained officers can recognize the characteristic appearance of persons who live in Mexico, relying on such factors as the mode of dress and haircut. Reply Brief for
the United States in United States v. Ortiz, at 12. In all
situations the officer is entitled to assess the facts in light
of his experience detecting illegal entry and smuggling..
Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 27.
In this case the officers relied on a single factor to justify stopping respondent's car: the apparent Mexican an...
ll Thr Court of Appeal-- decision~ cited throughout this sertion·
1
aw mt•rel) illustratJvC' Our cJtat10n of them does not imply a v1ew·
of t lw merits of partwular decJ~Jon:-;. Earh cas1• must turn on thetotulny of the partJCU)Hr rncr~uL.-;tancP~ •.
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cestry of the occupants.10 We cannot conclude that this
furnished reasonable grounds to believe that the three
occupants were aliens. At best the officers had only a
fleeting glimpse of the persons in the moving car, illuminated by headlights. Even if they saw enough to think
that the occupants were of Mexican descent, this factor
alone would justify neither a reasonable belief that they
were aliens, nor a reasonable belief that the car concealed
other aliens who were illegally in the country. · Large
numbers of native-born and naturalized citizens have the
physical characteristics identified with Mexican ancestry,
and even in the border area a relatively small propor~
tioll of them are aliens:11 The likelihood that any given
10

The Government alsJ argues that the location of this stop
should be considered in deciding whether the officers had adequate reason to stop respondent's car. This appears, however,
to be an after-the-fact justification. At trial the officers gave no
reason for the stop except the apparent Mexican ancestry of the
car's occupants. It is not even clear that the Government presented
the broader justification to the Court of Appeals. We therefore
decline at this stage of the case to give any weight to the location
of the stop.
11 The 1970 census and the INS .figures for alien registration in
197(l provide the following information about the Mexican-American
population in the border States. There were 1,619,064 persons of
MeXIcan origin in Texas, and 200,004 (or 12.4%) of them registered
as aliens. In New Mexico there were 119,049 persons of Mexican
origin, and 10,171 (or 8.S%) registered as aliens. In Arizona there
were 239,811 persons of Mexican origin, and 34,075 (or 14.2%)
registered as aliens. In California there were 1,857,267 persons of
Mexican origm, and 379,951 (or 20.4%) registered as aliens. Bureau of the Census, Subject Reports: Persons of Spanish Origin 2
(1970); INS, 1970 Annual Report, at 105. These figures, of course,
do not present the entire picture. Tht> number of registered aliens
from Mexico has increased smce 1970, INS, 1974 Annual Report, at
105, and we assume that very few illegal immigrants appear in the
registration figures. On the other h'l,nd, many of the 950,000 other
persons of Spanish or1gin living in these border States, see Bureau.
of the Census, supra, at 7, may have an appearance similar topersons of Mexican origin.
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person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to
ma,ke Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but standing
alone it does not justify stopping all Me;xican-Americans
to ask if they are aliens.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is .
Affirmed.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This case raises questions as to the United States
Border Patrol's authority to stop automobiles in areas
near the Mexican border. It differs from our decision in
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973),
in that the Border Patrol does not claim authority to
search cars, but C'nly to question the occupants about
their citizenship and immigration status.

I
As a part of its regular traffic checking operations in
southern California, the Border Patrol operates a fixed
checkpoint on Interstate Highway 5 south of San Clemente. On the evening of March 11, 1973, the checkpoint was closed because of inclement weather, but two
officers were observing northbound traffic from a patrol
car parked at the side of the highway. The road was
dark, and they were using the patrol car's headlights to
illuminate passing cars. They pursued respondent's car
and stopped it, saying later that their only reason for
doing so was that its three occupants appeared to be of
Mexican descent. The officers questioned respondent
and his two passengers about their citizenship and
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learned that the passengers were aliens who had entered
the country illegally. All three were then arrested, and
respondent was charged with two counts of knowingly
transporting illega! immigrants, a violation of 8 U. S. C.
§· 1324 (a) (2). At trial respondent moved to suppress
the testimony of and about the two passengers, claiming
that this evidence was the fruit of an illegal seizure. Th~
trial court denied the motion, the aliens testified at trial,
a,nd respondent was convicted on both counts.
Respondent's appeal was pending in the Ninth Circuit
0ourt of Appeals when we announced our decision in
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, holding that
the Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of roving
patrols to search vehicles, without a warrant or probable
cause, at points removed from the border and its functional equivalents. The Court of Appeals, sitting en
bane, held that the stop in this case more closely resembled a roving-patrol stop than a stop at a traffic checkpoint, and applied the principles of Alrneida-Sanchez.1
The court held that the Fourth Amendment, as interpreted in Almeida-Sanchez, forbids stopping a vehicle,
even for the limited purpose of questioning its occupants,
unleRs the officers have a "founded suspicion" that the
occupants are aliens illegally in the country. The court
ref1.1sed to find that Mexican ancestry alone supported
such a "founded suspicion" and held that respondent's
motion to suppress should have been granted.2 United
1 For the Court of Appeals' purposes, the distinction between a
r9ving patrol and. a fixed checkpoint was controlHng. The court
previously had held that the principles of Almeida-Sanchez applied
retrospectively to the activities of roving patrols but not to those
of fixed checkpoints. See United States v. Peltier, 500 F. 2d 98&
(CA9 1974), rev'd,- U. S. - (1975); United States v. Bowenp.
.500 Fo 2d 960 .(CA9 1974), aff'd,- U.S.- (1975) .
:z There may be room .. to question whether voluntary testimony
~ a witness at trial, as opp?sed to a government agent's testimony
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States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 499 F. 2d 1109 (CA9 1974),
We granted certiorari and set the case for oral argument
with Nos. 73-2050 and 73-6848. 419 U. S. 824 (1974).
The Government does not challenge the Court of
Appeals' factual conclusion that the stop of respondent's car was a roving-patrol stop rather than A. checkpoint stop. Brief for the United States, at 8. Nor
does it challenge the retroactive application of AlmeidaSanchez, id., at 9, or contend that the San Clemente
checkpoint is the functional equivalent of the border.
The only issue presented for decision is whether a roving
patrol may stop a vehicle in an area near the border and
question its occupants when the only ground for suspicion
is that the occupants appear to be of Mexican ancestry,
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals.

II
The Government claims two l!ources of statutory authority for stopping cars without warrants in the bord~r
areas. Section 287 (a) ( 1) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1357 (a)(l) (1970), authorizes any officer or employee of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, without a warrant, "to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his
right to be or to remain in the United States." There
is no geographical limitation on this a.uthority. The
Government contends that, at least in the areas adjacent
to the Mexican border, a person's apparent Mexican
about objects seized or statements overheard, is subject to suppres..
sion as the fruit of an illegal search or seizure. See United States v.
Guancz.Sanchez, 484 F. 2d 590 (CA7 1973), writ dismissed as
improvidently granted, 420 U. S. 513 (1975). But sinee the ques.
tion wa~S not raised in 'the petition for c~rtjoratit we ~o not address

it.
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ancestry alone justifies belief that he or she is an alien
and satisfies the requirement of this statute. Section
287 (a)(3) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1357 (a) (3) (1970) 1
authorizes agents, without a warrant,
11
within a reasonable distance from any external
boundary of the United States, to board and search
for aliens any vessel within the territorial waters of
the United States and any railway car, aircraft, con=
veyance, or vehicle
Under current regulations, this authority may be exercised
anywhere within 100 miles of the border. 8 CFR § 287.1
(a) (1975). The Border Patrol interprets the statute as
granting authority to stop moving vehicles and question
the occupants about their citizenship, even when its offi~
cers have no reason to believe that the occupants are
aliens or that other aliens may be concealed in the
vehicle. 3 But "no Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the Constitution," Almeida-Sanchez, supra, at 272,
and we must decide whether the Fourth Amendment
allows such random vehicle stops in the border areas.
0

0

• •"

III
The Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the
person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest. Davis v. Mississippi,
394 U. S. 721 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 16-19
( 1968) o "[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has
Aseized' that person/' Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 16, and the
3 We cannot accept respondent's contention that, even though
§ 287 (a) (3) does not mention probable cause, its legislative history
establisl1es that Congress meant to condition immigration officers'
authority to board and search vehicles on probable cause to believe
that they contained aliens. The legislative history simply does not
!lUpport this cont~:~ntion.

',
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Fourth Amendment requires that the seizure be "reasonable." As with other categories of police action subject
to Fourth Amendment constraints, the reasonableness of
such seizures dep~nds on a balance between the public
interest and the individual's right to personal security
free from arbitary interference by law offi<:ers. Terry v.
Ohio, supra, at 20-21; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387

u. s.

523, 536-537 (1967).

The Government makes a convincing demonstration
that the public interest demands effective measures to
control the illegal entry of aliens at the Mexican border.
Estimates of the number of illegal immigrants in the
United States vary widely. A conservative estimate in
1972 produced a fignre of about one million, but the
Immigration and Naturalization Service now suggests
there may be as many as 10 or 12 million aliens illegally
in the country.4 Whatever the number, these aliens
create significant economic and social problems, competing with citizens and legal resident aliens for jobs, and
generating extra demand for social services. The aliens
themselves are vulnerable to exploitation because they
cannot complain of substandard working conditions with·
out risking deportation. See generally Hearings on n..
legal Aliens before Subcomm. No.1 of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 13, pts. 1-5
(1971-1972).
The Government has estimated that 85% of the aliens
illegally in the country are from Mexico. United States
' The estimate of one million was produced by the Commissioner
of the INS for the Immigration and Nationality Subcommittee of
the House Judiciary CommittPe. Hearings on Illegal Aliens before
Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Com.m. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., ser. 13, pt. 5, at 1323-1325 (1972). The higher estimate
appears in the 1974 Annual Report of the Immigration a.nd Natural..
iaation Servicea at iii.
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v, .Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 402 (SD Cal. 1973).11 Th~
Mexican border is almost 2,000 miles long, 'and even a
vastly reinforced Border Patrol would find it impossible
to prevent illegal border crossings. Many aliens cross
the Mexican border on foot, miles away from patrolled
areas, and then purchase transportation from the border
area to inland cities, where they find jobs and elude the
immigration authorities. Others gain entry on valid
temporary border-crossing permits, but then violate the
conditions of their entry. Most of these aliens leave the
border area in private vehicles, often assisted by professional "alien smugglers." The Border Patrol's traffic
checking operations are designed to prevent this inland
movement. They succeed in apprehending some illegal
entrants and smugglers, and they deter the movement of
others by threatening apprehension and increasing the
cost of illegal transportation,
Against this valid public interest we must weigh the
interference with individual liberty that results when an
officer stops an at,tomobile and questions its occupants.
The intrusion is modest. The Government tells us that
a stop by a roving patrol "usually consumes no more than
a minute." Brief for the United States, at 25. There
is no search of the vehicle or its occupants, and the visual
inspection is limited to those parts of the vehicle that
can be seen by anyone standing alongside.11 According
6 This estimate tends to be confirmed by the consistently high
proportion of Mexican nationals in the number of deportable aliens
arrested each year. In 1970, for example, 80% of the deportable
aliens arrested were from Mexico. See INS, 1970 Annual Report,
l.tt 95. In 1974, the figure was 92%. INS, 1974 Annual Report,
at 94,
6 In this case the officers did l!icarch respondent's car, but because
they found no other incriminating evidence the validity of the search
is not in issue. Almeida-Sanchez ehanged the Border Patrol's prac..
tice of searching cars on routine stops, and the Government infol"lll$
ta.lS that roving patrols now search vehicles only when they hav0

14-114--0PINION

UNITED STATES v. BRIGNONI-PONCE

1

to the Government, "[a]ll that is required of the vehicle's
occupants is a response to a brief question or two and
possibly the production of a document evidencing a right
to be in the United States." Ibid.
Because of the limited nature of the intrusion, stops
of this sort may be justified on facts that do not amount
to the probable cause required for an arrest. In Terry v.
Ohio, supra, the Court declined expressly to decide
whether facts not amounting to probable cause could
justify an "investigative seizure" short of an arrest, 392
U. S., at 19 n. 16, but it approved a limited search-a
pat-down for weapons-for the protection of an officer
investigating suspicious behavior of persons he reasonably believed to be armed and dangerous. 'rhe Court
approved such a search on fa<:ts that did not constitute
probeble cause to believe the suspects guilty of a crime,
requiring only that "the police officer ... be able to point
to specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant" a belief that his safety or that of others is in
danger. ld., at 21, 27.
We elaborated on Terry in Adams v. Williams, 407
U. B. 143 (1972), holding that a policeman was justified
in approaching the respondent to investigate a tip that
ht'l was carrying narcotics and a gun.
(•The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information neces..
sary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug
his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, Terry recognizes
that it may be the essence of good police work t<J>
adopt an intermediate response. . . . A brief stop of
a suspicious individual, in order to determine his
probable cause to believe they will find illegally present aliens
A:ontrahand. Brief for the United States, at 25.

o~
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identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily
while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at
the time." ld., at 145-146.
These cases together establish that in appropriate circumstances the Fourth Amendment allows a properly
limited "search" or "seizure" on facts that do not constiw
tute probable cause to arrest or to search for contraband
or evidence of crime. In both Terry and Adams v.
Williams the investigating officers had reasonable grounds
to believe that the suspects were armed and that they
might be dangerous. The limited searches and seizures
ln those cases were a valid method of protecting the
public and preventing crime. In this case as well, be..
cause of the importance of the governmental interest at
stake, the minimal intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of practical alternatives for policing the border, we
hold that when an officer's observations lead him reason•
ably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain
aliens who are illegally in the country, he may stop the
car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke
suspicion. As in Terry, the stop and inquiry must be
11
reasonably related in scope to the justification for their
initiation/' 392 U. S., at 29. The officer may question
the driver and passengers about their citizenship and
immigration status, and he may ask them to explain suspicious circumstances, but any further detention or
search must be based on consent or probable cause.
We are unwilling to let the Border Patrol dig.,.
pense entirely with the requirement that officers
must have e reasonable suspicion to justify roving..
patrol stops. 7 In. the context of border area stops, the
1 Because the stop in this case was made without a warrant ancJ
the officers made no effort to obtain one, we have no occasion to
. +1'!ecide whether a warrant could be iss11ed to stop cars in a designate<$
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reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment
demands something more than the broad and unlimited
discretion sought by the Government. Roads near the
border carry not only aliens seeking to enter the country
illegally, but a, large volume of legitimate traffic as well.
San Diego, with a metropolitan population of 1.4 million,
is located on the border. Texas has two fairly large
metropolitan areas directly on the border; El Paso, with
a population of 360,000, and the Brownsville-McAllen
area, with a combined population of 320,000. We are
confident that substantially all of the traffic in these
cities is lawful and that relatively few of their residents
have any connection with the illegal entry and transportation of aliens. To approve roving-patrol stops of all
vehicles in the border area, without any suspicion that a
particular vehicle is carrying illegal immigrants, would
subject the residents of these and other areas to poten...
tially unlimited interference with their use of the highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol officers.
The only formal limitation on that discretion appears to
be the administrative regulation defining the term "reasonable di~tance" in § 287 (a) (3) to mean within 100
ai• miles from the border. 8 CFR § 287.1 (a) (1975).
Thus, if we approved the Government's position in this
case, Border Patrol officers could stop motorists at random
for questioning, day or night, anywhere within 100 air
miles of the 2,000-mile border, on a city street, a busy
highway, or a desert road, without any reason to suspect
that they have violated any law.
We are not convinced that the legitimate needs of law
enforcement require this degree of interference with lawarea on the basis of conditions in the area as a whole and in the
absence of reason to suspect that any particular car is carrying
aliens. See Almeida-Sanchez, supra, at 275 (MR. JusTICE PoWEL~.
CQDcurrin~); Camara v. Municipal Court 1 ·387 .U. S. 523 (1961),

.
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ful traffic. As we discuss in Part IV, infra, the nature
of illegal alien traffic and the ch&racteristics of smuggling
operations tend to generate articulable grounds for identifying violators. Consequently, a requirement of reasonable suspicion for stops allows the Government adequate
means of guarding the public interest and also protects
residents of the border area3 from indiscriminate official
interference. Under the circumstances, and even though
the intrusion incident to a stop is modest, we conclude
that it is not "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment
to make such stops on a random basis. 8
The Government also contends that the public interest
in enforcing conditions on legal alien entry justifies
stopping persons who may be aliens for questioning about
. their citizenship and immigrat~on status. Although we
may assume for purposes of this case that the broad
congressional power over immigration, see Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 765-767 (1972), authorizes Congress to admit aliens on condition that they will submit
to reasonable questioning about their right to be and
remain in the country, this power cannot diminish the
Fourth Amendment rights of citizene who may be mistaken for aliens. For the same reasons that the Fourth
Am:mdment forbids stopping vehicles at random to
8 Our decision in H1is case takes into account the special function
of the Border Patrol, the importance of the governmental interests
in policing the border area, the character of roving-patrol stops,
and the availability of alternatives to random stops unsupported by
reasonable suspicwn, Border Patrol agents have no part in enforcIng laws that regulate highway use, and their activities have nothing
to do wi1 h an inquiry whether motorists a:ud their vehicles are entitled, by virtue of compliance with lawH governing highway usage,
to be upon the public highways. Our decision thus does not imply
that state and local enforcement agencies are without power to conduct r<uch limited stops :ts are necessary to enforce laws regarding
driver's hrenses, vehicle registration, truck weights, and similar
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inquire if they are carrying aliens who are illegally in the
country, it also forbids stopping or detaining persons for
questioning about their citizenship on less than a reasonable suspicion that they may be aliens.

IV
The effect of our decision is to limit exercise of the
authority granted by both § 287 (a)(1) and § 287 (a) (3) .
Exr.ept at the border and its functional equivalents,
officers on roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they
are aware of specific articulable facts, together with
rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably
warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who
may be illegally in the country.9
Any number of factors may be taken into account in
deciding whether there is reasonable suspicion to stop a
car in the border area. Officers may consider the characm
teristics of the area in which they encounter a vehicle.
Its proximity to the border, the usual patterns
of traffic on the particular road, and previous
experience with alien traffic are all relevant. See
Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 159161 (1925); United States v. Jaime-Barrios, 494 F.
2d 455 (CA9), cert. den!ed, 417 U.S. 972 (1974) .10 They
also may consider information about recent illegal border
crossings in the area. The driver's behavior may be releAs noted above, we reserve the question whether Border Patrol
officers also may stop persons reasonably believed to be aliens
when there is no reason to believe they are illegally in the country.
See Cheung Tin Wong v, INS,- U. S. App. D. C.-, 468 F . 2d'
1123 (1972); Au Yi Lrru v. INS, 144 U.S. App. D. C. 147, 445 F.
2d 217, cert. demed, 404 U.S 864 (1971) . The facts of this cased()
not require decision on the point. Infra, at 12.
1
{) The court of appeals deci:;Ions cited throughout this section
are merely Illustrative. Our citation of them does not imply a view
of the merits of partirular decisions. Each case must turn on tim
c:ttahty of the particular circumstances.,
11
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vant, as erratic driving or obvious attempts to evade
officers can support a reasonable suspicion. See United
States v. Larios-Montes, 500 F. 2d 941 (CA9 1974);
Duprez v. Umted States, 435 F. 2d 1276 (CA9 1970) .
Aspects of the vehicle itself may justify suspicion. For
instance, officers say that certain station wagons, with
large compartments for fold· ·down seats or spare tires,
are frequently used for transporting concealed aliens.
See United States v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F . 2d 853 (CA9
1973), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1136 (1974) ; United States
v. Wright, 476 F. 2d 1027 (CA5 1973) . The vehicle
may appear to be heavily loaded, it may have an extraordmary number of passengers, or the officers may observe
persons trying to hide. See United States v. Larios.Montes, supra. The Government also points out that
trained officers can recognize the characteristic appearance of persons who live in Mexico, relying on such factors as the mode of dress and haircut. Reply Brief for
the United States m United States v. Ortiz, at 12- 13. In
all situations the officer is entitled to assess the facts in
light of his experience detecting illegal entry and smugglmg. Terry v Ohw, supra, at 27.
In this case the officers relied on a single factor to justify stopping respondent's car: the apparent Mexican ancestry of the occupants. 11 We cannot conclude that this
furnishP.d reasonable grounds to believe that the three
occupants were aliens. At best the officers had only a
,.~The Govt"rnment al::;o arguf's that the location of this stop
qhould be considered in deciding whether the officers had ade.
·quate reason to stop respondent's car. This appears, however,
to be an after-the-fact justification. At trial the officers gave no
reason for the stop except the apparent Mexican ancestry of the
car's occupants It is not even clear that the Government presented
the broader justification to the Court of Appeals. We therefore
.decline at this stage of t.be case to give any weight to the location
~f th, op.
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No. 74-114. Argued February 18, 1975-Decided June 30, 1975
The Fourth Amendment does not allow a roving patrol of the
Border Patrol to stop a vehicle near the Mexican border and
question its occupants about their citizenship and immigration
status, when the only ground for suspicion is that the occupants
appear to be of Mexican ancestry. Except at the border and its
functional equivalents, patrolling officers may stop vehicles only
if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together with
rational inferences therefrom, reasonably, warranting suspicion
that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country. Pp. 4-13.
(a) Because of the important governmental interest in combating the illegal entry of aliens at the border, the minimal intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of practical alternatives for
policing the border, an officer, whose observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens
who are illegally in the country, may stop the car briefly, question
the driver and passengers about their citizenship and immigration
status, and ask them to explain suspicious circumstances; but
any further detention or search must be based on consent or
probable cause. Pp. 4-8.
(b) To allow roving patrols the broad and unlimited discretion
urged by the Government to stop all vehicles in the border area
without any reason to suspect that they have violated any law,
would not be "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment.
Pp. 8-9.
(c) Assuming that Congress has the power to admit aliens on
condition that they submit to reasonable questioning about their
right to be in the country, such power cannot diminish the Fourth
Amendment rights of citizens who may be mistaken for aliens.
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policing the border, an officer, whose observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens
who are illegally in the country, may stop the car briefly, question
the driver and passengers about their citizenship and immigration
status, and ask them to explain suspicious circumstances; but
any further detention or search must be based on consent or
probable cause. Pp. 4-8.
(b) To allow roving patrols the broad and unlimited discretion
urged by the Government to stop all vehicles in the border area
without any reason to suspect that they have violated any law,
would not be "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment.
Pp. 8-9.
(c) Assuming that Congress has the power to admit aliens on
condition that they submit to reasonable questioning about their
right to be in the country, such power cannot diminish the Fourth
Amendment rights of citizens who may be mistaken for aliens.
!

D eci~i o;

UNITED STATES v. BRIGNONI·PO;NCE

1~

fleeting glimpse of the persons in t'Pe moving car, illUipi.,
by headlights. Even if they saw enough to think
that the occupants were of Mexican descent, this factor
alone would justify neither a reasonable belief that they
were aliens, nor a reasonable belief that the car concealed
other aliens who were illegally in the country, Large
numbers of native-born and ilaturalized citizens have the
physical characteristics identified with Mexican ancestry,
and even in the border area a relatively small propor.,
tion of them are aliens. 12 The likelihood that any given
person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to
make Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but standing
alone it does not justify stopping all Mexican-Americans
to ask if they are aliens,
The judgment of the Court of Appeals ie
Af}irmetl.

n~tted

The 1970 census and the INS figures for alien registration in
:i970 provide the following information about the Mexican-Americatl
population in the border States. There were 1,619,064 persons of
Mexican origin in Texas, and 200,004 (or 12.4%) of them registered
as aliens from Mexico. In New Mexico there were 119,049 persons
of Mexican origin, ann 10,171 (or 8.5%) registered as aliens. In Arizona there were 239,811 persons of Mexican origin, and 34,075 (or·
14.2%) registered as aliens. In California there were 1,857,267 per..
sons of Mexican origm, and 379,951 (or 20.4%) registered as aliens.
Bureau of the Census, Subject Reports: Persons of Spanish Origin '1:
(1970); INS, 1970 Annual Report, at 105. These figures, of course,
do not present the entire picture. The number of registered aliens
from Mexico has increased since 1970, INS, 1914 Annual Report, at
105, and we assume that very few illegal immigrants appear in the
registration figures. On the other hand, many of the 950,000 other
persons of Spanish origin living in these border States, see Bureau
of the Census, supra, at 1, may have a physir,al appearance simila·J(
to persons of Mexican ot·wn~
:12
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Syllabus
The Fourth Amendment therefore forbids stopping persons for
questioning about their citizenship on less than a reasonable
suspicion that they may be aliens. Pp. 9-10.

499 F. 2d 1109, affirmed.
PowELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN,.
STEWART, MARSHALL, a.nd REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. BuRGER, C. J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BLACKMUN, J.,
joined. REHNQUIST, J., filed a concurring opinion. DouGLAS, J.,
filed an opinion concurring ·in the judgment. WHI1'1!:, J., filed an ·
opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BLACKMUN, J., joined.
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MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring in the judgment.
Like MR. JUSTICE WHITE I can, at most, do no more than concur
in the judgment.

As the Fourth Amendment now has been interpreted by

the Court it seems that the Immigration and Naturalization Service is powerless to stop the tide of illegal aliens -- and dangerous drugs -- that daily

1/
and freely crosses our 2, 000 mile southern boundary .

Perhaps these

1/
The Court today recognizes that as many as twelve million illegal
aliens are present in this country at this time.
Ante, at 5, and n . 4. See
also, U.S. News and World Report, 27, July 22, 1974; U . S. News and World
Report, 77, Dec ember 9, 197 4. By all indications the problem will increase
in the future, not abate . United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp . 398, 402-03
(S.D. Cal. 1973 ). In the Baca case Judge Turrentine conducted a thorough
review of the entire problem and the present government response. Appended
to this opinion is an excerpt from Judge Turrentine's Baca opinion describing
the illegal alien problem and the law enforcement res pons e .

..
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decisions will be seen in perspective as but another example of a society
seemingly impotent to deal with massive lawlessness.

In that sense

history may view us as prisoners of our own traditional and appropriate
concern for individual rights, unable -- or unwilling -- to apply the concept
of reasonableness explicit in the Fourth Amendment in order to develop a
rational accommodation between those rights and the literal S<'ifety of the
country.
Given today' s decisions it would appear that, absent legislative
action, nothing less than a massive force of guards could adequately protect

2/
our southern border.

To establish hundreds of checkpoints with enlarged

border forces so as to stop literally every car and pedestrian at every border
checkpoint, however, would doubtless impede the flow of commerce and
travel between this country and Mexico.

Moreover, it is uncertain whether

stringent penalties for employment of illegal aliens, and rigid requirements
for proof of legal entry before employment, would help solve the problem, but
that remedy has not been tried.
I would hope that when we next deal with this problem we give greater
weight to the reality that the Fourth Amendment prohibits only "unreasonable
searches and seizures" and to the frequent admonition that reasonableness
must take into account all the circumstances and balance the rights of the

2/
For example, testimony in the Baca hearings revealed that a complement of 21, 000 officers would be needed to control adequately the 75 miles
of border in the El Centro sector alone.

"

..

- 3 -

individual with the needs of society.

See,

~·,

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1

(1968); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); United States v. Biswell,
406

u.s.

311 (1972).

!9PPE!ID!X
THE ILLEGAL ALIEN PROBLEM
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The United St.Aies Hnougb JegisJahve adion ba s determined that it is in tbe best interests of tbe nabon
to Jimit tl1e number of persons who can JegaJJy immigJ·ate into tbe co1mtry in any gi\'en year. These eontro]s
r-eflect in part a Congressional intent to prot.ed tbe
Americ-an labor market from an influx of foni_L,TJ.l
Jaho_t. K a.?·nntlt v. United States) 279 U.S. 231 (J 9~9);
~ 201 (h) of the ImmigmHon and X at?" anality Act of
1952) 66 Stat. J 63, as amended by tbe Act of Oc·tober 3, J965, 79 Stat. 911, 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (a).
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Under this policy of limited admission, 385,685
new immigrants entered the United States legally
during fiscal year 1972. Since July 1, 1968, the law
has established an annual quota of 120,000 personsfor the independent countries of the vY estern Hemisphere. Included within this · quota are immigrantsfrom the Republic of Mexico who in fiscal year 1972:
totalled 64,040. 1972 Annual Report, Immigrat£on ani£
Natural£zation Service, p. 2.
Currently illegal aliens are in residence within the
United States in numbers which, ''"bile not susceptible
of exact measurement, are estimated to be in the vicinity of 800,000 to over one million. Department of
Justice, Special Study Group on Illegal Immigrants
from :Mexico, A Progra1n for Eft ective And Humane
Action on Illegal Jlfexican Immigrants, 6 (1973),
[hereinafter cited as Crantton Rpt. J.
Of these illegal aliens, approximately 85 pe1·cent
axe citizens of Mexico. Cramton Rpt. at 6. They
are indnsh-ious, proud and hard-worbng people who
enter this country for the purpose of earning wages,
accumulating savings, and returning or sending their
savings home to :Mexico.
Since 1970, the number of illegal 1fexican aliens in
the United States who have been apprehended has
been grovv--ing at a rate in excess of 20 percent per
year. Cramton Rpt. at 6.
'rhe increasingly large numbers of .l\1exican · nationals seeking to illegally enter tbis country reflects
the substantial unemployment and underemployment
in :Mexico-fueled by one of the highest birth rates
in the world. lvioreover, .l\1.exican employment statistics are not likely to improve dramatically since fully
45 percent of .1\fexico's population is under 15 years
of age and, therefore, will soon be attempting to enter
the labor market.

'

.

Further prompting J\Iexiean nationals to seek rmpJo:y-mrnt in the UnitPd States is the fact that t1wre
is a signinc:mt disparity in wage rates het\'i'een this
country and Mexic-o. In 1\Iexicali and Tijnana, both
J\frxiran cities bordering the Sonthern District and
eac·h IYith a popnlntion in ex<~ess of 400,000, the average daj)y IYage is about $3.40 per dny. The minimum
wage is even )ower for workers in the interior of
:Mexico. Tlw nver3ge IYOJ·ker in Mexico, assuming he
(~an find IYOrk, ea111s in a dav as mueh as he can make
in only a few lJOurs in the United States.
In addition, it is estimated that the. per capita
iJ1<·ome of the pom·est 40 perc.-.ent of tl1e :Mexic:an population, the strata most likely to leave their homeland in search of a better life in tbe United States, is
less than $150 per year.
The manpower needs of the United States generated by \\TorJd \Yar II resulted in many J\fexicans
heing imported into this country and bec-oming familial' with employment opportunities and p1·actlces in
fbe rnited States. See Diaz v. K ay-Dix Ranch, 9 Cal.
App. 3d 595 (1970).
TJJe opportunities aYailable to J\fexiean aliens l1ave
traditionally been in ag6cnlture. While still true in
man~T parts of the United States Southwest, in recent
years the pattern has changed and more and more
illegal aliens are obtaining employment in service and
manufacturing sectors of our ec·onomy. These aliens
m·e increasingly found in \irhwlly all regions of the
colmtry and in all segments of the economy. State ·
Socjal Welfare Board, Issu.e: AlZ:ens in Cali[on2ia., 12
(1973) [Hereinafter cited as Al£ens in California.].
The lJatu:re of the ·change in employment opportunities al'ailable is demonstrated by one estimate that
250,000 iHegal aliens are employed jn Los Angeles
County where agricultural opportunities m·e known
~

.

to be limited. I-I ea·r ings on Jllpgal Aliens Before Subcomrn. 1 of the I-I ouse ComnL on the Judicim·.IJ, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 208 (1971) [Hereinafter
citrd as Hearings on Illegal AlieHs].
Other estimates of the impact of illegal alien:- in
California suggest that in 1971, when 59:),000 Californians " ·ere tmemployed (7.4 percent of the State:s
labor force), there \vere between 200,000 and 300,000
illegal aliens employed in California earning approximately $100 million in \Vages. I-I earZ:ngs on Illegal
Aliens at 150.
Since the majority of Mexicans are nnskmed or ]ow
skilled workers they tend to compete with ~:fexi.can
Americans, blaeks, Indians, and other minority groups
\"rho, dne to tl1e declining percentage of johs requiring
]ow or no skills, are finding it increasingly difficnlt
to obtain gainful employment. Cramton Rpt. at 12.
Illegal aliens compete for jobs \Yith persons leg·ally
residing in the United States \vho m·e unskilled and
uneducated and who form that very group ·which onr
society is trying to pro-vide with a fair share of America's prosperity.
In addition, illegal aliens tend to perpetuate poor
economic conditions b.v frnstrnting nnionization, esprcially in snch occupations as farm work.
Illegal alienf> pose a potential health hazard to the
romnmnity sinee many seek wol'k as nnrsemairls, food
handlers, cooks, honsekeepers, waiters, dish\\'aslwrs,
an cl gro<:ery workers. I mm igra tion and n1f'dical officials in Los Angeles, for example, haYe clisco>t>recl
that the illegal alien population in Los Ang·eles' barrio is infeded with a high incidence of typhoid, dysentery, tnbercnlosis, tape\Yorms, Yenereal disease and
hepatitis. L.A. Times, Sept. 16, 1973, pt. II, at 1.
In some states illegal aliens abuse public assistan(·p.
programs. In some instances entire families \Ybo en-

'

~
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tered the eonntry megally 1Ja\·e been admitted to tbe
l\·eJfm·e rolls. Aliens £n Cohjon2ia at 35, 43 .
.Another aspect of the problem c1·eated by iJJegal
aliens is that employed ahens tend to send a substantial portion of their earnings to relatives or friends in
J\fexico. This outflow of United States dolJars exaeerbates onr balanee of payments problem to the extent
of $1 hiJlion a year. H ean·ngs on Illegal Aliens, pt. 3
at 683.
The net effect of this silent i1n-asion of illegal aliens
fJ·om Mexico is suffering by the aliens who are frequently Yictims of extortion, -.;-:iolence and sharp practices, displacement of .Amerie.an citizens and legally
Tesiding aliens from the labor market, and irritation
between two neigbboring countries.
THE LAW ENFORCEMENT PROBLEM

GiYen that iJJegal ahens are a significant problem
:in .American life, especially for those minority groups
wbo are described as economically deprived, and that
Congress has decreed that all but a relatively fe,v
aliens a1·e to be permanently excluded, tben we nmst
analyze \Yhat Jaw enforcement problems exist. In this
Tegard, the follO\ving :findings of fact are made:
The illegal ahen problem is one found primarily in
tbe Southwestern R.egion of the United States.
This problem along the J\fexican-.American border
bas existed for some time with the original responsibihty for securing the integrity of the border being
assigned to the U.S . .Army, along mth the Departments of Treasury and Labor, who had about 20,000
men assigned to tbe border bet\\een Browns\-:ille,
Texas, and San Diego, California, in 1920. National
Geogmphic 1Jfagaz1:ne, ".Along Our Side of the J\fexican Border" (July 1920).

..

Currently the burden of controlling the entry of
aliens and stemming the flow of ilJegal aliens along
the Mexican-American border is assigned to the INS.
This border extends for almost 2,000 miles from the
Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Coast.
Along this border there were over 152 million legal
entries at authorized ports of entry during fiscal 1972,
of \vhich over 91 million were made by aliens, with
over 39 million legal entries being made at the three
ports of entry in Southern California (Calexico, San
Ysidro and Tecate) of which over 24 million were
made by aliens. Immigration and Naturalization
Senice, 1.1J7.? Annual Repo-rt, 2f5.
Of these entries made by aliens, the huge portion
\Yf>re made by visitors with official permission to enter
the country who had been issued temporary "border
passes" such as I -186 cards (1 ssued to resident~ of
Mrxico), which authorize the holder to travel within
:m area no fnrther than 25 miles from the border and
for a period of time not to exceed 72 hours. See
8 C.F.R. § 212.6.
These temporary border passes (I-186) are issued
to simplify procedures needed for entry, and the
issuing process recognizes the inter-relationship of
contiguous communities along both sides of the border.
Hearings on IllP.gal Aliens, pt. 1, 192.
In fiscal1973 approximately 208,000 I-186 cards \vere
issned and it is egtimated that over two million such
c·arcls are currently in circulation. Hearings on IllPgal
..·iliPnS, pt. 1, 173.
\\~ithin the INS, the F.S. Border Patrol, which
was first established in 1924, has the primary flmction
of preventing the illegal entry of aliens and the
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The notation "IKS'' when used hen'in has reference to
the Immigration and Katuralizntion Sen·ice.
1
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apprehension of those who have entered illegally and
those wbo smuggle these iJJegal entrants.
The Border Patrol has approximately 1,700 agents,
who are weJJ-trained Jmv enforcement officers, and of
these abont 80 percent are assigned along our sontbern
border with Mexico.
A "deportable Rlien" is a person who has been
fonnd to be deportable hy an immig1·abon judge, or
\Yho :-~dmits his deportability 11pon quesboning by
official agents.
Tbe nnmber of drportnble aliens apprehended by
tl1e Bm·der Patrol (\Yhich makes the grent majority
of app1·ehensions) nationaJJy lws g1·0\'il.l from 38,861
during fiscal 19o3 to 498,123 in fiscal 1973; of this
mm1her 128,889 "·ere fonnd by Border Patrol agents
working in the Chnla Vista sector wbieh inch1des
70 -miles ·of the border in San Diego County, and
23,125 were ]orated by :1gents in the El Cenb·o sector
IYhich includes the Imperial County of California and
75 miles of the Mexiean-AmerieRn b01·der.
TJw Bm·der Patrol agents h<we the power to apprehend ilJegal aliens since by regulation tl1e Attorney
Ge11eJ·aJ has drsignated Border Pahol agents to be
immig1·ation. office1·s and authorized them to exercise
powers and dntifs as snch office1·s [8 C.F.R. § 103.1
(i)]; innni gration officers baYf bet>n giYr.n certain
functions by statute ~ 101(a) (17) of thC' Inunigration
and J\Tationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. J63: as amend(:)d
by tbe Act of October 3, 1973, 79. Stat. 911, 8 r.S.C.
§ 1101(a) (17), which provides that an of:fic~r of the
INS shall l1ave the power, without a warrant, to 'Stop
and :interrogate any alien or person believed to ·be an
aben as to his right to -remain. or to be in the United
Statt>s. St>e Au Y£ Lan v. I.N.S., 445 F. 2d 217 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), cert. de1}1:Pd, 404 _
u.s. 864.
Sec. 287(a) (3) of the 19.52 ' Immjgration Art ·includes authority for an inunigration officer within a

.... .,.,
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reasonable distance from the border of the United
States to hoard and search any conveyance or vehicle;
"1·easonable distance~~ as used in that sed.i.on of the
Act means within 100 air miles from any external
boundary of the United States, 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(b).
Immigration officers also are authorized to conduct
inspection of aliens seeking admission or readmission
to, or the privilege of passing through, the United
States, and also are authorized and impowered to
boar·d and search any vehicle or like conveyance in
which they believe aliens are being brought into the
United States. Sec. 235 (a) of the 1952 Immigration
.Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1525(a).
The deployment of Border Patrol agents along the
border is intended to maximize the effectiYeness of the
limited number of personnel, '''ith the first line of
defense being called the "line watch." The line watch
consists of agents being placed immediately upon the
physical boundary where experience has shown that
large numbers of ilJPgal aliens can be detected attempting entry. A large number of agents so assigned
are primarily concerned with responding to sensor
a l anus (electronic detection eqni pment) which are
located at stratf'gic positions. These <:1gents also re~pond to citizen c-omplaints conc·erning the snspected
presence of deportable' aliens.
In fiscal 1973, there \Yere 175,511 deportable aliens
apprehended thronghont thf' nation by agents assigned
to the line '\Yatch, '\Yith 69,147 being apprcbended in
the Chula Vista sector and 5,908 in the El Centro
sector.
While the Border Patrol would like to apprehend
all deportable aliens right on the border by agents
on the line watch, inspeetions at regular points of
entry are not infallible and illegal crossings at other
than legal ports of entry are numerous and recurring
with the maintenance of continnons patrol over these
5fl~- 268-- 74 ---- ~

!

...-ast f=-hetches of the border in Southern California
being physically impossible, for tl1e approximately
145 miles of boundary creates pb?sical barrjers to
effective patrol and man-made de-rites such as fences
and electronic devices are in large part ineffective.
Increased manpower on line watch would not make
that acti,-rity appreciably more effecti...-c as vi·as demonshated in 1969 dnring "Operation Intercept" wherein
many more agents "'IYere stationed immediately on the
hm·der, and yet, the number of i118gal aliens apprehended by agents operating inland was not signifie~mtly diffeJ·ent from like periods when sucb additional manJW\ver was not loeated at the boundary.
Once the aliens negotiate their \Yay through tl1e
port of entry or walk nrross tbe bm·der at a place
other than an offkial port of entry, tbey find transportation inland either in public conveyances, or
private vehicles "'lvith increasing numbers being transpOl-ted by professional smugglers. A few ha-re been
kno,vn to '"alk some distance inland and be apprehended after ba-ring walked ns fm· north as Julian,
Califo1·nia, which is over 60 miles hom the border.
After CTossing the Jine ,,·atch some illegal aliens
seek employment in the Soutbern District, but the.
...-ast m::ljority attempt to proceed to Los Angeles
County and further north,Yard.
Once the ilJegnl alien gets settled in a big city far
away from the border it becomes very difficult to
apprehend him, and, the1·efore, the Border Patrol
attempts to eontaiD the jlJegal entnmt ''ithin this
district. Ahens in California at 7. \Yith this objer.ti1e
in mind, they ha·ve (pursuant to their statnt.ory authority discussed above) estC~bhsbed, since at least
1927, strategically located traffic inspection faciht.ies,
commonly referred to as checkpoints, on higlnYays and
ro::lds, for the purpose of questioning vehicle occupants beljeved to be ahens, as to their right to be, or

•.
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to remain, in the united States, and also to search
such vehicles for aliens illegally therein. ImmigTation
and N atnralization SerTice, Bouler Patr-ol Handbook 9- 1 (197:2) [hereinafter cited as Handbook].
The pr·imary objective of tbe checkpoints is to intercept vehicles or com·eyances transporting illegal
aliens, or nonresident aliens admitted with temporary
border passing cards (Form I-186), with particular
attention being paid to vehicles operated by smugglers or transporters destined for the interior in violation of 8 U .S.C. § 1334.
The selection of the location of a checkpoint is determined by factors relevant to the interdiction or
intereeption of deportable aliens who have succeeded
in gaining entry in an un]awfnl manner or are proceeding beyond the immediate border area in violation
of conditions of their admission as border crossers,
8 C.F.R. § 213.60. The primary factors in selecting a
checkpoint site are:
1. A location on a highway just beyond the confluence of two or more roads from the border, in order
to permit the checking of a large volume of traffic
with a minimum number of officers. This also avoids
the inconvenience of repeated checking of comnmter
or urban traffic which wonlcl occuT if the sites were
operated on the nctv.-ork of roads leading from and
through the more populated areas near the border.
2. Terrain and topography that restrict passage of
vchic:Jcs aronml the checkpoint, snch as mountains,
desert, and as in the case of the San Clemente cbeckpoint, the Camp Pendleton Marine Base.
3. Safety factors: an unobstructed view of oncoming traffic, to provide a safe distance for slo\Ying
and stopping; parking space off the highway; power
source to illuminate control signs and inspection area,
and bypass capability for vehicles not requiring
examination.

- --- -·--
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4. Due to the travel restrictjons of the J1'orm I-186
nmnesident border crosser to an area 25 miles from
tl1e bm·der (unless issued additional documentation)
the checkpoints, as a geDeral rule, are located at a
point beyond tl1e 25 mile zone in order to control tl1e
nnlav;rfuJ movement into the interior of snch -.;-isitors,
H anrluoolL.
StJ-ategic sites tlwt meet the fm·rgoing em1merntf'd
c-.1·iteria are selected for "pe1111anent cl1eckpoints."
These :ne sitrs e(}nipped to handle a lm·ge volume of
haffic on what \VonJd be n 24-hour hasis exeept in
("ase of mnnpm-...'er shortage, poor \Veather, or where
haffic brc·omes excessive eausing a potentia] safety
haza1·d. H andlJook nt 9-3.
Other haffic cl1eckpoints, kno\Yn as "temporary
checkpoints" m·e maintained on roads wl1ere traffic is
Jess frequent. The placement of these sites \Yill be
governed by the same safety factors as inYolved in
permanent site placement and are nsnalJy loc·.ated
\Yl1eJ·e the terrain allows an element of surprise. Opnations at these temporary cl1eckpoints an~ set np at
in·egnlar intervals and intermittently so as to confnse
tlw potential violator. H a.ndbook at 9-3.
\?\~hen the cbec·kpoints, vdwther permanent or temIJOrary, m·e in operation, an officer standing at the
"point" in fnJl d1·ess unifonn on the bigbway will
1iew the decelerating oncoming vel1icles and their passengers, and \\'ill Yisnally det.en11ine whetber he has
1·ea~on to believe the oc·cnJJants of the Yehicle are
aliens (i.e., "breaks the pattern" of usnal traffic). If
so, the vehicle w-ill be stopped (if the traffic at the
checkpoint is beaYy, as at the San Clemente checkpoint, the Yehicle wiJl be actually directed off the
highv;'ay) for inqlJiries to be made by the agent. If
the agent does not have reason to bebeve tbat the
Yel1icJe app1·oar:hing the checkpoint is carrying aliens,
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he may exchange salutations, or merely waYe the vehicle through the checkpoint.
If, after questioning the occupants, the agent then
believes that illegal aliens may be secreted in the
vehicle (because of a break in the "pattern" indicating the possibility of smuggling) he will inspect the
vehicle by giving a cursory visual inspection of those
areas of the -v-ehicle not ·v isible from the outside (i.e.
trunk, interior portion of camper, etc.).
At the point of location of the sites now in regular
use few aliens have reached the locale on foot, v;ith
99% having entered a Yehicle of one type or another. Approximately 12% of all apprehensions of deportable aliens throughout the nation are made at
checkpoints.
In the United States, during fiscal 1973, approximately 55,300 deportable aliens were apprehended hy
Border Patrol agents v;orking traffic checking opel·ations. In the Chula Vista sector the number fo1· that
period was 21,232, while in the El Centro sector the
total was 3,825.' During fiscal 1973, a total of 4,975
of the above were visitors apprehended at the checkpoints and a majority of these were tbose 1vho 1-rere
in violation of the terms of temporary border passes
(Form I-186).
The placement of the checkpoi11ts and their operations are coordinated between the two sectors located
in this district and with Border Patrol activities to
the east in Arizona. In actual operation the checkpoints,
be they "permanent" or "temporary," have the same
basic accou~tel'ments. Typically, about one-half mile to
one mile south of the checkpoint is the first notificaApparently apprehensions other than those actually made at
the checkpoint are included in these figUI·es, but they are a
representation of the total activity at these checkpoints and
the majority of apprehensions included therein are made at the
checkpoints [R. T. 274, 396].
2
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tion that the (·l1rekpoint is ahead. The notice is in the
form of a black on yello\v sign indicating "STOP
AHEAD" v•hich has :Aoodhgbts for njghttime illumination, H andl.Jook at 9- 9. Next, about 200 yards from
the checkpoint is another sign eantioning the traffic
to slow do\Yn or to be careful; tl1is sign usnally bas
flashing yellO\v Jjghts attached. For the fift-y ym·ds
directly solJth of the checkpoint there are placed
trafnc eones evenly spaeed along each side of the
higlnYay. The act.nal checkpoint bas a sign indjcating
to the traffic to stop, 'lrith official Border Patrol vehicles parked on r.ach side of the stop zone showing
the official Border Patrol emblem and/or the desjgnation U.S. OFFICERS. At this point the agents assigned at the "point," in their official uniform, conduct checking and inspection operations. Be:vond the
checkpoint is usually a sign indicating "THANK
YOU."
\Yhile a large number of app1·eJJensions are made
at the cbeckpoints each year, as related above, the
primary 1·eason for t.l1e.ir operation is that they effec·bYely deter large numbers of aliens from illegally
entering the cmmtry or violating the terms of any
temporary crossjng card they may have, because tl1ey
form an effechve obstacle and are located on all major
rontes north out of the bOl'der region.
The detenence aspect of tbese traffic checkpoint
open1tions is amply demo11strated by the fact that the
illegal alien bas to resort to the emplo:r-ment of professional smugglers to proYide transportation aronnd
or tlnougb these checkDoints.
Some of these smuggling operations have de1eloped
into sophisticated and inYolved operations with the
following general modus operandi:
1. Contact is made between the smnggler and the
ahen prior to the latter's leanng :11:exico.

" The aliens then make entry on foot, with possibly
the aiel of a "guide," or by nse of temporary border
passes. Then they enter Yehirles approximately 2 or
20 miles inland after ha\·ing passed through the
Border Patrol's line watch activities.
3. To get through the traffic checkpoint they might
use a "drop house," which acts as a staging area to
keep the aliens m...-aiting inclement weather, or any
event that might cause the checkpoint to close dO\v'TI
temporarily. Or, they may use a "decoy" vehic-le,
\Yhich is a vehicle loaded ·with illegal aliens which it is
anticipated \Yill be stopped at the checkpoint and
\YOnlcl therefore OCCHpy the agents SO that other vehicles could pass through vvithont inspection. They
even use "scout cars" to probe those roads where
temporary checkpoints are maintained, so as to advise
other -.;· ehicles \vhether it is safe to proceed.
±. The "load" vehicles themseh·es can be of any
type of con,·eyance and the methods used to secret
aliens inside them are varied and often show some
originality. Unfortunately, sometimes these are very
dangerous to the aliens themselves, for it has been
reported that it is not at all unusual for an alien to
die from asphyxiation while concealed in an automobile trnnk or a tank car.
5. The cost of the transportation provided to the
aliens is approximately $225 to $250 for each alien
for the trip through the checkpoint on to the Los
Angeles area. Since smuggling operations are almost
exclusively "cash and carry" businesses and the average income among :Mexican nationals who may wish
to seek residence here illegally is qnite small, then this
cost tends to act as a -.;eery significant detenent in and
of itself. The checkpoints are the major reason for
· snch a high price and if they \Vel:e discontinued for
an~- len_
d h of time it would be one more enconragement to illegal immigration .
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The deterrent impact of tl1ese checkpoints J1ns hern
noted on several oceasions wben tbey rr.smned operation nnexpectedly and a great number of aliens " 'C>J'e
apprebenJed.
The evidence presented before tbis c-.o11rt r:Jenrly
establishes that tJ1ere is 110 reasonable or e.ffedin'
alternative metbods of deteetion and apprrhension
aYnilable to the Bm·der Patrol, in tJw ahsrJ1(·.e of tlw
(·hrckpoints for Pl'r.n a gPometric inen~ase in its personnel or hne vi·atc:h would not Jr.aYe any rontrol oYer
those admitted as temporary Yisitoi·s from Mexieo.
Of tbe approxim.ateJy l1alf miJlion illegal alirns
apprehendt>d in fiseal 1973, virtnaJ1y none \Yere prosernted, 11nless they presented co1mtPrfeit or altered
dor.uments or aided in smngp;ling- endea-rors.
This district has only 3<;'o of the totnl ]pngth of land
hm·ders, and yet, fully 307o of all apprel1tmsiom:. of
clPportahle. aliens made in tJ1e United States are mn.de
''ithin this district.
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